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As presently construed, the Constitution does not prohibit the 
death penalty.1 The states2 and the federal government3 may punish 
I. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976); 
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976). The Supreme Court's eighth amendment jurispru• 
dence would permit reconsideration of the constitutional question should society reject capital 
punishment in the future. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see generally Radin, Tire Jurisprudence of Oeath: Evolving Standards/or 
the Cruel and UntlSllal Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978). 
2. Thirty-six states had capital punishment laws in effect as of December 31, 1981. 
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEATH-Row PRISONERS 1981, 2-3 (1982) 
[hereinafter referred to as DEATH-Row PRisONERS 1981). E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 
(West 1982); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1979); TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 37.071 
(Vernon 1981). For a compilation of state death penalty statutes, see Gillers, Oeclding Who 
Oies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. I, 101-19 (1980) (App. I). At the end of 1981, a record high of 838 
persons were being held under sentence of death in state prisons. DEATH-Row PRISONERS 
1981 at I. 
3. A number ciffederal statutes impose the death penalty, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1976); 49 
U.S.C. § 1472(i)(l)(B) (1979), although their constitutionality is in doubt. No federal prisoners 
are currently under sentence of death, with the exception of four inmates held under Armed 
Forces jurisdiction in accordance with the capital provisions of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice. DEATH-ROW PRisONERS 1981, supra note 2 at 2. 
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the commission of certain crimes4 with death, so long as the extreme 
penalty is not imposed on a mandatory basis5 and so long as the 
procedures used in imposing a death sentence meet constitutional 
scrutiny.6 
One such procedure - subjected to constitutional scrutiny since 
19687 - is the means by which a capital jury is selected. Capital 
jury selection practices, and the composition of capital juries they 
produce, have taken on added importance in recent years. In its 
1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,8 the Supreme Court invalidated 
capital punishment statutes leaving the life or death decision to the 
unfettered discretion of the jury, in view of the high potential for 
arbitrary and discriminatory application of the penalty. In response 
to Furman, however, thirty-five states and the federal government 
enacted new death penalty statutes, typically attempting to channel 
capital sentencing discretion by specifying aggravating and mitigat-
ing standards.9 This response led the Court in 1976 to reject the 
contention that capital punishment did not reflect "the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," the 
4. The eighth amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments limits the abil-
ity of legislatures to impose death for certain crimes where the penalty would be dispropor-
tionate to the offense. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. S84, S99-600 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(unconstitutional for crime of rape of adult woman); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1039 (1982) (unconstitutional for crime of rape of child under 
12). In fact homicide may be the only crime for which death may be imposed under the eighth 
amendment, and not all homicides will pass muster. See Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 
(1982) (unconstitutional to impose death for conviction for felony murder when defendant 
,neither committed the murder himself, attempted to do so, nor intended to take life); Com-
ment, The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty for Felony Murder, lS Hous. L. R.Ev. 
3S6 (1978). 
S. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam) (unconstitutional to require 
death penalty for intentional killing of a firefighter or peace officer engaged in performance of 
duties); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("the fundamental respect for 
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitu-
tionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."); Roberts v. Loui-
siana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). The Court has reserved the question whether mandatory death 
laws are permissible in the limited circumstance of a prisoner or escapee serving a life sentence 
who ·commits murder. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. S86, 604 n.11 (1976) (plurality opinion); 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. at 637 n.S; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 n.9 (1976) 
(plurality opinion). 
6. E.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 
(1981); Estelle v. Smith, 4S1 U.S. 454 (1981); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 9S (1979) (per curiam); Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. S86 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Davis 
v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. S10 (1968). 
The Court recently reiterated its "insistence that capital punishment be imposed fairly, and 
with reasonable consistency, or not at all." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. at 87S. 
7. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. S10 (1968); see text accompanying notes 118-133 iefra. 
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
9. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1S3, 179-80 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
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Court's traditional standard for applying the eighth amendment's 
ban on cruel and unusual punishments. 10 In so doing the Court re-
lied not only on the actions of legislatures in revealing the society's 
standards of decency, but also stressed the conduct of capital juries, 
acting as reflectors of community sentiments on 'the death penalty 
question. Noting that some 460 death sentences were imposed in less 
than four years following Furman, 11 the Court found that these jury 
determinations serve as "a significant and reliable objective index of 
contemporary values,"12 and indicated that the community had not 
rejected the death penalty as an appropriate punishment. At the 
same time, the Court rejected as cruel and unusual statutes mandat-
ing the death penalty for conviction of certain crimes, relying on the 
reluctance of American juries to convict a significant portion of those 
charged under such mandatory statutes as indicating a repudiation 
of automatic death sentences.13 
The compromise struck by the Supreme Court thus has left the 
hard questions involved in imposing the death penalty to the jury 
room. 14 The composition of the capital jury is therefore crucial to 
the fairness of the death penalty and to its continuing constitutional 
validity as a method of punishment. A central premise underlying 
the Court's decision to uphold capital punishment is that capital ju-
ries reflect the standards of decency of the community on the crucial 
life or death question.15 There is substantial doubt, however, about 
10. 428 U.S. at 173, quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
11. 428 U.S. at 182. 
12. 428 U.S. at 181. For similar expressions concerning the importance of jury determina-
tions in assessing the constitutionality of capital punishment, see Erunund v. Florida, 102 S. 
Ct. 3368, 3375-76 (1982); 102 S. Ct at 3386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., 
Powell, & Rehnquist, JJ.); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280,293 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972) 
(Brennan, J., concurring); 498 U.S. at 386 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 498 U.S. at 439-40 
(Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, & Rehnquist, JJ.). 
13. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976). See also Enmund v. Florida, 
102 S. Ct. at 3375-76 (finding that the eighth amendment was violated by a statute authorizing 
capital punishment for felony murder where defendant did not co=it the homicide, attempt 
to kill, or intend that the killing take place supported by evidence that "American juries have 
repudiated imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as" these); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. at 596-97 (finding that eighth amendment was violated by statute authorizing capital 
- punishment for rape supported by ''the response of juries reflected by their sentencing deci-
sions," declining to impose the death penalty in at least 90% of the rape convictions in Georgia 
since 1973). 
14. Although jury sentencing in capital cases is prevalent, a minority of states permit the 
judge to decide the de;ith penalty question. See Gillers, supra note 2, at 14, 101-19 (App. I). 
Professor Gillers has argued that the Constitution requires that a capital defendant be sen-
tenced by a jury, unless waived. Id. at 39-74. The Supreme Court has never resolved this 
question. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 609 n.16 (1978). 
15. See note 12 supra. 
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the accuracy of this underlying premise. Many criminal defense at-
torneys believe that prosecutors seek to prevent persons who are gen-
erally or even vaguely opposed to the death penalty from serving on 
capital juries. Although the Supreme Court in its 1968 decision in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois 16 limited the prosecutor's ability to use the 
challenge for cause for this purpose, it is commonly believed that the 
practice continues through use of the peremptory challenge.17 
If prosecutors do engage in such a practice, several constitutional 
issues are raised. The systematic exclusion of jurors generally op-
posed to the death penalty by prosecutorial use of the peremptory 
challenge may violate a defendant's due process right to an impartial 
jury in the determination of sentence or in the determination of 
guilt. 18 In addition, if opponents of the death penalty in the commu-
nity involved are sufficiently numerous and distinctive to comprise a 
"cognizable class," the practice may also violate the sixth amend-
ment fair cross-section_ requirement. 19 Perhaps the overriding con-
cern is with the ability of capital juries to reflect accurately the 
standards of decency of the comm~ty without which the eighth 
amendment prohibits the death penalty.20 
A demonstration that the prosecutor used the peremptory chal-
lenge in the manner described in a single case probably wouid be 
insufficient to support a constitutional challenge in the federal courts 
and in the vast majority of state courts. In these courts a prosecutor's 
use of the peremptory in a single case is generally beyond review.21 
To raise a constitutional challenge, a defendant may have to show a 
systematic pattern in the use of peremptories by prosecutors over a 
16. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
17. See Gillers, supra note 2, at 85 n.391; People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal. 3d 425, 438 n.9, 606 
P.2d 341, 348 n.9, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 n.9 (1979) (quoting prosecutor's statement at voir 
dire concerning a venireperson who had expressed opposition to the death penalty, that "if she 
were not a challenge for cause, I would kick her off on a peremptory challenge."); In re Ander-
son, 69 Cal. 2d 613,619,447 P.2d 117, 121, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 25 (1968) (''The Attorney General 
asserts that since the chances of a jury's being able to determine the penalty impartially are 
diminished if the jury contains even one person who is hostile to, or has reservations concern-
ing, the death penalty, it may be assumed that, if the challenges for cause had not been avail-
able, the prosecutor would have excluded the veniremen in question by way of peremptory 
challenge . . . ."). · 
IS. See notes 116-205 infra and accompanying text. 
19. See notes 205-309 infra and accompanying text. The class of opponents of the death 
penalty would constitute all with scruples against capital punishment, whether removed for 
cause or by peremptory challenge. 
20. See notes 310-27 infra and accompanying text. 
21. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); see text accompanying notes 30-36 infra. 
For the minority view, see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 
(1978); see notes 38, 40-44 infra and accompanying text. 
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significant number of cases,22 including the removal of at least one 
juror opposed to the death penalty in the defendant's own case.23 
To determine whether this practice by prosecutors does in fact 
exist, the author conducted a study of capital jury selection in Flor-
ida's Fourth Judicial Circuit. After presenting the results of that 
study, this Article analyzes the constitutional issues raised by the 
data, and proposes restructuring the voir dire in capital cases to pre-
vent abuse of the peremptory challenge. 
Part II of this Article reviews the limits on the prosecutor's use of 
the peremptory challenge. Although a strong presumption favors 
the propriety and nonreviewability of the peremptory, a showing of 
a consistent pattern of behavior with no apparent constitutional jus-
tification can overcome this presumption. Where the government's 
use of the peremptory reflects a systematic pattern inimical to consti-
tutional values, the jury selection process contravenes the due pro-
cess of law guaranteed to the def end ant by the fourteenth 
amendment. Part III presents the results of a study which reveals 
both a systematic use of prosecution peremptory challenges against 
death-scrupled jurors and their resulting underrepresentation on ju-
ries actually selected. Part IV argues that the use of peremptory 
challenges to eliminate potential jurors opposed to the death penalty 
offends due process and sixth and eighth amendment values. Part V 
argues that a restructured voir dire could cure the constitutional in-
firmities of unfettered prosecutorial peremptory challenges in capital 
cases. This reform would eliminate the possibility of constitutionally 
objectionable use of the peremptory challenge while preserving the 
state's interest in the nonreviewability of its peremptory challenges 
and in excluding jurors within the existing standards for challenges 
for cause. 
II. RESTRICTING THE PROSECUTOR'S USE OF THE 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
The peremptory challenge, although not constitutionally re-
quired, 24 has a long history as a "necessary part of trial by jury."25 A 
22. 380 U.S. at 223. 
23. Absent the removal of at least one such juror in his case, any pattern shown would not 
have harmed the defendant, and he would lack standing to assert either his own rights or those 
of the excluded class. 
24. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219, citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. S83, 586 
(1919). But see Babcock, Voir .Dire: Preserving "Its Wondeiful Power," 21 STAN. L. REV. 545, 
555-56 (1975). 
25. 380 U.S. at 205. Peremptories were historically used by defendants to eliminate jurors 
thought to be biased against them. See 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •353. Peremptory 
November 1982) Peremptory Challenges in Capital Cases 7 
major purpose of the peremptory challenge is to eliminate bias 
which does not fall within the narrow criteria necessary to sustain a 
challenge for cause.26 The peremptory challenge is "frequently exer-
cised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to.legal proceedings or 
official action, namely the race, religion, nationality, occupation or 
affiliations of people summoned for jury duty."27 A second purpose 
is to remove counsel's reluctance to offend venirepersons during 
questioning relating to challenges for cause that might not ultimately 
be allowed.28 Close judicial scrutiny of the prosecutor's use of the 
peremptory challenge in a single case might limit the utility of the 
device, since uncertainty as to its availability would undermine its 
salutary effect of encouraging vigorous voir dire examination.29 In 
challenges by the prosecution have not always been permitted and were the subject of debate. 
See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REP-
RESENTATIVE JURIES 139-50 (1977). By the beginning of this century, the prosecution had 
firmly established both the right to exercise peremptories and the ability to use them to elimi-
nate entire races or classes of people. Id. at 150; see Babcock, supra note 24, at 551 n.20. 
The Court in Swain acknowledged the differences in the history of the defendants' and the 
prosecutors' right to peremptory challenges, but noted that the American jury system should 
guarantee "'not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice 
against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.'" Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. at 220, quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). But see J. VAN 
DYKE, supra at 140-57, 167; Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint far the 
Perpetuation of the All-Wlzite Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1170-73 (1966). 
26. The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both 
sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on 
the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise . . . . Although histori-
cally the incidence of the prosecutor's challenge has differed from that of the accused, the 
view in this country has been that the system should guarantee ''not only freedom from 
any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Be-
tween him and the state the scales are to be evenly held/' . 
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised wi~out a 
reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control .•.. 
While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable 
and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or 
imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable. 
Swain v. Alabama, 320 U.S at 220 (citations omitted). Challenges for cause are restricted to 
eliminating actual bias - an acknowledged prejudicial state of mind - or implied bias, pre-
sumed from the juror's relationships or interests in ways specified by statute. Note, Voir .Dire: 
Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 1493, 1499-501 (1975); see generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 140-69. By con-
trast to the peremptory, the challenge for cause, although each side may make an unlimited 
number, must be approved by the trial judge, and is based on narrow grounds, such as actual 
or presumed specific bias toward a party or witness. See, e.g., H?pt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 
(1887); see ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice - Slandards Relating lo 
Trial by Jury 68-69 (Approved Draft, 1968). · 
27. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 220 (footnote omitted). 
28. 380 U.S. at 220; notes 103-104 iefra and accompanying text. 
29. This assumption underlies the Swain Court's reluctance to find prosecutorial peremp-
tory practice unconstitutional absent compelling proof of a sustained and systematic pattern of 
exclusion. The belief that the peremptory challenge cannot survive judicial supervision, how-
ever, has been expressly rejected by six state courts. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 
P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); People v. Payne, 31 CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA)"2229 (Ill. App., 
May 19, 1982); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 
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Swain v. Alabama,30 however, the Court made it clear that the prose-
cution's use of the peremptory challenge is not totally beyond 
review. 
A. Swain v. Alabama 
Swain presented the Supreme Court with a challenge by a black 
defendant to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to re-
move all black members of the venire. The defendant showed that 
in selecting his jury, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to 
eliminate all six blacks on the jury panel.31 The defendant further 
showed that no black had ever served on a petit jury in Talladega 
County, Alabama since 1950 because those few who were included 
on jury venires were challenged peremptorily or for cause.32 None-
461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 
612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981). 
The cases are discussed more fully at notes 40-44 infra and accompanying text. See also 
Brown, McGuire & Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative .Device in Criminal 
Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 192 (1978); Note, The .Defendant's 
Righi lo Object to Proseculorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 370 
(1979); Comment, People v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenges-A New Interpretation, 14 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 370 (1978); Co=ent, A New Standard far Peremptory Challenges: People v. 
Wheeler, 32 STAN. L. REV. 189 (1979). 
30. 380 u.s 202 (1965). 
31. 380 U.S. at 210. 
32. 380 U.S. at 226. The defendant also challenged the selection of the grand jury and the 
petit jury venire. The defendant produced data showing that while black males constituted 
26% of all males in Talladega County only 10 to 15% of the grand jury and petitjury panels 
were black. The Court rejected the defendant's contention that he had established a prima 
facie violation of equal protection since the burden on the defendant was to show purposeful 
discrimination. Purposeful discrimination, according to the Court, required more than a mere 
showing that blacks were underrepresented by as much as 10%. 380 U.S. at 208,09. Thus, 
although the Court in Swain was willing to accept statistical proof of discriminatory purpose, 
the defendant simply had failed to meet the then-required statistical burden. 
At the time of Swain, a prima facie case of discrimination could be established by demon-
strating a substantial disparity between minority group members in the population and on the 
jury list plus the existence of a selection procedure subject to use for discriminatory ends. E.g., 
Avery v. Georgia, 345,559 (1953). The Court in Swain declined to find the disparity shown to 
be sufficient, and also declined to treat the Alabama selection procedure as involving a dis-
crimination-prone device. 380 U.S. at 207-09. More recent cases have relaxed both aspects of 
the standard. An influential article demonstrated statistically that the disparity in Swain could 
have occurred by chance only in one out of 100 trillion venires, and urged the use of statistical 
decision theory in jury discrimination cases. Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical .Decision 
Theory to the Jury .Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338, 356-58 (1967). The Court soon 
utilized this new statistical tool, C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 455-56 (1980); see, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 
U.S. 625, 630 n.9 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (1967), and it is now the 
accepted method of proving discrimination in jury cases. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482, 494 n.17 (1977). · 
More recent cases have also relaxed the second aspect of the standard so that a selection 
procedure that lends itself to use for discriminatory ends will suffice (in conjunction with a 
substantial disparity) to establish a prima facie case even where the procedure is not facially 
race-focused. Compare Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, and Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 
U.S. 625, with Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, and Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559. Thus 
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theless, the Court rejected this challenge on the basis that the defen-
dant did not make a showing of systematic discrimination by the 
state because he failed to separate blacks challenged peremptorily by 
the prosecution from those challenged by the defense. 
Despite its concern for protecting the exercise of peremptory 
challenges from routine judicial scrutiny, the Court did recognize 
that the challenge was subject to some constitutional restrictions: 
We have decided that it is permissible to insulate from inquiry the re-
moval of Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the 
prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he 
is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular crime 
charged. But when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, 
whatever "the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the de-
fendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes 
who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners 
and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no 
Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim 
takes on added significance. . . . 
[S]uch proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are 
excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of 
the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being 
used to deny the Negro the same right to participate in the administra-
tion of justice enjoyed by the white population.33 
Swain, then, acknowledges that prosecutorial peremptory challenge 
practices are subject to judicial review of their constitutionality, al-
though the facts in that case did not justify the exercise of that 
authority. 
The Court in Swain explicitly discussed only the rights of blacks 
to serve on juries, although other cases have established the right of 
defendants not to have blacks excluded by law from their juries.34 
Castaneda treats Spanish surname visibility, 430 U.S. at 495, and the subjectivity of the key-
man system, 430 U.S. at 497, as suspect although neither is explicable only as a discriminatory 
device. The Court in Swain declined to treat the Alabama version of the key-man system in 
this way. 380 U.S. at 207-09. 
Thus in both respects, the approach of Swain has been eclipsed by more recent equal pro-
tection cases that use statistical decision theory to establish discrimination, and-that treat an 
opportunity to discriminate which is not explicable solely as a discriminatory device as suffi-
cient to trigger the Avery rule. Moreover, if the violation asserted is of the sixth amendment 
fair cross-section requirement, rather than equal protection, no showing of discriminatory pur-
pose is necessary. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368-69 & n.26 (1~79); see notes 294-96 i'!fra 
and accompanying text 
33. 380 U.S. at 223 (dicta). "In these circumstances," the Court noted, "it would appear 
that the purpose of the peremptory challenge is being perverted." Id at 223-24. 
34. E.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). Swain was decided before the sixth amend-
ment was held applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and there- . 
fore representativeness was not in issue. Prior cases had established that it is denial of equal 
protection to try a minority defendant before a jury from which all members of his race have 
been excluded. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Patton v. Mississippi, 332·u.s. 463 
(1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauderv. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
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Whatever rights defendants might have on their own, the Swain de-
cision clearly indicates that the defendant, at least if he can show 
exclusion in his particular trial, would have standing to assert the 
rights of the excluded class of jurors.35 But because the defense, as 
well as the prosecution, participated in the peremptory process, the 
Court held that the defendant had not shown that the under-
representation of blacks was the result of unconstitutional jury selec-
tion procedures by the state.36 
Commentators have severely criticized the Swain decision for im-
posing an impossibly high burden of proof upon defendants seeking 
to challenge a prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge.37 Swain 
seriously restricts the way a defendant can demonstrate that the 
In Swain the Court was less concerned with the equal protection rights of minority defendants, 
380 U.S. at 221-22, but instead was concerned with the rights of blacks to serve as jurors in 
general, 380 U.S. at 324. 
In Peters v. Kiff, three members of the Court based their decision reversing the conviction 
of a white defendant who had been tried by a jury from which blacks had been systematically 
excluded on due process grounds. 407 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas & Stewart, 
JJ.). Three other members of the Court concurred on the basis that 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1976) 
expressed a strong policy against excluding qualified jurors on the basis of race. 407 U.S. at 
507 (White, J.,joined by Brennan & Powell, JJ.). Since the sixth amendment fair cross-section 
requirement has been held applicable to the states, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), 
and since blacks are plainly a cognizable class, their systematic exclusion from juries would 
today be considered a violation of the sixth amendment. 
35. The Court suggests that if the proper showing of a pattern of exclusion were made, the 
case would be sufficiently analogous to the cases cited in note 34 supra (involving other types 
of exclusion by the state) as to warrant reversal. A white defendant could not make the same 
analogy to those prior cases, but since Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, he should have standing to 
assert the Swain claim. 
36. Unlike the selection process, which is wholly in the hands of state officers, defense 
counsel participate in the peremptory challenge system, and indeed generally have a far 
greater role than any officers of the State. It is for this reason that a showing that Negroes 
have not served during a specified period of time does not, absent a sufficient showing of 
the prosecutor's participation, give rise to the inference of systematic discrimination on 
the part of the state. 
380 U.S. at 227. The record must show with some "acceptable degree of clarity ... when, 
how often, and under what circumstances the prosecutor alone has been responsible for strik-
ing" the underrepresented group. 380 U.S. at 224. 
A dissenting opinion accused the majority of confusing priorities by exalting a procedural 
device over a constitutional right. 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The dissent em-
phasized that the Constitution does not require the use of peremptory challenges, but does 
require trial by a representative jury. Moreover, the dissent noted, a finding that the prosecu-
tor's practice in Swain violated the Constitution would not require the abandonment of the 
peremptory challenge; only where the prosecutor's use of the peremptory reaches the extreme 
level presented in Swain would exercise of the peremptory be subject to restriction. 380 U.S. at 
244-45. 
37. See, e.g., Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 29; Finkelstein, supra note 32 at 351-
52; Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise ojthe Peremptol')' to Exclude Non-White Jurors: A 
Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. Rav. 
555, 560 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Cincinnati Comment]; Comment, supra note 25 at 1160; 
Note, Fair Jul')' Selection Procedures, 75 Y ALB L.J. 322, 323 (1965); Note, Limiting the Peremp-
tol')' Challenge: Representation oj Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 17 IS, 1723 & n.36 (1977) 
(hereinafter cited as Yale Note]. 
November 1982) Peremptory Challenges in Capital Cases 11 
prosecutor systematically eliminated a disproportionate number of 
members of a group by requiring a showing of prosecutorial conduct 
in the relevant district over some indefinite period oftim.e. Not only 
does such a showing require transcribing voir dires of a large 
number of cases, itself an expensive undertaking, but additional in-
vestigation would be · required to ascertain the race of each 
venireperson, as the voir dire transcripts rarely reflect this factor. 
Such a showing is beyond the ability and resources of virtually all 
defendants.38 As a result, prosecutors can continue to eliminate 
members of minority groups through the use of the peremptory chal-
lenge, virtually without restriction.39 
For these reasons a number of state courts have recently rejected 
the Swain approach. In the leading case, People v. Wheeler, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court adopted a more lenient standard.40 In 
Wheeler, the California court overturned the conviction of a black 
defendant because the prosecutor had exercised his peremptory chal-
lenges against all seven blacks on the jury panel, leaving an all white 
jury. 
The California court, expressing the need to "define a burden of 
proof which a party may reasonably be expected to sustain in meri-
torious cases,"41 found the Swain standard inappropriate. To protect 
38. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 286, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148 Cal Rptr. 890, 909 
(1978) (rejecting the Swain rationale partially for this reason). 
39. The only limitation, outside of establishing the evidence required by Swain, is the 
countervailing use of defense peremptories. This limitation is particularly ineffective where 
the defense tries to maintain the representation of a minority group by its challenges against 
the majority. See note 152 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
40. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). The court recognized that the 
exercise of a peremptory challenge is presumptively based on legitimate considerations, but 
refused to concede that this presumption allows the prosecutor to exercise the challenge with-
out any limitation. While conceding that the peremptory is a challenge for which "no reason 
need be given," the court emphasized that it is not a challenge "for which no reason need 
exist." 22 Cal 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901. Otherwise, the court noted, 
the peremptory could be used to eliminate jurors on the basis of group membership in viola-
tion of the fair cross-section requirement of both the state and federal constitutions. 22 Cal. 3d 
at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. The court construed the state constitutional 
right to an impartial jury to include the fair cro~ section requirement. Although noting that 
both the state provision and the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the right, the court rested its 
decision on state grounds. 22 Cal 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal Rptr. at 903. 
41. 22 Cal 3d at 278, 583 P.2d at 763, 148 Cal Rptr. at 904. The statistical methods re-
quired by the Swain decision for showing systematic exclusion, while helpful in attacking the 
construction of jury source lists, were found inadequate "during voir dire . . . when counsel 
may be trying to expose an emerging pattern of discrimination in time to forestall an unfair 
trial." 22 Cal. 3d at 279, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The court rejected the Swain 
standard of systematic exclusion over an indefinite period of time for several reasons. The 
court found the standard "virtually impossible" to meet statistically in the context of peremp-
tory challenges because of the discretionary nature of the peremptory. Moreover, the court 
was concerned that Swain offered no protection to the first defendant who is a victim of 
prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge as it would not be possible to establish a 
systematic pattern of exclusion using a single case. 22 Cal 3d at 285,583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. 
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effectively the right to a representative jury, the court found it neces-
sary to adopt a standard under which the defense could establish 
systematic exclusion of all or nearly all members of a group on the 
basis of a single voir dire. Under this approach, a prima facie case 
can be established by showing that. the prosecutor excluded all or 
nearly all members of a "cognizable group within the meaning of the 
representative cross section rule," or that he or she directed a dispro-
portionate number of peremptories at such a group.42 A defendant 
need not compile an extensive statistical record; he or she need only 
establish that "from all the circumstances in the case" there was a 
"strong likelihood" that these persons were excluded because of their 
group affiliations. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden 
shifts to the state to show that the challenges were based on trial-
related factors rather than group bias.43 
The Wheeler decision has prompted extensive commentary on 
the peremptory challenge and the rejection of the Swain standard in 
at least four other states.44 Most of the commentators have approved 
of Wheeler, citing the deficiencies of the Swain approach in prevent-
Rptr. at 908-909. Finally, the court noted that any attempt to meet the Swain burden would 
require large expenditures beyond the ability of the typical defendant. Moreover, even if 
funds were available, the data are not, and few, if any, judges would interrupt the proceedings 
by granting continuances of unpredictable length to permit the necessary investigation. 22 
Cal. 3d at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909. 
42. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. 
43. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The defendant in Wheeler 
attempted to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion by showing that the prosecu-
tor removed every black from the jury. However, the trial court would not require the prose-
cutor to explain his use of the peremptory, on the ground that such use was beyond judicial 
scrutiny. 22 Cal. 3d at 264, 585 P.2d at 753, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 894. The California Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that a demonstration that the prosecutor had excluded a dispropor-
tionate number of blacks required him to explain his motives. The court's remedy was based 
on proposals made by J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 166-67; Yale Note, supra note 37, at 
1733-41. 
In People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978), a companion 
case to Wheeler, the California court clarified what a prosecutor must show to rebut a prima 
facie case. In Johnson, unlike Wheeler, the prosecutor freely admitted his intent to exclude 
blacks from the jury. The prosecutor claimed that he was challenging blacks because the 
state's witness had used the word "nigger," and the prosecutor feared that black jurors might 
be offended by the language and, as a result, be unable to serve as impartial jurors. 22 Cal. 3d 
at 298-99, 583 P.2d at 775, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 916. The court found this reason insufficient to 
justify the exclusion of all blacks since many whites are offended by the same language. More 
importantly, added the court, the benefit of having black jurors serve in a racially related trial 
outweighs any harm of bias that may result. The sixth amendment was intended to include all 
community perspectives on the jury including those of people who are offended by the issues at 
trial. 22 Cal. 3d at 300, 583 P.2d at 775-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 917, 
44. People v. Payne, 31 CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2229 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982); Common-
wealth v. Reid, 424 N.E.2d 495 (Mass. 1981); Commonwealth v. Soares, 347 Mass. 461, 387 
N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. 
App. 1980); People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981). For cases rejecting 
the Wheeler approach, see State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 591 P.2d 166 (1979); State v. Grady, 
93 Wis. 2d I, 13,286 N.W.2d 607,612 (1979). For cases reserving judgment on the Wheeler 
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ing prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge.45 Nonetheless, 
the majority of states and the federal courts still follow Swain; in 
these jurisdictions a successful attack on prosecutorial use of the per-
emptory challenge continues to depend upon meeting the heavy bur-
den imposed by that decision. 
B. The Burden Imposed by Swain 
Nearly every attempt to meet the burden imposed by Swain to 
demonstrate prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge has 
failed. 46 Almost all of the cases challenging prosecutorial peremp-
tory challenge practices have involved the use of the peremptory to 
exclude blacks.47 However, a few have involved peremptory chal-
lenges of jurors opposed to the death penalty.48 Most of these at-
tempts have failed to meet the Swain standard because of an 
insufficient showing relating to the number of venirepersons chal-
approach, see Mallett v. State, 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980); People v. Smith, 622 P.2d 90 (Colo. 
App. 1980). 
45. See, e.g., Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 29; Note, 17ze Defendant's Right to 
Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1770 (1979); 
Co=ent, People v. Wheeler: Cal!fomia's Answer to Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 16 
SAN.DIEGO L. REV. 897 (1979). For critical co=entary, see Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory 
Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Mo. L. REv. 337 
(1982). 
46. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 286, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 909 
(1978); Brown, McGuire & Winters, supra note 29, at-203; Yale Note, supra note 37, at 1715; 
see Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14, 24 (1977 & Supp. 1981). 
47. 79 A.L.K3d at 27-46 .. Attempts to challenge the use of the peremptory to exclude 
members-o(otlier ethnic groups have also been unsuccessful. See, e.g., State v. Rossi, 273 So. 
2d 265 (La. 1973) (Italian-Americans); State v. Salinas, 87 Wash. 2d 112, 549 P.2d 712 (1976) 
(Mexican-Americans). 
Some courts have gone so far as to state that even where the prosecutor admits that he is 
purposely excluding blacks there is no violation of equal protection. E.g., United States v. 
Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), qjfd., 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1980). In Danzey, the 
court construed Swain as giving the prosecutor unfettered discretion in the exercise of the 
peremptory challenge in a single case. According to the Danzey court, a prosecutor's motive in 
exercising the peremptory is wholly irrelevant: a violation of equal protection occurs only 
when the prosecutor uses the peremptory systematically to eliminate blacks in case after case 
over a sufficient period of time. This conclusion is dubious at best since the only reason the 
Swain Court cited for requiring a showing of exclusion in case after case is the presumption 
that the prosecutor is acting on the basis oflegitimate considerations in any single case. If the 
prosecutor concedes that he is acting on the basis of illegitimate considerations, he is no longer 
entitled to that presumption, and a violation of equal protection ( or of the sixth amendment if 
a "cognizable class" is affected, see notes 233-57 i'!fra and accompanying text) would be estab-
lished. What constitutes an illegitimate purpose is not entirely clear. Swain indicates that 
exclusion of blacks because of race may be legitimate if the prosecutor has reason to believe 
blacks are more likely to be biased against the state in a particular case. 380 U.S. at 220-21. 
48. See, e.g., People v. Floyd, I Cal. 3d 694, 464 P.2d 64, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1970); Jones v. 
State, 243 Ga. 820,256 S.E.2d 907 (1979); Smith v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 93,239 S.E.2d 510 (1977); 
Lee v. State, 226 Ga. 162, 173 S.E.2d 209 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 936 (1972); 
Brice v. State, 264 Md. 352, 286 A.2d 132 (1972). 
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lenged,49 the use of an insufficient number of cases to establish a 
systematic pattem,5° or an insufficient showing of state participation 
in such challenges. 51 
All of these cases, although recognizing the heavy burden im-
posed by Swain, continue to acknowledge the viability of the Swain 
exception if the defendant can show systematic exclusion over a suf-
ficient period oftime.52 In one significant case, United States v. Pear-
son,53 the Fifth Circuit emphasized that "the burden is not 
insurmountable."54 The court stated that a defendant's burden un-
der Swain: 
might require checking the docket for a reasonable period of time for 
the names of defendants and their attorneys, investigation as to the 
race of the various defendants, the final composition of the petit jury 
and the manner in which each side exercised its peremptory 
challenges. 55 
The court further noted that the burden imposed by Swain did not 
require a showing of 100% exclusion of the group in question.56 
In several recent cases defendants have submitted comprehensive 
studies concerning the prosecutor's use of the peremptory. In one 
such case, United States v. Mc.Daniels, a study of court records in a 
particular district for a two-year period showed that 68% of the per-
49. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
961 (1976) (no showing of systematic exclusion where blacks served on eight of the fifteen 
cases included in the defendant's study). 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 197.7); United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971); Common-
wealth v. Green, 246 Pa. Super. 472,400 A.2d 182 (1979); State v. Bolton, 354 So. 2d 517,519 
(La. 1978). In Pearson, the defendant's study included only a one-week period. In the other 
cases the defendant relied solely on exclusion of blacks from the jury in his own case. The 
Eighth Circuit has suggested that even fifteen cases may be insufficient to establish a system-
atic pattern. United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
961 (1976). 
51. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965). Other attempts have failed be-
cause the defendant's study did not include all types of cases. See, e.g., McKinney v. Walker, 
394 F. Supp. 1015 (D.S.C. 1974) (defendant showed that blacks were excluded in cases where 
the defendant was black but failed to show a similar exclusion in cases where the defendant 
was white). In United States v. Newman, 549'F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 
(1977), discussed i'!fra note 59, defendant's challenge was rejected because his study included 
cases from two independent divisions within the same district, thereby skewing the statistics. 
52. See cases cited in Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14, 53-56 (1977 & Supp. 1981). 
53. 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971). 
54. 448 F.2d at 1218. Other cases, expressing concern over prosecutorial abuse of the per-
emptory challenge, have also noted that the defendants burden under Swain is not insur-
mountable. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v, 
Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976). 
55. 448 F.2d at 1217. The defendant in Pearson failed to meet the Swain burden of proof 
because his study of one week did not e_ncompass a sufficient period of time. 448 F.2d at 1218. 
56. 448 F.2d at 1217. 
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emptory challenges used by the prosecutor were directed against 
blacks,57 but in five of the fifty-three cases in the study the prosecutor 
challenged no blacks, and blacks actually served on a number of ju-
ries. Although the evidence showed that blacks were challenged 
three times more frequently than whites, the percentage of blacks 
actually serving on juries fairly approximated the percentage of 
blacks in the community.58 The court considered this evidence com-
prehensive but insufficient to meet the heavy Swain burden, empha-
sizing that, despite the prosecutor's use of the peremptory, the juries 
remained fairly representative. The court was sufficiently disturbed 
by the pattern in the prosecutor's use of the peremptory revealed by 
the study, however, to grant a new trial "in the interest of justice."59 
This growing concern over prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory 
recently led the Supreme Court of Louisiana to overturn a convic-
tion based on its conclusion that the defendant had met his burden 
57. 379 F. Supp. 1243, 1244 (E.D. La. 1974). The probability that the prosecutor used the 
peremptory without regard to racial factors was calculated as .00002S68726. 379 F. Supp. at 
1246 n.S. 
S8. 379 F. Supp. at 1244. The percentage of blacks serving on juries (22.8%) compared 
very favorably with the percentage of blacks on voter registration lists (21.4%) from which 
prospective jurors were drawn. The court hypothesized that the prosecutors' use of the per-
emptory against blacks was offset by the defendants' use of the peremptory to exclude whites. 
379 F. Supp. at 124S n.3. The conditions under which this offsetting can be accomplished and 
the extent to which it justifies the prosecutor's actions are discussed at notes 1S1-S6 i'!fra and 
accompanying text. 
S9. 379 F. Supp. at 12S0 (applying FED. R. CRIM. P. 33). In a similar case, a federal 
district court found that the Swain burden had been met by the defendant. United States v. 
Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub nom. United States v. Newman, S49 
F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977). In Robinson, the defendant's study, in-
cluding thirty-nine trials, showed that the prosecutor had used his peremptory to exclude 
69.5% of blacks and 84.8% of blacks and hispanics from the petitjuries. 4S1 F. Supp. at 472. 
Given the percentage of blacks on the final panel before exercise of the peremptory, the ex-
pected frequency of a jury containing at least one black member was calculated at 68%, but the 
actual frequency of juries with a black member was only 33.3%. 4S1 F. Supp. at 472-73. On 
the basis of these findings the court concluded that the prosecutor's use of the peremptory to 
exclude blacks had reached an excessive point and that judicial relief was necessary. The court 
disallowed the challenges of the black venirepersons and ordered that jury selection continue 
with the blacks included. In addition, the court imposed a prospective remedy requiring the 
United States Attorney to maintain a record of future use of the peremptory against minority 
groups. 4S1 F. Supp. at 474. 
The Second Circuit vacated the order on the basis that the district court had erroneously 
combined statistics from two independent divisions within the same district. S49 F.2d at 244-
4S.' In the appropriate division, the actual frequency of blacks appearing on juries was sixty 
percent, a figure which compared favorably with the expected frequency of sixty-eight percent. 
The district court's conclusion that the prosecutor was systematically eliminating blacks 
through use of the peremptory was therefore found to be unwarranted. Newman has been 
criticized for adopting the overly restrictive language of Swain requiring absolute exclusion of 
blacks to establish a violation. See Cincinnati Comment, supra note 37, at S6S. The court's 
separation of the two divisions for purposes of analyzing the statistical data is also question-
able since the United States Attorney operates throughout the district. See Recent Decisions, 
Constitutional Law - Exclusion of Black Veniremen Through Use of Prosecution's Peremptory 
Challenges Held to be in Violation of Equal Protection Clause, 8 CUMB. L. REV. 307, 318 (1977). 
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of proof under Swain. In State v. Brown60 the defendant showed 
that the prosecutor had exercised five peremptory challenges, all 
against blacks, creating an all white jury in his case. In addition, the 
defendant referred the court to several cases recently decided by the 
Louisiana courts wherein the same prosecutor or other prosecutors 
in the same district had exercised their peremptory challenges to cre-
ate all white or nearly all white juries. In these prior cases, the Loui-
siana courts had denied relief, finding that Swain placed beyond 
scrutiny a prosecutor's exercise of the peremptory challenge in a sin-
gle case.61 In Brown, however, the co~rt found that the defendant 
had demonstrated a prima facie case of systematic exclusion on the 
basis of the record in his case and the other cases. 62 
Several state cases have rejected challenges to the prosecutor's 
use of the peremptory to exclude jurors who voice general objections 
to the death penalty.63 However, with one recent exception, in each 
of these cases the defendant challenged only the exercise of the pros-
ecutor's peremptory challenges in his own case. In these cases the 
defense made no effort to establish a systematic pattern of exclusion 
extending over a period of time.64 Therefore, the cases are substan-
tially consistent with Swain and do not suggest that a court would 
uphold systematic use of the peremptory challenge to exclude scru-
pled jurors.65 The recent exception was the Florida case in which the 
60. 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979). 
61. 371 So. 2d at 752-53. 
62. Because the prosecutor failed to justify his exercise of peremptory challenges, the court 
reversed the conviction. See also State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979), where the 
court, relying on Brown, found systematic exclusion on the basis of testimony by three local 
attorneys and the prosecutor's admission that he had consistently used his peremptory chal-
lenge to exclude blacks. 
63. See, e.g., Smith v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 93,239 S.E.2d 510 (1970); Brice v. State, 264 Md. 
352, 286 A.2d 132 (1972); Capler v. State, 237 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1970), vacated on otlter 
grounds, 408 U.S. 937 (1972); Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 515, 184 S.E.2d 786, vacated 
on otlter grounds, 408 U.S. 940 (1971). See also People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 
N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973) (death penalty vacated under 
Furman, court finding it unnecessary to reach claim that Swain violated where all 33 scrupled 
venirepersons remaining after defense and court challenges were removed by prosecutor: 20 by 
challenges for cause, and 13 by peremptory challenges). For additional cases, see Annot,, 79 
A.L.R.3d 14, 46-50 (1977 & Supp. 1981). In a recent California case, the defendant raised the 
issue, attempting to combine Wheeler with Witherspoon. People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 
631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981) (decided on other grounds). 
64. In light of the recent Wheeler decision, see notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text, 
in some jurisdictions it may be sufficient to show that jurors generally opposed to the death 
penalty were excluded in a single voir dire. 
65. Some cases have implied that the use of the peremptory to exclude jurors with rescrva• 
tions concerning the death penalty is always permissible. See, e.g., Capler v. State, 237 So. 2d 
445, 449 (Miss. 1970), vacated on otlter grounds, 408 U.S. 607 (1972) (objections to the death 
penalty may give rise to "doubt on the part of the prosecution that the juror would follow the 
law as to imposition of the death penalty" and such doubt is sufficient reason for exercise of 
the peremptory); ef. People v. Moore, 42 Ill. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 299, revd on otlter grounds, 408 
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preliminary results of the study described in the following Part were 
reported.66 
U.S. 786 (1972) (exclusion of jurors in violation of Witherspoon is harmless error where the 
prosecutor has remaining peremptories since the peremptory may permissibly be used to ex-
clude scrupled jurors). But cf. Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558, 564 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(rejecting harmless error contention based on remaining peremptories); Burns v. Estelle, 592 
F.2d 1297, 1300 (5th Cir. 1979), ajfd en bane, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); People v. 
Sears, 71 Cal. 2d 635, 648 n.5, 450 P.2d 248, 257 n.5, 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 881 n.5 (1969), revd on 
other grounds, 2 Cal. 3d 180,465 P.2d 847, 84 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1970) (prosecutor's duty to assure 
defendant a fair trial includes obligation to refrain from exercising peremptory challenges so 
as to produce an unrepresentative jury on capital punishment); In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 
619-20, 447 P.2d 117, 122, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 26 (1968); Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 596, 280 
S.E.2d 623 (1981); Grijalva v. State, 6_14 S.W.2d 420, 425 (fex. Crim. App. 1980). 
66. Dobbert v. State, 409 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 1982). Soon after the governor had signed a . 
warrant for his execution, Dobbert filed in the trial court - Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit 
- a motion to vacate his death sentence. As one of the grounds for relief, the defendant 
alleged violation of his due process and sixth amendment rights resulting from the systematic 
exercise of peremptory challenges by prosecutors in the circuit to exclude death-scrupled ju-
rors. On January 20, 1982, testimony was presented in the trial court concerning the prelimi-
nary results of the study reported in this Article. At the time, only 26 of the 30 cases ultimately 
reviewed had been analyzed; transcripts had not yet been completed in four of the cases. The 
testimony revealed the systematic pattern presented in greater detail in this Article. No at-
tempt was made by the state to explain the exercise of peremptory challenges on any basis 
other than views on the death penalty. The testimony also revealed that the prosecutor chal-
lenged all 12 death-scrupled venirepersons in _Dobbert's case who were subject to possible 
prosecutorial peremptory challenge, with the result that no death-scrupled juror remained on 
the jury that convicted him. The trial court denied the motion; holding that neither the testi-
mony nor the pleadings took the case beyond the scope of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 
(1965). 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. 409 So. 2d 1033. The court noted that 
the exception recognized in Swain for attacking systematic exercise of peremptory challenges 
was based on the systematic exclusion of blacks, and found no indication that the Supreme 
Court would extend the exception to the systematic exclusion of other groups. 409 So. 2d at 
1057. The court, however, declined to resolve the issue, finding that even ifit were to conclude 
that the Swain exception was applicable, the defendant had failed to demonstrate that his 
rights had been violated. Without any further explanation, the court concluded that "neither 
the record nor the pleading, including the study by Professor Winick, are sufficient to move 
this case beyond the general rule of Swain v. Alabama." 409 So. 2d at 1057. As an alternate 
holding, tlie court found that the defendant had waived any right to challenge the jury by his 
failure to raise an objection at trial concerning the State's use of peremptory challenges. The 
court further noted that in any event, the defendant was not prejudiced by the State's use of 
peremptory challenges. Although the prosecutor had removed all 12 venirepersons expressing 
opposition to the death penalty who were subject to possible prosecutorial peremptory chal-
lenge, the court noted that the jury had reco=ended by a vote of IO to 2 that Dobbert receive 
a life sentence rather than the death penalty. 409 So. 209 at 1057-58. Since under Florida law 
the trial judge may impose a death sentence no matter what the jury reco=ends, see FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1), (2) (West 1982), the court labeled as "frivolous" the defendant's 
claim that the judge might have imposed a life sentence had the jury's life recommendation 
been unanimous. 
The defendant then filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the systematic use of 
peremptory challenges and raising a number of other grounds. The habeas court ruled that the 
Florida Supreme Court had not reached the merits, but had decided the case on a waiver 
theory. Dobbert v. Strickland, 532 F. Supp. 545, 559 (M.D. Fla. 1982). It denied relief, agree-
ing that the issue had been waived by failure of the defendant to raise a contemporaneous 
objection. 532 F. Supp. at 561. The court further found that the "cause" and "prejudice" 
exception to the waiver rule recognized by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), was inap-
plicable because the defendant had shown neither cause nor prejudice. The district court also 
expressed the view that defendant's claim was in any event without merit. Noting that the 
defendant's legal theory was based on Swain and Witherspoon, the court found Witherspoon 
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These recent cases illustrate growing judicial concern with 
clearly inapplicable as it dealt only with challenges for cause, and further found that the Swain 
exception was limited to racial discrimination. 532 F. Supp. at 561-62. 
Dobbert appealed the denial of habeas corpus relief to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which on February 5, 1982, just hours before his pending execution, granted a stay of 
execution pending appeal. Dobbert v. Strickland, 670 F.2d 938 (11th Cir. 1982). Assuming 
that the Eleventh Circuit does not reverse Dobbert's conviction and death sentence based upon 
one of the many other grounds asserted in his appeal, it is likely that the court will reach the 
merits of his peremptory challenge claim notwithstanding the waiver problem that troubled 
the district court and the Supreme Court of Florida. Even if the appellate court finds that the 
Florida court based its decision on its procedural default rule rather than on the merits, com-
pare Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 152 (1979) (if under state law failure to 
comply with state procedural rule does not bar consideration of constitutional claim, federal 
court may consider the claim on habeas), and Newman v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 969 (1976) 
(federal court cannot apply a state waiver rule precluding habeas corpus petition if the state 
court had declined to impose the procedural bar), with Ratcliffv. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 477-78 
(5th Cir. 1979) (federal court may apply state timely objection rule to bar constitutional claim 
where state court discussed merits of claim after ruling that there is a procedural defect), and 
even if abuse of peremptory challenges is deemed waivable, compare Witherspoon v. Illinois, 
391 U.S. 510, 522, 523 n.22 (1968), and Wigglesworth v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 947 (1971) (Wither-
spoon error not waived by failure contemporaneously to object), with Spinkellink v. Wain-
wright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979) (Witherspoon error 
waived by failure of counsel to order transcript of voir dire; however, court indicated that such 
failure might not have barred the claim, had it been deemed meritorious), cause and prejudice 
should be found on these facts. 
The Supreme Court, although originally leaving open the definition of "cause" and 
"prejudice," Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 (1977), has recently discussed both re-
quirements. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982); United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584 
(1982). In Engle, the Court suggested that both take their meaning from principles of comity 
and finality, which counsel against revision of state court convictions absent a showing that the 
incarceration attacked is fundamentally unjust. 102 S. Ct. at 1575. The Court declined to find 
"cause" where, although the petitioner did not know of the constitutional defect at the time of 
trial, the basis of the constitutional claim was available and had been litigated by others. 102 
S. Ct. at 1574-75. In .Dobbert, the claim advanced is a novel one, never previously litigated, 
Moreover, at the time of voir dire, Dobbert "lacked the tools to construct" his constitutional 
claim. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1574. Although the legal tools (Witherspoon and Swain) 
were available, they had not previously been put together for use in this context; nor did the 
factual predicate to their combined use exist at the time of the voir dire, which occured in 1974. 
At that time Dobbert would not have been able to raise the constitutional claim. The voir dire 
in his case, held about a year after Florida had reenacted its post-Funnan death penalty stat-
ute, occurred at the very beginning of the pattern found to exist in the study. At that time any 
objection to the use of peremptory challenges would have been rejected under the holding of 
Swain. The evidence of the pattern and practice necessary to support a Swain claim was 
unavailable at that time, and became available only with the completion of this study. 
Thus, a contemporaneous objection in .Dobbert wouJd have been futile, not merely in the 
sense that the trial court under existing law would have rejected it, see Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. 
Ct. at 1572 & n.35, but also in the sense that the claim was not ripe and would not have 
become ripe for several years. As a result, there is no possibility that Dobbert's failure contem-
poraneously to raise the issue was a deliberate choice to withhold the claim "in order to 'sand-
bag' - to gamble on acquittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay 
off." Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1572 n.34; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 89-90; see 
Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1981). 
Moreover, contrary to the view of the Supreme Court of Florida, Dobbert was prejudiced 
by the practice complained of. Had his jury contained at least some of the 12 death penalty 
objectors excluded by prosecutorial peremptory challenges, it might have decided his guilt 
differently. Moreover, it might have voted unanimously for a life sentence, rather than voting 
10 to 2 for life. Certainly it cannot be assumed that a sentencing judge would be unaffected by 
the difference between disagreeing with a unanimous jury reco=endation and one in which 
two jurors agreed with him if he imposed death. There thus is a substantial "risk of a funda-
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prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge. The prosecutor's 
exercise of the challenge is increasingly seen as no longer beyond 
judicial reproach. Even in those jurisdictions adhering to the strict 
rule of Swain, a defendant who can compile an adequate statistical 
record of prosecutorial use of the peremptory in a particular district 
over a several year period should be able to meet the Swain burden 
and invoke judicial review of the prosecutor's conduct. 
The defendant's heavy burden under Swain should as a matter of 
law be at least somewhat easier to carry when the alleged systematic 
pattern in the use of peremptory challenges has been applied in 
death penalty cases. Capital cases are unique, different even from 
race cases, and this fact should make courts especially sensitive to 
the use of peremptory challenges to produce a jury disposed toward 
death. As the Supreme Court has recognized in every 4eath penalty 
case since Furman, "death is a punishment which is different from 
all other sanctions in kind rather than degree."67 As a result, the 
Court has acknowledged that more in the way of due process is re-
quired to impose the death penalty than a sentence to a term of 
years: 
mental miscariage of justice in this case." United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. at 1596. The 
Court in Frady, in a substantial tightening of the standard of "actual prejudice," stated that a 
habeas petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of 
prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infe_cting his entire 
trial with error of constitutional dimensions." 102 S. Ct. at 1596. The error complained of in 
Frady, however, concerned jury instructions, and the Court's analysis of the evidence and of 
the jury's verdict led it to conclude that there was "no substantial likelihood" that the instruc-
tions "prejudiced Frady's chances with the jury." 102 S. Ct. at 1597-98. With regard to certain 
errors, however, including those involving jury composition, such an assessment as to prejudi-
cial impact is not possible. For this reason, the Supreme Court _in the closely related context of 
applying the rule of harmless error has declined to require a showing of particularized 
prejudice and has automatically reversed convictions where the jury was improperly com-
posed. E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); see 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge with pecuniary interest in outcome); Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219 (denial or impairment of peremptory challenge); Lewis v. United 
States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (same). It would seem inappropriate to read the actual 
prejudice approach of Frady to ban a habeas petitioner in Dobbert's situation from challeng-
ing jury selection practices that create a substantial risk of material prejudice. See Huffman v. 
Wainwright, 651 F.2d at 350. 
It thus seems likely that the Eleventh Circuit will reject the waiver argument accepted by 
both the Supreme Court of Florida and the federal district court, and resolve the merits of 
Dobbert's constitutional attack. 
67. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. at 3377; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-
04 (1976) (plurality opinion). See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869, 874 (1982); Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (plurality 
opinion of Burger, C.J.); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S 
349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.); 430 U.S. at 363-64 (White, J., concurring); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187-89 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-91 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (noncapital 
case). For a philosophical analysis of the notion that death is different, see J. MURPHY, Cruel 
and Unusual l'unishmenl, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND THERAPY 223-49 (1979). 
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[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of im-
prisonment, however long . . . . Because of that qualitative differ-
ence, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in 
the determination that death is tlie appropriate punishment in a spe-
cific case. 68 
Not only is this sentiment frequently expressed, but in a variety of 
contexts the courts have actually treated death penalty cases differ-
ently than other cases. 69 Thus, the use of peremptory challenges in 
capital cases should be subjected to closer scrutiny than in noncapi-
tal cases. 70 
68. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). The most 
recent expression of this view came from the Court's newest member, Justice O'Connor: 
[T]his Court has gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be 
executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the 
sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake. 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869, 878 (1982) (concurring opinion). An earlier expression 
came in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring): 
[C]apital cases . . . stand on quite a different footing than other offenses. In such cases 
the law is especially sensitive to . . . procedural fairness . . . . I do not concede that 
whatever process is "due" an offender faced with a fine or prison sentence necessarily 
satisfies the requirements of the Constitution in a capital case. The distinction is by no 
means novel . . . ; nor is it negligible, being literally that between life and death. 
See also cases cited in note 67 Sllpra; Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955) (Frank-
furter, J.); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (opinion of Jackson, J.); Andres v. United 
States, 33 U.S; 740, 752 (1948) (opinion of Reed, J.); Gillers, S11pra note 2, at 31-35, 60-61, 86-
89; Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect far Persons: Super .Due Process far .Death, 53 So. 
CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1155-63 (-1980); White, .Death-Qual!fied Juries: The "Prosecution-Prone-
ness" Argument Reexamined, 41 U. P1rr. L. REv. 353, 353-54, 402-04 (1980). 
This approach is fully consistent with the Supreme Court's general due process calculus, 
under which the level of process that is required in a particular situation depends on a balanc-
ing of several factors, including the private interest affected by governmental action and the 
risk and cost of error. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604-08 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319,335 (1976); Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 
MINN. L. REV. 331, 399-400 (1981). 
69. Compare United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (provision of Federal Kidnap-
ping Act authorizing the death penalty following jury verdict, but not where jury trial waived, 
unconstitutionally burdens right to trial by jury), with Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 
(1978) (state homicide statute authorizing life sentence following jury verdict, but lesser sen-
tence where defendant pleads non vult and waives jury trial, held not to burden defendant's 
rights unconstitutionally under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments); compare Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (standardless death penalty statutes violate eighth amend-
ment), with Britton v. Rogers, 63l F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980) (standardless sentencing statute in 
noncapital case held not to violate eighth amendment); compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death penalty statute violates eighth amendment), with Com-
monwealth v. Jackson, 369 Mass. 904, 344 N.E.2d 166 (1976) (mandatory one-year sentence 
for carrying firearm without a license held not to violate the eighth amendment); compare 
Powell v. Ala.bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (capital defendant unable to employ counsel or make 
his own defense has due process right to assigned counsel), with Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 
(1942) (refusal to appoint counsel for robbery suspect held not to violate due process). 
70. One difference might be to permit a lower level of statistical significance to demon-
strate a prima facie case under Swain in a capital case than in noncapital contexts. See D. 
BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 318 (1980), 
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III. A STUDY OF PROSECUTORIAL USE OF THE PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE To EXCLUDE SCRUPLED JURORS 
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The Swain test is empirical, requiring proof of a pattern of 
prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge over a substantial 
period of time. The study presented here addresses the issue of 
whether a careful review of the data on capital jury selection in a 
single district would reveal such a pattern. The data indicate that the 
prosecution relied on its peremptory challenges to systematically ex-
clude death-scrupled individuals from capitaljuries.71 This result, at 
least for the district studied, brings the government's conduct within 
the ambit of Swain, justifying judicial review to ensure that the pros-
ecution's peremptory challenges conform to constitutional standards. 
A. The Study 
The study analyzes data drawn from Florida's Fourth Judicial 
Circuit. To comply with the requirements imposed by Swain for 
showing systematic exclusion of a particular group over a period of 
time, the study covers the five-year period72 from January '1974, soon 
after Florida's reenactment of the death penalty, 73 through Decem-
ber 1978. 
The Swain analysis focuses on prosecutorial practices in a partic-
ular district. In Florida the relevant district is the judicial circuit, of 
which there are twenty in the state.74 Each circuit contains one or 
more counties. Because of considerations of manageability and cost, 
the study examines only the Fourth Judicial Circuit, located in the 
northeast portion of the state. The Fourth Circuit includes Dµval 
County, which is coterminous with the City of Jacksonville, a large 
urban area, and two principally rural counties, Clay and Nassau.75 
71. The term "death qualified" could be used to describe the resulting jury although the 
term usually is used to describe the result of challenges for cause of venirepersons because of 
their death penalty attitudes. The term, although frequently used, is ambiguous. See Hovey v. 
Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I, 16 n.34, 616 P.2d 1301, 1307 n.34, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 134 n.34 
(1980); Hoffman, Witherspoon After Wheeler: Death-Qualifying Is Bad For Defendant, 1 
CRIM. JUSTICE J. 1, 3-4 (1979). As used here, it shall refer to the use of challenges by the 
prosecutor, either for cause or peremptory to remove venirepersons who at voir dire express 
opposition to the death penalty. The venirepersons are here referred to as "scrupled" or 
"death-scrupled," in accordance with prevailing usage. 
72. See United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 n.6 (E.D. La. 1974) {two-year 
period held sufficient in the context of Swain challenge to the systematic exclusion of blacks). 
73. 1974 Fla. Laws. ch. 74-379. 
74. A. MORRIS, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 517-18 {18th ed. 1981). · 
75. According to 1970 figures, Duval County had a population of 528,865 (98% urban), 
Clay County had a population of32,059 (47.7% urban), and Nassau County had a population 
of20,626 {33% urban). A. MoRRis, supra note 74, at 517-18. Juries in the Fourth Circuit are 
selected from voter registration lists. According to voter registration lists for the 1976 general 
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Court records revealed the cases during this five-year period in 
which defendants were indicted for capital offenses - first degree 
murder76 or involuntary sexual battery of a child under twelve, 77 the 
two capital crimes at the time. The data presented do not include 
cases in which prior to jury selection defendants plead guilty, had 
their charges nolle prosequed, died, or were adjudicated not guilty 
by reason of insanity. Nor do they include two other cases, one be-
cause the prosecution and defense attorneys had stipulated prior to 
jury selection that the state would not seek the death penalty, 78 and 
the other because the prosecutor, who failed to mention the death 
penalty during voir dire, admitted that he did not treat the case as a 
death penalty case. 79 Finally, three cases were eliminated because 
neither transcripts nor court reporter notes existed. 80 
Several of the cases involved joint trials of more than one de-
fendant in which a single voir dire occurred. Thus a total of thirty-
three juries were selected during the five-year period in cases treated 
as death penalty cases, and the study includes all thirty available voir 
dires. 
B. Methodology 
To establish a prima facie case under Swain it should suffice to 
show that th(? prosecution uses the peremptory challenge to remove 
scrupled jurors to an extent that can be characterized as "system-
atic."81 A number of circuit court opinions make clear that "system-
election, the voters of the Fourth Circuit were 21.3% black (23% for Duval County, 5% for 
Clay County, and 14% for Nassau County) and 15.5% white (73.6% for Duval County, 91.1% 
for Clay County, and 84.9% for Nassau County). THE 1978 FLORIDA ALMANAC 392-93 (D. 
Marth & M. Marth eds. 1978). Eighty-one and one-third percent of voters were Democrats 
(81.5% for Duval County, 73% for Clay County, and 93% for Nassau County), 15.4% were 
Republicans (15.2% for Duval County, 23% for Clay County, and 6% for Nassau County), and 
3.3% were registered with other parties or as independents (3.3% for Duval County, 4% for 
Clay County, and 1% for Nassau County). Id. 
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (West 1982). 
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (West 1982). The Supreme Court of Florida, applying 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), has since ruled that the death penalty under this statute 
would offend the eighth amendment. Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (1981), cert. denied, 102 
S. Ct. 1039 (1982). 
78. State v. Walker, No. 78-1622 (Duval County Ct., Fla.). 
79. State v. Freeman, No. 76-818 CF (Duval County Ct., Fla.). 
80. State v. Swain, No. 77-4172 CF (Duval County Ct., Fla.); State v. Freeman, No. 76-818 
CF (Duval County Ct., Fla.); State v. Turner, No. 73-179 (Nassau County Ct., Fla.). For a 
discussion of nomesponse error treatment, see note 106 infra. 
81. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S .. 202, 227 (1965); United States v. Nelson, 529 
F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929, 930 (8th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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atic exclusion" does not require a showing of 100% exclusion. 82 How 
much less than 100% is an open question as Swain and its progeny 
set no specific standard for when use of the peremptory to eliminate 
members of a class qualifies as "systematic." Guidance can be found 
in the parallel context of selection of the pool of eligible jurors for 
the formation of grand and petit juries, where "systematic exclusion" 
is necessary to demonstrate a prima facie case of violation of the fair 
cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment or of equal protec-
tion. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Swain cited cases involving se-
lection of jury pools in its discussion of the demonstration required 
to "show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges 
. . . over a period of time."83 In both contexts unrepresentative ju-
ries can be seen as products of "systematic" official action when the 
underrepresentation produced is "inherent in the particular jury-se-
lection process utilized."84 In both, similar statistical methods 
should be acceptable to determine whether the discrepancy produced 
qualifies as "systematic." 
In cases involving challenges to the jury selection methods used 
to form grand and petit jury pools, the courts hold that a prima facie 
case of constitutional violation is established by showing substantial 
underrepresentation of a group. 85 Such underrepresentation is es-
tablished by a "method of proof, sometimes called the 'rule of exclu-
sion' " involving a statistical comparison of ''the proportion of the 
group in the total population to the proportion ... [actually serving 
as] jurors, over a significant period of time."86 This methodology, 
using statistical probability theory to demonstrate s~tisfaction of the 
legal standard of "systematic exclusion,"87 should be acceptable in 
82. United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971); accord, circuit court 
cases cited in note 81 supra. 
83. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 226-27, citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 
480 (1954); Patton v. Mississippi, 322 U.S. 463 (1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
The Court required a more detailed showing that prosecutorial conduct produced the unrepre-
sentative result in the peremptory challenge context because of the possibility in the peremp-
tory process but not in the selection process that defense counsel peremptory practices may 
have produced the result. 380 U.S. at 227. 
84. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366-67 (1979). 
85. "While the earlier cases involved abs9lute exclusion of an identifiable group [due to the 
system by which juries were selected], later cases established the principle that substantial 
under-representation of the group constitutes a constitutional violation as well, if it results 
from purposeful discrimination." Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977); see Alexan-
der v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967). 
86. Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 494. See also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. at 630 
& n.9; Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967); Whitus v. 
Georgia, 385 U.S at 552 n.2. 
81. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70; Finkelstein, supra note 32, at 338, 353-56 ; 
Kairys, Juror Selection: The Law, A Mathematical Method of Analysis, and a Case Study, 10 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771, 785-89 (1972); Sperlich & Jaspovice, Statistical .Decision Theory and 
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the peremptory challenge context and can be adapted to test whether 
prosecutors systematically use their peremptory challenge to elimi-
nate from capital juries those expressing opposition to the death 
penalty.88 
Analysis of the transcripts of the voir dires of capital cases over a 
significant period of time can establish ho:w the prosecutors use their 
peremptory challenges for nonscrupled venirepersons and for scru-
pled venirepersons. By comparing prosecutorial practices for the 
two groups, the. probability that the number of scrupled jurors chal-
lenged occurred by chance can be calculated by using the binomial 
distribution. If the difference between the number of scrupled 
venirepersons expected to be challenged (based on the prosecutor's 
pattern in the use of peremptories for nonscrupled venirepersons) 
and the number actually challenged is greater than two or three stan-
dard deviations - a probability between 5% (.05) and 1% (.01) -
then the hypothesis that the result was achieved at random ''would 
be suspect to a social scientist."89 
the Selection of Grand Jurors: Testingfar Discrimination in a Single Panel, 2 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 75 (1975); Co=ent, The Civil Petitioner's Right to Representative Grand Juries and a 
Statistical Method of Showing Discrimination in Jury Selection Cases Generally, 20 UCLA L, 
REv. 581, 620-31 (1973). In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,496 n.17 (1977), the Supreme 
Court used this methodology to reach its conclusion that a prima facie case of discrimination 
in the selection of grand juries in a Texas county had occurred. The Court cited the Finkel-
stein article, Sllpra, as well as several standard statistics texts: P. ~OEL, INTRODUCTION TO 
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS (4th ed. 1971); F. MOSTELLER, R. ROURKE & G. THOMAS, 
PROBABILITY WITH STATISTICAL APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1970). The Supreme Court has used 
statistical probability theory in other contexts as well. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 237 
(1978), for example, the Court relied on this methodology for its finding that reduction injury 
size below six would reduce minority group representation on juries, citing Lempert, Uncover-
ing "Nondiscemible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 13 MICH, L, 
REV. 643 (1975). This methodology is also co=only used in employment discrimination 
cases. See generally D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70. 
88. See cases cited at note 81 supra (prima facie case of systematic exclusion through use of 
the peremptory is established by a statistical showing that the prosecutor has systematically 
exercised his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks over a period of time); United States v, 
Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 472-73 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub nom. United States v. New-
man, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977) (approving use of statistical 
probability theory to carry Swain burden); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243, 
1246 n.5 (E.D. La 1974) (same). 
89. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,497 n.17 (1977). In explicitly approving this meth-
odology in the jury selection context, the Court has indicated that for large samples, "if the 
difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three 
standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be suspect to 
a social scientist." The two or three standard deviation rule has been applied by the courts in 
other contexts as well. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 443 U.S. 299, 308, 
311 nn.14&17 (1977); Hameed v. International Assn. of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron 
Workers Local 396,637 F.2d 506, 513-14 (8th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. United Va. Bank, 615 F.2d 
147, 151-52 (4th Cir. 1980); Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 784 n.29 (2d Cir. 1980); 
see D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 294-95. Two standard deviations is the equivalent 
of a probabilty of 5% (.05), the point normally regarded by statisticians and social scientists as 
"statistically significant." Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I, 26 n.58, 616 l>.2d 1301, 1314 
n.58, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 141 n.58 (1980); R. WINKLER & w. HAYES, STATISTICS: 
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Of course, variables other than the venireperson's views on capi-
tal punishment could account for any relationship found. To control 
for any such potentially confounding variables, analysis of the voir 
dire transcripts can also identify other possibly relevant variables -
demographic characteristics of the venireperson and his or her re-
sponses to certain voir dire questions. Twenty-nine such potential 
confounding variables were identified,90 and multivariate analysis is 
used to determine if a statistically significant relationship exists be-
tween venirepersons' attitudes concerning capital punishment and 
the exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenges, after removing 
the potentially confounding effects of these variables. 
If a statistically significant relationship, i.e., one exceeding the 
two or three standard deviation rule, is demonstrated between the 
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges and attitudes toward 
capital punishment, and if this relationship remains statistically sig-
nificant after removal of the effects of potentially confounding vari-
ables, then a prima facie case of prosecutorial abuse of the 
peremptory may be found.91 Under the traditional approach applied 
PROBABILITY, INFERENCE AND DECISION 413 (2d ed:-1975); Finkelstein, supra note 37, at 359. 
Three standard deviations is the equivalent of a probability of 1% (.01), regarded as "highly 
significant" Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 26 n.58, 616 P.2d at 1314 n.58, 168 Cal. 
Rptr. at 141 n.58. 
In Castaneda, the Supreme Court described the method of computing the standard devia-
tion and illustrated it with the facts of the case before it: 
Given that 79.1% of the population is Mexican-American, the expected number of Mexi-
can-Americans among the 870 persons summoned to serve as grand jurors over the 11-
year period is approximately 688. The observed number is 339. Of course, in any given 
drawing some fluctuation from the expected number is predicted. The important point, 
however, is that the statistical model shows that the results of a random drawing are likely 
to fall in the vicinity of the expected value .... The measure of the predicted fluctuation 
from the expected value is the standard deviation, defined for the binomial distribution as 
the square root of the product of the total number in the sample (here 870) times the· 
probability of selecting a Mexican-American (0.791 ) times the probability of selecting a 
non-Mexican American (0.209). 
430 U.S. at 496-97 n.17. The difference between the expected and observed number of Mexi-
can-Americans was approximately 29 standard deviations, the likelihood that such a substan-
tial departure from the expected value would occur by chance was less than 1 in 10140• Thus, 
the Court found that a prima facie case of discrimination against Mexican-Americans had 
been established. 430 U.S. at 496 & n. 17. Similar methodology has been approved in cases 
raising Swain challenges to the systematic exclusion of black venirepersons. See United States 
v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 472-73 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub nom. United States v. 
Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908 (1977); United States v. McDaniels, 
379 F. Supp. 1243, 1246 n.5 (E.D. La 1974). 
90. See text following note 100 i'!fra. 
91. Even though potential confounding variables were analyzed in this study, it should not 
be legally necessary for a defendant to perform this analysis to demonstrate a prima facie case 
ofprosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge. The lower federal courts, in d~cu_ssing the 
burden imposed by Swain, have not mentioned any need for the defend~t to eliminate ~e 
possibility that variables other than race may explain the_ prosecutors exerctSe _of per~mptones. 
See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th. Crr. 1981). Moreover, 1!1 the Jury selec-
tion context, a prima facie case of violation of the sixth amendment cross-section requirement 
or of equal protection is demonstrated by a statistical showing of substantial underrepresenta-
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in jury selection cases, such a prima facie case would shift to the 
prosecutor the burden to demonstrate that the challenges were based 
on trial related factors, rather than merely on opposition to the death 
penalty.92 
This methodology can also be used to assess the impact of such a 
systematic practice by prosecutors on the representative character of 
the juries selected. For this purpose a typical application of the "rule 
of exclusion" will suffice. Thus, a statistical comparison can be 
made of the proportion of scrupled venirepersons in the cases in the 
period studied who remained after challenges for cause and exercise 
of defense peremptories to the proportion actually selected as jurors. 
Establishing a statistically significant discrepancy between the ex-
pected number of scrupled jurors and the number actually selected 
would further support a constitutional challenge. In addition, an 
analysis of both defense and prosecutorial peremptory practices 
would meet the Swain requirement that any unrepresentative prod-
uct of peremptory challenge practices be attributed to the action of 
prosecutors rather than of defense counsel.93 
C. TheData 
Table 1 represents the total number of venirepersons in the voir 
dires studied who were examined as potential jurors or alternates, 
subdivided into nonscrupled venirepersons (those not expressing op-
position to the death penalty) and scrupled venirepersons (those ex-
tion of a cognizable class in the jury pool selected, without the necessity of eliminating the 
effect, if any, of other potential variables. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) 
(sixth amendment); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (equal protection). For exam-
ple, in Castaneda, a challenge to composition of grand juries, the defendant relied on statistical 
methods to demonstrate substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans in the county 
over a substantial period of time. The state courts had rejected this equal protection claim, 
finding that the defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case because, among other 
things, he did not demonstrate that factors other than race - age, poor health, lack of citizen-
ship, illiteracy, unsound mind, lack of moral character, criminal charges pending or a criminal 
record - had not accounted for the disproportionate results shown. The Supreme Court dis-
agreed, finding that a prima facie case had been established even though the defendant had 
not attempted to control for these potentially confounding variables, each of which would have 
disqualified a juror under state law. 430 U.S. at 484-85, 496, 504. 
92. This "question-raising, burden-shifting" use of statistical proofs is the approach com-
monly used in discrimination cases. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 27-30. 
93. Because defense attorneys are involved in the peremptory challenge system, the major-
ity in Swain stated that the rule of exclusion, "a proof standard developed in a context where 
there is no question of state responsibility for the alleged exclusion . . ., cannot be woodenly 
applied to cases where the discrimination is said to occur during the process of peremptory 
challenge of persons called for jury service." 380 U.S. 202,227. However, if a study identified 
the use of peremptory challenges by both prosecutors and defense attorneys, it would be possi-
ble to assess the extent of state responsibility for any unrepresentative result that had occurred. 
If this could be done, the rule of exclusion would seem the applicable method of demonstrat-
ing the existence of a pattern of "systematic exclusion." 
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pressing such opposition at the voir dire).94 The characterization of 
venirepersons reflects only their responses to inquiries at voir dire,95 
94. Venirepersons were separated into two groups for purposes of the study: those who 
voiced opposition to the death penalty and those who did not. It is useful to subdivide these 
categories further to delineate some of the issues made relevant by Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 
U.S. 510 (1968). See text accompanying notes 118-33 ln.fra. With certain modifications, the 
typography of the spectrum of attitudes on capital punishment developed in Hovey v. Superior 
Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 20,616 P.2d 1301, 1311, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 138 (1980), will be used. The 
group expressing opposition to the death penalty, also referred to here as "scrupled" venireper-
sons, can be further subdivided into three categories: (1) the "automatic acquittal" group, 
those opposed to the death penalty who could never return a verdict of guilt, and who there-
fore are subject to challenge for cause under Witherspoon, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 
596 (1978); (2) the "automatic life imprisonment" group, those opposed to the death penalty 
who although. they could consider a verdict of guilt, could never recommend a sentence of 
death, also subject to removal under Witherspoon; and (3) the "oppose death penalty'' group, 
those opposed to the death penalty who will not automatically vote against it or against guilt in 
every case, and who therefore may not be removed by challenge for cause consistent with 
Witherspoon. The group not expressing opposition to the death penalty, also referred to here 
as "nonscrupled" venirepersons, can be further subdivided into three categories: (1) the "auto-
matic death penalty'' group, those who favor the death penalty and will automatically vote for 
it if the defendant is convicted, and who are presumably subject to challenge for cause by the 
defendant, see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 n.20 (1968), clllng Crawford v. 
Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 303-04 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded far further conslderatlon ln light 
ef Witherspoon, 393 U.S. 76 (1968), reinstated (unreported), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970) 
(alternative holding); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 393 U.S. at 536 (Black, J., dissenting); Smith v. 
Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578,79 (5th Cir. 1981) (dictum); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 
20 n.48, 616 P.2d at 1310 n.48, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 137 n.48; Gillers, supra note 2, at 99 n.452 
(suggesting that permitting such jurors to serve may undercut Woodson, invalidating legisla-
tively mandated death sentences, and Lockett, commanding that a capital defendant receive 
individualized consideration); (2) the "favor death penalty" group, those who favor the death 
penalty but will not vote to impose it in every case; and (3) the "indifferent" group, those who 
express indifference to the death penalty, neither favoring nor opposing it, or who state they 
are undecided about the death penalty. The last two categories ofvenirepersons would not be 
subject to challenge for cause based on their views on capital punishment. 
95. While it is possible that some jurors who actually oppose the death penalty failed to 
voice objection (as well as that some who favor the penalty lied and voiced opposition, perhaps 
in an effort to avoid jury service), this should not affect the value of the study. First, under the 
method of questioning used in capital voir dires, persons who oppose the death penalty are 
asked to state their opposition. As Witherspoon forbids the prosecutor to inquire as to the 
venireperson's views of the propriety of death in the case at issue, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21, the 
questioning usually concerns whether the venireperson is opposed to the death penalty in gen-
eral or harbors moral or religious scruples against it. In a typical capital voir dire, the prosecu-
tor questions each venireperson intensively on the issue of capital punishment if the 
venireperson expresses any opposition or even hesitancy concerning capital punishment in or-
der to determine whether the person may be challenged for cause under Witherspoon. More-
over, the practice condemned by Witherspoon is the challenge of jurors "simply because they 
volced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples 
against its infliction." 391 U.S. at 522 (emphasis added). 
Of course the verbal responses of venirepersons do not tell the entire story. Prospective 
jurors also communicate through paralinguistic behavior ("aspects of speech - such as 
breathing, pauses and latencies, pitch and tone of voice, and speech disturbances") and kinetic 
behavior or "body language" ("facial expressions, body movements, body orientation, eye con-
tact, and hand movements"). Suggs & Sales, Using Communication Cues to Evaluate Prospec-
tive Jurors During the Voir Dlre, 20 .ARiz. L. REv. 629, 630-31 (1978). However, a study of this 
kind- dependent as it is on the transcribed record of the voir dire - is necessarily limited to 
the verbal communication of venirepersons. As venirepersons in capital cases are asked to 
verbalize their opposition to the death penalty, this is not a shortcoming. Moreover, as appel-
late challenges to jury selection practices in capital cases raising Witherspoon error are adjudi-
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typically by the prosecutor, as to whether they opposed the death 
penalty. Table 1 also shows the numbers of venirepersons removed 
for cause,96 those removed by defense peremptory challenges, and 
those remaining, the latter category constituting venirepersons sub-
ject to exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenge. 
Table 1 shows several interesting trends. First, the fraction of 
scrupled jurors in this area of the country amounts to about thirteen 
percent, approximately half the national average.97 The high 
number of challenges for cause among the scrupled jurors indicates 
that slightly more than half of the scrupled jurors could not vote for 
the death penalty under any circumstances, or were biased on the 
issue of guilt.98 The breakdown of venirepersons remaining after 
challenges for cause consequently includes only about 6% scrupled 
potential jurors. The defense peremptory challenges are extremely 
one-sided in favor of keeping scrupled jurors, and have the effect of 
increasing their representation from about 6% to about 8% of the 
potential jurors. 
Table 2 shows how the prosecutors used their peremptory chal-
lenges on potential jury members and altemates,99 subdivided into 
scrupled and non-scrupled venirepersons. 
Table 2 shows that while the prosecution used peremptory chal-
lenges against 28% of the nonscrupled jurors, it eliminated 77% of 
the scrupled jurors. And whereas 13% of the community opposed 
the death penalty, and 6% opposed it in a manner not justifying re-
cated purely on the transcribed record, this should be sufficient as a matter of law in the 
peremptory challenge context as well. 
96. Venirepersons were removed for cause on the motion of the prosecutor or defense, and 
sometimes by the court without motion. The trial court traditionally has the discretion to ex-
cuse a juror on its own motion. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 582 F.2d 968, 969 (5th Cir. 
1978) (per curiam). 
97. Opposition to the death penalty has dramatically lessened in the past 15 years. At the 
time of the Witherspoon decision, approximately 47% of the population fell into the "generally 
opposed to capital punishment" category. See 391 U.S. at 520 n.16 (citing 2 POLLS, INTERNA• 
TIONAL REVIEW ON PuBLIC OPINION No. 3, at 84 (1967)). Gallup polls conducted periodically 
since indicate that the nation's views have changed significantly, with only 25% opposing capi-
tal punishment and 66% favoring it in 1981. SoURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
- 1981, 209-12 (T. Flanagan, D. van Alstyne & M. Gottfriedson eds. 1982) (hereinafter cited 
as SOURCEBOOK). 
98. Based on the experience with nonscrupledjurors, one would expect about 18 of the 147 
scrupled venirepersons to be challenged for cause independent of their death penalty attitudes, 
Of the remaining 129, 74, or about 57%, were challenged for cause, presumably because of 
their views on the death penalty. 
99. In Florida each party generally has 10 peremptory challenges in a capital case. FLA, 
STAT. ANN.§ 913.08(l)(a)(2) (West 1982); FLA._ R. CRIM. P. 3.350(a). (Each party is given an 
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror selected. FLA. R. CRIM, P. 3.3SO(f), 
Two alternates are usually selected. 
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moval for cause under Witherspoon, fewer than 3% of the actual ju-
rors and alternates opposed the death penalty. 
The Appendix includes a breakdown of the data shown in Tables 
1 and 2 according to the venireperson's status as either a potential 
juror or potential alternate. These data do not suggest any different 
conclusions regarding these two categories, particularly in view of 
the relatively small number of potential alternates. 
For each ·of the 629 venirepersons subject to exercise of 
prosecutorial peremptory challenge, data was also collected concern-
ing twenty-nine potentially confounding variables. Based on the 
transcripts of the voir dires, 100 data were collected concerning such 
demographic factors as the venireperson's sex, marital status, age, 
number of children, occupation (based on eleven occupational cate-
gories), employment status, level of education, and length ohime in 
the community. Data were also collected concerning the venireper-
son's response to typical voir dire questions such as whether he or 
she knew or had a relative who knew the defendant, the prosecutor, 
the defense attorney, the judge, a witness or another juror; whether 
he or she had previously been the victim of a crime or had a relative 
who had been such a victim; whether he or she had previously served 
as a juror; and whether he or she had previously served as a juror in 
a capital case. In addition, data were collected concerning whether 
the prosecutor had attempted to remove the venireperson for cause, 
had attempted to remove him or her for cause based on death pen-
alty attitudes, and had questioned the venireperson concerning his or 
her ability to be impartial in deciding the defendant's guilt. 
In the case of twenty-two of these potential confounding vari-
ables, the transcripts did not contain sufficient information to permit 
100. The inability of a study of the kind undertaken here to go beyond the transcribed voir 
dire places obvious limits on the consideration of possibly confounding variables. For many 
venirepersons, the transcripts did not contain information on some of the control variables 
sought to be analyzed. However, unless the prosecutors had prior knowledge concerning the 
members of the venire ( or in the case of a few of the demographic variables, unless the prose-
cutors were able to identify these factors visually), the absence of information in the transcripts 
also indicates that the prosecutors lacked information concerning these variables, making it 
highly unlikely that they significantly affected the exercise of peremptories. Of course, some 
demographic variables not revealed by the transcripts were subject to visual observation - the 
race, personal appearance, and style of dress of the members of the venire, for example. And it 
is possible that prosecutors had access to out-of-court sources of information concerning the 
venirepersons that might influence the exercise of peremptory challenges. However, in the 
Florida case in which the study was raised, the state made no attempt to explain the exercise of 
peremptories on any of these bases. See note 66 supra. In the face of the strong inference 
created by the data, see notes 106-13 iefra and accompanying text, this omission suggests that 










TOTAL VENIREPERSONS EXAMINED (JURORS AND ALTERNATES) 
(Based on 30 cases) 
Subject to exercise of 
Venire persons Excused by prosecutorial peremptory 
Venire persons Challenged for Challenged for Excused for remaining after defense challenge (those remaining 
examined as cause by cause by cause by court excuse for peremptory after excuse for cause and 
potential jurors prosecutor defense without motion cause challenge defense peremptories) 
969 36 25 60 848 271 577 
(86.83%) (34.95%) (96.15%) (71.43%) (93.91%) (98.9%) (91.73%) 
147 67 1 24 55 3 52 
(13.17%) (65.05%) (3.85%) (28.57%) (6.09%) (1.1%) (8.27%) 
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TABLE2 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
IN SELECTING JURORS AND ALTERNATE JURORS 










Potential jurors subject to 
exercise of prosecutorial 
peremptory challenge 
(those remaining after 






















the multivariate analysis planned. IOI Further analysis of these vari-
ables was not attempted because of the biases in statistical computa-
101. The following table reports the percentage of missing data for each variable consid-
ered to have severe missing data problems. 
Variable 
1) age ofvenireperson 
2) number of children of venireperson 
3) occupation of venireperson 
4) level of education of venireperson 
5) time of venireperson in community 
6) venireperson knew prosecutor 
7) venireperson knew defense lawyer 
8) venireperson knew judge 
9) venireperson knew other juror 
IO) venireperson knew witness 
11) relative of venireperson knew defendant 
12) relative of venireperson knew prosecutor 
13) relative of venireperson knew defense lawyer 
14) relative of venireperson knew judge 
15) relative of venireperson knew other juror 
16) relative of venireperson knew witness 
17) venireperson had criminal record 
18) relative of venireperson had criminal record 
19) venireperson was victim of crime 
20) relative of venireperson was victim of crime 
21) venireperson had previously served as juror 
22) venireperson had previously served as juror in capital case. 
Percentage missing 























32 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 81:1 
tion which would be caused by the missing data. In the case of seven 
of the potential confounding variables there either was no missing 
data or the extent of missing data (less than 5%) was regarded as 
minimal. These variables were the venireperson's sex, marital status, 
and employment status, and whether the venireperson knew the de-
fendant, was unsuccessfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor, 
was unsuccessfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor based on 
death penalty attitudes, and was questioned by the prosecutor as to 
ability to be impartial in deciding guilt. Table 3 presents summary 
data on the use of prosecutorial peremptory challenges as a function 
of each of these variables, for scrupled and nonscrupled venireper-
sons. A more detailed breakdown of the data is tabulated in the 
Appendix. 
TABLE3 
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL CONFOUNDING VARIABLES 
Venireperson Characteristics Percent Percent of Venireeersons Challenged 
Scrueled Total Scrueted Nonscrueled 
Male 7.5 33.5 77.3 29.9 
Female 8.9. 31.3 76.7 26.8 
Married 6.7 22.5 64.3 19.5 
Not Married 11.0 49.2 90.5 44.1 
Employed 7.4 29.9 73.5 26,5 
Not Employed 8.7 36.0 84.6 31.4 
*Know Defendant 0.0 83.3 0.0 83.3 
Not Know Defendant 8.4 31.9 76.0 27.8 
*Challenged for Cause 61.1 94.4 90.9 100.0 
Not Challenged for Cause 6.7 30.4 73.2 27.4 
*Challenged for Cause (Death) 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Not Challenged for Cause (Death) 6.8 31.2 71.4 28.2 
Questioned on Guilt Impartialty 8.5 31.0 76.9 26.7 
*Not Questioned 0.0 73.7 73.7 
*Small number of venirepersons (less than 3% of total) 
This Table illustrates a slight difference102 only between the use 
of peremptory challenges for males (33.4%) and for females (31.3%). 
However, a substantial disparity between the use of peremptories for 
scrupled and for nonscrupled venirepersons is shown for both males 
The prosecutors' failure to inquire as to these variables suggests that they did not relate to 
the exercise of peremptories, unless, of course, the prosecutors had independent knowledge 
concerning these factors. See note 100 mpra. 
102. The use of the terms "slight difference" and "substantial disparity" in the description 
of the data appearing in Table 3 is not intended to convey any statistical conclusion. 
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(77 .3% of scrupled male venirepersons were challenged compared to 
29.9% of those who were nonscrupled) and females (76.7% of scru-
pled females were challenged compared to 26.8% for those who were 
nonscrupled). Thus although as shown in Table 3, women are 
slightly more likely to be death-scrupled than are men, there is no 
indication that the study results are the result of challenges based on 
sex rather than death penalty attitudes. 
The prosecutors challenged 22.5% of married venirepersons com-
pared to more than twice this percentage (49.2%) for those not mar-
ried. And unmarried venirepersons are more likely to be scrupled. 
Nonetheless, within each sub-category a substantial disparity is 
shown between the use of peremptories for scrupled and non-
scrupled venirepersons: for those not married, 90.5% of scrupled 
venirepersons were challenged compared to 44.1% for- those non-
scrupled; for those who were married, 64.3% of scrupled venireper-
sons were. challenged compared to 19.5% for those who were 
nonscrupled. 
A slight difference only is observed between the exercise of per-
emptory challenges for employed venirepersons (29.9%) and for 
those who were unemployed (36%). Again, within each sub-cate-
gory, a substantial disparity between the use of peremptories for 
scrupled and for nonscrupled venirepersons is shown: for those em-
ployed, 73.5% of scrupled venirepersons were challenged compared 
to only 26.5% for those who were nonscrupled; for those who were 
not employed, 84.6% of scrupled venirepersons were challenged 
compared to 31.4% for those who were nonscrupled. 
Not surprisingly, a substantial percentage (83.3%) of those re-
sponding affirmatively to the question of whether they had previ-
ously known the defendant were challenged. All six of these were 
nonscrupled venirepersons. For those who did not know the defend-
ant previously - 99% of total venirepersons - a substantial dispar-
ity between the use of peremptories for scrupled and for non-
scrupled venirepersons is shown: 76% of scrupled venirepersons 
compared to 27.8% of those who were nonscrupled were challenged. 
One of the principal functions of peremptory challenges is to fa-
cilitate exercise of the challenge for cause;103 indeed, their availabil-
ity minimizes tensions inherent in our system of challenges for 
cause. 104 As a result, it can be expected that prosecutors will chal-
103. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965); 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*353; Lempert, Jury Size And The .Peremptory Challenge, in THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 
349, 353-54 (R. Cover & 0. Fiss 1979). 
104. Lempert, supra note 103, at 354. 
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lenge peremptorily all or virtually all of those who they had previ-
ously attempted to remove for cause. This table reveals the expected 
result as 17 of the 18 venirepersons unsuccessfully challenged for 
cause (94.4%) were removed peremptorily. All seven of these who 
were nonscrupled were removed, but perhaps suprisingly, one of the 
11 scrupled venirepersons unsuccessfully challenged for cause (9.1%) 
was not excused peremptorily. For those venirepersons not chal-
lenged for cause - 97% of total venirepersons - a substantial dis-
parity between the use of peremptories for scrupled and for non-
scrupled venirepersons is shown: 73.2% of scrupled venirepersons in 
this category were excused by peremptory compared to only 27.4% 
for those non-scrupled. 
The next comparison in Ta,ble 3 examines a subset of those un-
successfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor - those so chal-
lenged based on their attitudes concerning the death penalty. All ten 
venirepersons in this category were removed peremptorily; by defini-
tion, all venirepersons in this category were scrupled. For those not 
challenged for cause as a result of their attitudes on the death pen-
alty - representing more than 98% of the total - a substantial dis-
parity between the use of peremptories for scrupled and for non-
scrupled venirepersons is shown: 71.4% of scrupled venirepersons 
are removed for cause compared to 28.2% of those who are 
nonscrupled. 
As the peremptory challenge is primarily " a device for eliminat-
ing from the jury individuals whose capacity for impartial judgment 
is suspect, but not so much as to require their exclusion as a matter 
oflaw,"105 one would expect that a higher percentage of those whose 
impartiality was questioned by the prosecutor would be removed by 
peremptory challenge than those whose impartiality was not ques-
tioned. Surprisingly, the data showed the contrary. For those ques-
tioned as to their ability to be impartial in deciding guilt - 97% of 
total venirepersons - 31% were removed. Although only 19 
venirepersons were not so.questioned (perhaps because a decision to 
challenge them had already been made on other grounds), of these, 
73.7% were removed by peremptory challenge. All 52 scrupled 
venirepersons were questioned as to impartiality, as were 97% of 
those who were non-scrupled, but 76.9% of the scrupled in this cate-
gory were removed compared to 26. 7% for those who were non-
scrupled. 
105. Id. 
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D. Analysis 
The question under investigation is whether prosecutors· in the 
Fourth Judicial Circuit systematically used their peremptory chal-
lenges to eliminate from capital juries those potential jurors expres-
sing opposition to the death penalty. Table 2 shows that for scrupled 
jurors subject to prosecutorial peremptory challenge, 40 out of 52 
(76.9%) were challenged. Given that prosecutors used peremptory 
challenges for 28.2% of nonscrupled potential jurors, one would ex-
pect that 15 of the 52 scrupled jurors would have been challenged. 
The chance of 40 or more scrupled potential jurors being removed 
by prosecutorial peremptory challenge at random is approximately 
eleven in one hundred billion (.000,000,000,11), or the equivalent of 
7 .6 standard deviations. This presents an astronomical degree of sta-
tistical significance; the result could be pure chance to approximately 
the same extent that flipping 33 heads in a row could be a chance 
result using an unbiased coin.106 
Moreover, the data demonstrate that, despite even more one-
sided (in the opposite direction) use of defense peremptories, the pat-
tern in the use of peremptories by the prosecutors produced a sub-
stantial underrepresentation of scrupled jurors on the jury panels 
selected. Table 1 reveals that 147 out of 1116 (13.2%) venirepersons 
examined as potential jurors expressed opposition to the death pen-
alty, and that 969 (86.8%) did not. After those excused for cause and 
by defense peremptory challenge were eliminated, 629 venirepersons 
remained. Of these, 52 (8.3%) were scrupled and 577 (91.7%) were 
nonscrupled. Table 2 reveals that 426 jurors and alternates were ac-
tually selected. Of these, one would expect that 35 (8.3%) would 
have been scrupled. In fact, as Table 2 reveals, only 12 scrupled 
106. Although the transcripts in three cases were unavailable, see note 80 supra and ac-
companying text, their unavailability did not appear to be related to any variable that would 
suggest that the 30 voir dires analyzed were in any way unrepresentative. Confidence in draw-
ing conclusions based on 30 out of33 voir dires is also appropriate in view of the response rate 
(90.91%), which is extremely high for studies of this type, involving court records that are 
rarely complete. Accordingly, the small nonresponse error problem encountered is not serious. 
To demonstrate further the strength of the conclusions reached on the basis of the 30 voir 
dires studied, a ''worst case" analysis was performed in which the incredible assumption was 
made that in each of the three missing cases, all 12 jurors selected were opposed to the death 
penalty. This would add 36 scrupled potential jurors subject to prosecutional peremptory 
challenge who were not challenged, resulting in 39 out of 84 (46.43%) scrupled jurors chal-
lenged. See Table A.I at page 91 infra .. Given that the prosecutors used peremptory chal-
lenges for 30.08% of nonscrupled potential jurors, one would expect that about 25 of these 84 
scrupled jurors would have been challenged. The chances of39 or more of the scrupled poten-
tial jurors being removed by prosecutorial peremptory challenge at random is calculated at 
thirteen in one million (.000,013), or the equivalent of 4.2 standard deviations. Thus, even a 
''worst case analysis" of the three missing cases reveals a result that is statistically significant to 
an extremely high degree. 
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venirepersons were selected, the remaining 40 having been removed 
by prosecutorial peremptory challenge. The chance of 12 or fewer 
scrupled jurors being selected at random is calculated at approxi-
mately 32 out of one million (.000,032), or the equivalent of 4.0 stan-
dard deviations. This presents a high degree of statistical 
significance; the probability of such a result occurring by chance is 
approximately equal to that of flipping 14 heads in a row with an 
unbiased coin. 
Of course, the Supreme Court in Swain warned that the rule of 
exclusion, "a proof standard developed in a context where there is no 
question of state responsibility for the alleged exclusion," should not 
be ''woodenly applied" in the peremptory challenge context, where 
the unrepresentative result may well be attributable to action of de-
fense counsel.107 The substantial underrepresentation of scrupled ju-
rors just demonstrated, however, resulted exclusively from 
_ prosecutorial action - the exercise by prosecutors of peremptory 
challenges to remove 40 out of 52 scrupled potential jurors who but 
for these challenges would have served on the juries selected. Tables 
1 and 2 demonstrate that the substantial underrepresentation of scru-
pled jurors occurred despite, rather than because of, defense ac-
tion.108 Of the 43 scrupled venirepersons removed by either party by 
means of peremptory challenge, 40 were removed by the prosecution 
and only 3 by the defense. By contrast, the defense accounted for 
271 of the 434 peremptory challenges to nonscrupled venirepersons. 
Several methods may be used to test for the effects of potential 
confounding variables 9n the preceding results. 109 A trivariate chi-
107. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,227 (1965); see note 93 supra. 
108. If the above calculation of the effect of prosecutorial peremptory challenges on the 
representative character of panels of jurors and alternate jurors selected is recomputed by ad-
ding back in those potential jurors subject to defense peremptory challenge, the results still 
indicate a statistically significant underreprese~tation in the number of scrupled jurors and 
alternates selected. Table 1 reveals that 147 out of 1116 venirepersons examined (13.17%) 
expressed opposition to the death penalty, and that 969 (86.83%) did not. After those excused 
for cause were eliminated, 55 scrupled venirepersons (6.09%) and 848 nonscrupled venireper-
sons (93.91%) remained. Table 2 reveals that 426 venirepersons were actually selected as ju-
rors and alternate jurors. Given that 426 venirepersons were actually selected, one would 
expect that 26 of them (6.09%) would have been scrupled venirepersons. In fact, as Tables 1 
and 2 reveal, only 12 scrupled venirepersons were selected, the remaining 43 having been 
eliminated by peremptory challenge (40 by prosecutors and 3 by defense attorneys). The 
chances of 12 or fewer scrupled venirepersons being selected at random is approximately 33 
out of 10,000 (.0033), or the equivalent of2.72 standard deviations. Moreover, this substantial 
underrepresentation was produced overwhelmingly by prosecutorial peremptory challenges. 
Of the 43 scrupled venirepersons removed by peremptory challenge, 40 (93.02%) were removed 
by prosecutorial peremptories and only 3 (6.98%) by defense peremptories. 
109. See, e.g., D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 211-86; Y. BISHOP, s. FEINBERG & 
P. HOLLAND, DISCRETE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: THEORY & PRACTICE (1975); D. MORRI· 
SON, MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL METHODS (2d ed. 1976). 
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square analysis was used to assess the effect of each of the seven 
potentially confounding variables on the relationship between exer-
cise of prosecutorial peremptory challenges and death penalty atti-
tudes.110 For the variables of sex, marital status, and employment 
status, a trivariate chi-square analysis was appropriate and demon-
strated that a statistically significant relationship remained between 
the exercise of peremptory challenges and death penalty attitudes af-
ter removing the effects of these variables.In For the remaining four 
I IO. See B. WINER, STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 855-59 (2d ed. 
1971). A related methodology is sometimes used in employment discrimination cases. See D. 
BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 2ll-17 (subgroup comparison). Because this study ex-
amined an entire population - all death penalty cases in which a jury was impanelled in 
Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit for the five-year period - rather than a sample, there is 
controversy concerning whether chi-square analysis may be applied. Compare N. NIE, C. 
HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER & D. BENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 224 (2d ed. 1975) (inappropriate for entire populations), with Gold, Statistical Tests 
and Substantive Significance, 4 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 42 (1969), and Winch & Campbell, Proof? 
No. Evidence? Yes. The Significance of Tests of Significance, 4 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 140 (1969) 
(appropriate). 
An alternate method of analysis that could not be used here is multiple regression, a device 
for making quantitative estimates of the effects of different factors on a dependent variable. 
See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 70, at 239-86; Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of 
Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex .Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 
(1980); Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1442 
(1973); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980); Smith 
& Abram, Quantitative Analysis and Proof of Employment .Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 
33; Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment .Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof 
and Rebullal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975). Where the dependent variable is dichotomous, as 
it is here (challenged or not challenged), a number of threats to validity are presented that 
render multiple regression analysis generally unavailable. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra 
note 70, at 267-72. An emerging methodology, "logit" analysis or "probit analysis," is avail-
able in certain instances with dichotomous dependent variables. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, 
supra, at 271-72 n.55; Id. 1981 Supplement at 55; Y. BISHOP, s. FEINBERG & P. HOLLAND, 
supra note 109; E. HANUSHEK & ]. JACKSON, Statistical Methods far Social Scientists 190-200, 
204-05 (1977). For recent legal studies using this methodology, see Baldus, Pulaski, Wood-
worth & Kyle, Ident!fying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of .Death: A Quantitative Ap-
proach, 33 STAN. L. REV. I (1980); Nagel & Hagan, 17,e Sentencing of White-Collar Criminals 
in Federal Courts: A Socia-Legal Exploration of .Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1427 (1982). 
Unfortunately, as the computer programs for these methods were unavailable at the University 
of Miami, it could not be determined whether the data were amenable to these techniques of 
analysis. 
111. For sex, the disparity shown was significant at the .000,000,000,3 level of statistical 
significance. No other relationship (i.e., between challenges and sex, with the effects of death 
penalty attitude removed; or between death penalty attitude and sex, with the effects of exer-
cise of challenges removed; or the three-way interaction among all of them) was significant 
beyond the .27 level of statistical significance. 
For employment status, the disparity shown was significant at the .000,000,000,2 level of 
statistical significance. No other relationship (i.e., between challenges and employment status, 
with the effects of death penalty attitude removed;. or between death penalty attitude and em-
ployment status, with the effects of exercise of challenges removed; or the three-way interac-
tion among all of them) was significant beyond the .157 level of statistical significance. 
For marital status, the disparity shown was significant at the .000,000,000,21evel of statisti-
cal significance. However, marital status was statistically related to the exercise of challenges 
at the .000,000,000,3 level The relationship of death penalty attitude with marital status, hav-
ing removed the effects of exercise of challenges was not statistically significant (at the .693 
level). The three-way interaction among all of them was statistically significant at the .000,28 
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variables - whether the venireperson knew the defendant, whether 
the venireperson was unsuccessfully challenged for cause by the 
prosecutor, whether the venireperson was unsuccessfully challenged 
for cause by the prosecutor based on death penalty attitudes, and 
whether the venireperson was questioned by the prosecutor on abil-
ity to be impartial in deciding guilt - the small number of 
venirepersons in some entries in the detailed data tabulated in the 
Appendix indicates that the trivariate chi-square analysis is not ap-
propriate and a descriptive discussion of the impact of these vari-
ables on peremptory challenge practices and death penalty attitudes 
is all that is possible. As none of the venirepersons who knew the 
defendant were scrupled, a comparison was possible only for those 
(99% of the total) who did not know the defendant. In this subgroup, 
the disparity between scrupled (76% challenged) and nonscrupled 
venirepersons (27.8% challenged) mirrored the overall disparity 
shown. With respect to the variable of prior unsuccessful challenge 
for cause by prosecutor, a slight difference is shown between scru-
pled (90.9% challenged) and nonscrupled venirepersons (100% chal-
lenged) for the small number of venirepersons (3% of the total) 
previously challenged. For those not so challenged (97% of the to-
tal), however, the disparity between scrupled (73.4% challenged) and 
nonscrupled venirepersons (27.4% challenged) mirrored the overall 
disparity shown. As none of the venirepersons who were unsuccess-
fully challenged for cause by the prosecutor based on death penalty 
attitudes were nonscrupled, a comparison was possible only for those 
(more than 98% of the total) who were not challenged for cause on 
this basis. In this subgroup, the disparity between scrupled (71.4% 
challenged) and nonscrupled venirepersons (28.2% challenged) mir-
rored the overall disparity shown. As all of the scrupled venireper-
sons were questioned by the prosecutor concerning their ability to be 
impartial, a comparison was not possible for those not so questioned. 
For those questioned on impartiality (97% of the total), the disparity 
between scrupled (76.9% challenged) and nonscrupled (26.7% chal-
lenged) mirrored the overall disparity shown. 
Thus, the binomial distribution analysis demonstrates a relation-
ship between exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenges and 
death penalty attitudes that is statistically significant to an astro-
nomical degree, a relationship that remains unchanged after remov-
ing, through trivariate chi-square analysis, the effects of the three 
level. These relationships found for the variable of marital status do not in any way detract 
from the conclusion that exercise of challenges and death penalty attitudes are related to a 
statistically significant extent. 
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potential confounding variables for which there was sufficient data 
to perform the analysis. This should certainly suffice to satisfy the 
burden imposed by Swafn. For the five-year period studied a prim.a 
facie case has been demonstrated that prosecutors in Florida's· 
Fourth Judicial Circuit systematically used their peremptory chal-
lenges to eliminate from capital juries venirepersons expressing op-
position to the death penalty.112 And, because those opposed to the 
death penalty are in the minority, 113 this practice resulted in their 
substantial underrepresentation despite the best countervailing ef-
forts of the defense. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SYSTEMATIC 
EXCLUSION OF SCRUPLED JURORS 
Under Swain, the prosecution's use of the peremptory challenge 
is subject to review if the defense can show a pattern of abuse ex-
tending over a sufficient number of cases114 Part II discussed the 
requirement of systematic use of the peremptory; Part III presented 
data indicating such a pattern in the district studied. The remaining 
requirement to make out a case under Swain is that the Constitution 
must forbid the particular systematic practice challenged by the de-
fense. In Swain, the exclusion of blacks from juries clearly violated 
their right to equal participation in the criminal justice system and, 
arguably, the right of the defendant to a representative jury. 115 The 
systematic use by prosecutors of their peremptory challenges to elim-
inate from capital juries those who express opposition to the death 
penalty implicates a number of constitutional rights, including the 
112. Under the traditional approach in jury selection cases, the establishment of such a 
prima facie case shifts to the state the burden of demonstrating that the challenges were based 
on legitimate trial related factors rather than merely on opposition to the death penalty. See, 
e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); 
see note 91 supra and accompanying text. In the Florida case in which the study was raised, 
the state made no attempt to explain its exercise ofperemptories on any basis other than views 
on capital punishment See note 66 supra. Under the traditional approach, such a failure to 
offer evidence to rebut the inference suggested by the data results in judgment for the defen-
dant. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482. 
• 113. See note 97 supra. 
114. To have standing to question the prosecutor's pattern of peremptory abuses, the de-
fendant probably would have to show that the jury composition in his case was adversely 
affected, although this was not an issue in Swain. 
115. Swain did not raise the issue of representativeness, since it was decided before the 
sixth amendment was held applicable to the states. See note 34supra. However, representa-
tiveness clearly was involved in earlier equal protection jury cases, see, e.g., Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1880), and arguably Swain simply held that the state could not 
achieve through the use of the peremptory what it could not do by statute under Strauder. 
Thus representativeness seems to have been an underlying, if not explicit concern. 
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fourteenth amendment due process right and the fair cross-section 
right inherent in the sixth and eighth amendment guarantees. 
A. Systematic Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors and the .Due Process 
Right to an Impartial Jury 
I. Witherspoon and the Right to Jury "Impartiality on Sentence 
The right to trial by an impartial jury lies at the very heart of due 
process. Even before the Supreme Court held that the sixth amend-
ment right to jury trial applied to the states as a matter of due pro-
cess, 116 the Court declared that due process guarantees to the 
criminally accused "a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' 
jurors."117 It was this due process right - and not the fair cross-
section requirement of the sixth amendment right to jury trial - that 
the Court found to have been violated by the practice condemned in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois .118 
In Witherspoon, the United States Supreme Court restricted the 
use of the challenge for cause to remove from capital juries persons 
generally opposed to the death penalty. The Court did not condemn 
all challenges for cause based on opposition to the death penalty. It 
specifically declined to disapprove of the removal of venirepersons 
who made it "unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically 
vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to 
any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before 
them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would pre-
vent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's 
guilt." 119 However, the Court ruled out the removal for cause of 
potential jurors who merely express general opposition to the death 
116. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
117. Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 
(1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 
(1963). The Court has more recently noted that the right to an impartial jury arises from both 
the sixth amendment and principles of due process. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 
(1976). 
118. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Although the Court used the language of due process, 391 U.S. 
at 523, and cited prior due process cases, it also mentioned the sixth amendment, and its refer-
ence to the jury's role of "express[ing] the conscience of the community" in assessing punish-
ment suggests that it was. applying the fair cross-section requirement. 391 U.S. at S18-19. 
However, Witherspoon could not have been a sixth amendment case, as the trial in Wither-
spoon occurred before the sixth amendment was held applicable to the states in Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and the Court, two weeks after Witherspoon was decided, 
declined to give.Duncan retroactive effect. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). Wither-
spoon can thus be viewed as applying the constitutional principles "of due process as seen 
through the filter of Sixth Amendment values." Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 10-11 
n.17, 616 P.2d 1301, 1304 n.17, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131 n.17 (1980). 
119. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21 (emphasis in original). Accord, 
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1969). 
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penalty but who are willing to consider the possibility of its imposi-
tion in at least some cases and to make an impartial decision on the 
issue of the defendant's guilt. 120 In the years since its decision the 
Court has consistently adhered to Witherspoon, applying it repeat-
edly to invalidate death sentences imposed by juries from which 
even one prospective juror was excluded for cause because of views 
on capital punishment on "any broader basis" than authorized by 
Witherspoon .121 
Prior to the Court's decision, under the generally prevailing prac-
tice prosecutors ascertained on voir dire whether prospective jurors 
harbored any opposition to the death penalty, and removed for cause 
all who did. 122 The desire to select an impartial jury was not neces-
sarily the only factor that led prosecutors to use the challenge for 
cause in this manner. The practice may also have been fueled by the 
prosecutor's desire to select a jury inclined to impose a death sen-
tence as well as one that would likely identify more with the prosecu-
tion than with the defense and thus be more likely to convict.123 
In Witherspoon, the defendant was tried pursuant to a statute 
which gave the jury wide discretion in choosing between life impris-
onment and the death penalty, and also permitted the prosecutor to 
challenge for cause any juror who stated "that he has conscientious 
scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the 
same."124 The trial court eliminated forty-seven venirepersons be-
cause of their opposition to the death penalty. Of those eliminated, 
120. Just as veniremen cannot be excluded for cause on the ground that they hold such 
views [against capital punishment], so too they cannot be excluded for cause simply be-
cause they indicate that there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to rec-
ommend capital punishment. And a prospective juror cannot be expected to say in 
advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before 
him. The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to 
consider all of the penalties provided by state law and that he not be irrevocably commit-
ted, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts 
and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21. Moreover, even a ''.juror who believes that 
capital punishment should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its aboli-
tion" might be able to "subordinate his _personal views to what he perceived to be his duty to 
abide by his oath as a juror and to obey the law of the State." 391 U.S. at 514 n.7. See also 
Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 484 (1969). 
121. E.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Davis v:Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per 
curiam); Mathis v. New Jersey 403 U.S. 946 (1971) (reversing death sentences in consolidated 
petitions). See also Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (remanding); Boulden v. Holman, 
394 U.S. 478 (1969) (remanding). 
122. See note·17 supra. 
123. See generally Bedau, The Courts, Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L. 
REv. 201,209; Oberer, .Does .Disqual!ficat/on ef Jurors far Scruples Against Capital Punisqment 
Constitute .Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 545, 555 (1961); White, 
supra note 68, at 405. 
124. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959); see 391 U.S. at 519. 
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only five had stated that they would not vote for the death penalty 
under any circumstances; the remainder were dismissed before it 
could be ascertained whether they could vote for death in an appro-
priate case despite their general opposition to capital punishment. 125 
By permitting the automatic removal for cause of jurors who had 
scruples against capital punishment, Illinois had denied Wither-
spoon his due process right to an impartial jury on the issue of sen-
tence. When the state "swept from the jury all who expressed 
conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment and all 
who opposed it in principle,"126 it produced a "hangingjury,"127 one 
"uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."128 Under the jury 
selection practices at issue, Illinois had "stacked the deck" 129 against 
the defendant, producing a "tribunal organized to return a verdict of 
death."130 This violated one of the "basic requirements of proce-
dural fairness ... that the decision whether a man deserves to live 
or die must be made on scales that are not deliberately tipped toward 
death."131 
The Witherspoon Court thus held that a jury culled of all who 
opposed the death penalty could not be neutral on the question of 
sentence, as the due process right to. an impartial jury requires, but 
would be biased in favor of returning a sentence of death. More-
over, a defendant suffering Witherspoon error need not demonstrate 
particularized prejudice; the Court found it "self-evident that, in its 
role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this jury fell woe-
fully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was enti-
tled." 132 The Court left open the question of whether such a jury 
125. 391 U.S. at 514. 
126. 391 U.S. at 520. 
127. 391 U.S. at 523. 
128. 391 U.S. at 521. 
129. 391 U.S. at 523. 
130. 391 U.S. at 521. 
131. 391 U.S. at 521-22 n.20. 
132. 391 U.S. at 518. At another point, the Court noted that by excluding all who opposed 
capital punishment, the state had "crossed the line of neutrality." 391 U.S. at 520. No empiri-
cal support was deemed n~cessary to justify the conclusion of bias as to sentence. In a number 
of cases, both prior to Witherspoon and more recently, the Court has also employed a pre-
sumption that the fact-finder was biased. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) 
(state licensing board with pecuniary interest in outcome may not conduct license revocation 
proceedings); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (a judge who was the subject of 
the defendant's contemptuous utterances at trial may not preside over his post-trial criminal 
· contempt proceeding); Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (per curiam) (prospective 
jurors who had heard guilty verdict announced in open court against defendant about to be 
tried in second trial on similar charges presumed biased); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) 
(judge who had conducted prior grand jury inquiry may not preside at defendants' trials for 
criminal contempt stemming from their grand jury appearances); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 
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could fairly consider the question of a defendant's innocence or 
guilt.133 
When prosecutors use their peremptory challenges in a system-
atic fashion to exclude from capital juries those not subject to re-
moval for cause under Wltherspoon, precisely the same result as that 
condemned in Witherspoon ensues.134 A jury culled of all capital 
punishment objection - whether by removal for cause or by per-
emptory challenge - may be considered just as much a '-'hanging 
jury," as one "organized to return a verdict of death." As Wither-
spoon seeks to protect the fundamental principle of jury impartiality, 
it would seem to condemn capital sentencing decisions "made on 
scales that ·are ... deliberately tipped toward death"135 no matter 
how accomplished. There is more than one way to "stack a deck," 
and when the prosecutor accomplishes indirectly through use of the 
peremptory challenge the precise result condemned in Witherspoon 
through use of the challenge for cause, the constitutional conse-
(1927) (judge with pecuniary interest in outcome may not hear case). For lower court applica-
tions of implied bias rules, set'., e.g., McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1981) (bias 
implied where juror conceals information at voir dire that would have resulted in disqualifica-
tion for cause); United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977) (new trial required where 
two of the jurors in robbery trial had worked for bank that had been robbed); Haak v. State, -
Ind.-, 417 N.E.2d 321 (1981) (juror whose husband was offered a job by prosecutor's office 
on day of jury selection impliedly biased). In other contexts the Court has rejected an implied 
bias approach in favor of a procedure at which the defendant is given the opportunity to prove 
actual bias. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 102 S. Ct 940 (1982) (juror's submission during trial of 
job application to prosecutor's office does not violate defendant's due process rights absent 
proof of actual bias); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 277 (1954) (attempted bribe of juror); 
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950) (jury members in trial for criminal contempt for 
failure to appear before House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities were 
U.S. Government employees subject to discharge for disloyalty). 
133. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,517, 518 (1968). The Court was presented with 
the preliminary and unpublished results of several studies indicating that death-qualified juries 
(those from which all prospective jurors generally opposed to the death penalty are removed) 
are biased in favor of the prosecution on the issue of guilt. 391 U.S. at 517 n.10; see notes 163. 
& 164 infra. The Court rejected this evidence as ''too tentative and fragmentary." 391 U.S. at 
517; but see notes 164-76 infra and accompanying text. 
134. The ~alifornia Supreme Court, in deciding a related issue, has recognized that sys-
tematic use of the peremptory challenge to exclude jurors with conscientious scruples against 
the death penalty would violate the principle of Swain: 
(l]n light of the Witherspoon definition of a capital jury which is "impartial" on the issue 
of imposing the death penalty it cannot be assumed that a prosecutor who uses peremp-
tory challenges to remove all jurors who have reservations concerning the death penalty is 
acting on the basis of "acceptable considerations." . . . [A] prosecutor who uses peremp-
tory challenges for the purpose of producing [a death qualified] jury is violating his obli-
gation to assure the defendant a fair trial. 
People v. Sears, 71 Cal. 2d at 648 n.S, 450 P.2d at 257 n.5, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 881 n.5. The court 
reasoned that although Swain compels the presumption that the state is using its peremptories 
to obtain an impartial jury, the prosecutor as an "agent of sovereignty" has a duty to ensure a 
fair penalty determination within the limits of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 {!,S. 510 (1968). 
See also In re Anderson, 69 Cal 2d 613, 619-20, 447 P.2d 117, 122, 73 Cal Rptr. 21, 26 (1968); 
Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 858 (Fla. 1969). · 
135. 391 U.S. at 521-22 n.20. 
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quences should be the same. In both cases the resulting jury is not 
neutral on the question of sentence, but is biased in favor of capital 
punishment. 
The Witherspoon principle, as the Court has recently noted in 
Adams v. Texas, constitutes "a limitation of the State's power to ex-
clude: if prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of 
their views about capital punishment on 'any broader basis' than in-
ability to follow the law or abide by their oaths, the death sentence 
cannot be carried out."136 The Witherspoon principle thus reflects a 
careful balance between conflicting interests - the state's interest in 
enforcing its capital punishment scheme and the defendant's interest 
in an impartial jury on sentence. The state's interest would be satis-
fied if the prosecution could exclude jurors who would automatically 
vote against death in any case137 or whose views would prevent them 
from being impartial on the question of guilt. Accordingly Wither-
spoon does not forbid exclusion of these jurors.138 But once the 
state's interest in avoiding nullification of its statutory scheme is ac-
complished, the state's power to exclude comes to an end. At that 
point, the defendant's right to an impartial jury prohibits exclusion 
of scrupled jurors on "any broader basis" than is necessary to satisfy 
the state interest in avoiding nullification. 
The Court's approach in Adams suggests that it would not sanc-
tion the upsetting of the careful balance struck in Witherspoon 
through means of the peremptory challenge, or indeed through any 
other means of exclusion. In Adams, the state brought about the ex-
clusion of capital punishment objectors on a "broader basis" than 
approved by Witherspoon through means not of removal for cause 
based on scruples against the death penalty, but of disqualification 
for unwillingness or inability to swear, in accordance with a state 
statutory requirement, that the possibility that the defendant will be 
executed will not affect the juror's deliberations on any issue of fact. 
That the Court found that this method of exclusion violated Wither-
spoon indicates that it will not tolerate the infringement of the 
Witherspoon principle by other methods of exclusion, including sys-
tematic use of the peremptory challenge. 
Arguably, the use of the peremptory challenge to achieve the re-
136. 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980). 
137. Professor White has argued, however, that so long as the state has left the death pen-
alty decision to jury discretion, "it is not apparent why a juror's consciettious scruples against 
capital punishment or even her total unwillingness to vote for it in any case would incapacitate 
her from participating in the discretionary judgment." White, supra note 68, at 355. 
138. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,522 n.21 (1968); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 
596 (1978). 
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sult described in Witherspoon can be distinguished from that case 
and from Adams because peremptory practice involves somewhat 
different state interests. Prohibiting the use of peremptories to 
achieve the proscribed result necessarily involves review of the moti-
vation behind the challenges, threatening the important policies 
which underlie them. Swain, however, makes clear that the peremp-
tory is not sacrosanct139 and may not be used systematically by pros-
ecutors to accomplish an unconstitutional result. Although Swain 
involved racial equality interests, traditionally protected by height-
ened scrutiny and solicitude from the courts, the defendant's interest 
in death penalty cases - literally a matter of life and death -
should weigh no less against the state interest in the peremptory sys-
tem.140 Just as use of the peremptory systematically to exclude 
blacks would constitute a perversion of the challenge that is not be-
yond judicial review, 141 its use systematically to exclude prospective 
jurors in death cases because of their views about capital punishment 
on a "broader basis" than approved by Witherspoon would seem no 
less offensive to the Constitution. 
The state's primary interest in the peremptory challenge - the 
avoidance of juries biased against the state142 - is similar to the 
state interest protected in Witherspoon. As in Witherspoon, this in-
terest is fully protected by limiting exclusion in such a way that ju-
rors may not systematically be removed because of their views on 
capital punishment on " 'any broader basis' than inability to follow 
139. If anything, the prosecutorial conduct to which this Article objects should be subject 
to more searching judicial scrutiny than the conduct alleged in Swain. The presumption of 
prosecutorial propriety underlying that decision clearly made· very difficult the inference that 
government officers deliberately and universally removed potential jurors because of the bla-
tantly unconstitutional criterion of race. But presuming that prosecutors will not deliberately 
subvert constitutional values does not lead to the conclusion that they would not engage in the 
systematic exclusion of death-scrupled individuals from capital juries; they almost certainly, 
albeit erroneously, believe the practice to be constitutional. See note 17 supra. The unconsti-
tutionality of peremptorily challenging death-scrupled venirepersons involves considerations 
of due process, trial by jury, and cruel and unusual punishment which are far subtler, if no less 
compelling, than the naked racism which the Court in Swain was so reluctant to infer from the 
record before it. The judiciary, therefore, would express no disrespect for prosecutorial mo-
tives by restricting peremptory challenges as advocated here. 
Nor does the second policy underlying the Swain result, the need for the ability to chal-
lenge venirepersons whom vigorous voir dire examination may offend, as distinct from the 
presumption of prosecutorial good faith, weigh heavily against the rule this Article proposes. 
Since restructuring the voir dire by limiting inquiry into venirepersons' general attitudes to-
ward the death penalty would not deprive the prosecution of any peremptories, see notes 336-
51 i,yra and accompanying text, the government need not fear that vigorous investigation of 
potential jurors' attitudes might result in alienating venirepersons who could not later be ·re-
moved for cause. 
140. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text. 
141. 380 U.S. at 223-24. 
142. See note 26 supra. 
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the law or abide by their oaths."143 To permit systematic use of the 
peremptory to remove the very group of jurors that Witherspoon 
held should serve on capital juries if they were to remain impartial 
would thus produce the very jury Witherspoon condemned as biased 
on sentence. Unless there are significant additional state interests in 
the peremptory challenge, Witherspoon would seem dispositive. 
Of course, to some extent, the state interest in the peremptory 
challenge can be seen as obtaining favorable jurors, not merely as 
avoiding jurors biased against the state. Whether the state interest in 
this partisan function of the peremptory should be deemed legiti-
mate has never been decided. The purpose of the peremptory is typ-
ically seen as attempting "to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try 
the case before the court."144 The Swain Court's description of the 
functions of the peremptory does not mention the purely partisan 
interest in obtaining favorable (as opposed to avoiding biased) ju-
rors. 145 Indeed, some commentators have questioned the legitimacy 
of the prosecutor's purely partisan interest in the peremptory. 146 
However, even assuming the legitimacy, as an aspect of our adver-
sary system, of the peremptory as a partisan tool to select favorable 
jurors, this interest would not justify systematic use of the challenge 
to achieve what would otherwise be an unconstitutional result. 
Thus, prosecutors might attempt to remove all black jurors peremp-
torily, on the assumption that black jurors as a class tend to be more 
pro-defense than white jurors.147 Any attempt to justify such a use 
of the peremptory by reference to its partisan objectives, however, 
would violate the dicta in Swain .148 Systematic use of the peremp-
143. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980). 
144. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222-(1965). 
145. See 380 U.S. at 219-20 (to eliminate extremes of partiality; to assure the party that the 
jurors will decide on the basis of the evidence and not otherwise; to facilitate the exercise of 
challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror's hostility through examination 
and challenge for cause). See also Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899) ("The man-
ner of selection is one calculated to secure an impartial jury . . . • The right to challenge is the 
right to reject, not to select, a juror."); 4 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES •353 (peremptory 
challenges "grounded on two reasons": (1) to allow a defendant to remove jurors conceived to 
be prejudiced, thus insuring that he has "a good opinion of the jury, the want of which might 
totally disconcert him"; and (2) to facilitate the exercise of challenges for cause since if such a 
challenge to a juror is rejected, "perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes 
provoke a resentment"). 
146. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 167 ("it is the duty of the prosecutor, as an officer 
of the state, to see that the accused is tried by a fair, impartial, and representative jury; it is not 
the role of the prosecutor to attempt to empanel a jury composed of those most likely to con-
vict"); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 25, at 357 n.97 (''the use of peremptories to obtain a 
partial jury would defeat its purpose"). 
147. See Yale Note, supra note 45, at 1733 n.77. 
148. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. 
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tory against members of a particular group, even though serving 
what might be a legitimate goal of the peremptory, cannot be permit-
ted to produce the effect ~ondemned by an overriding constitutional 
value - the value of equal protection in the Swain context, or of the 
fair trial guaranteed by due process in the capital trial context. 
Viewed in· this way, the Swain dicta finds support in a number of 
constitutional contexts, where what would otherwise constitute legiti-
mate state interests have not been permitted to violate overriding 
constitutional values. 149 In short, Swain, like Witherspoon, repre-
sents a careful balance between conflicting interests. It permits the 
prosecutor to seek partisan ends by partisan means without judicial 
oversight so long as the prosecutor does not act according to a gen-
eral formula that produces a result in conflict with the constitutional 
command against excluding blacks as a class from jury service. 
When the prosecutor does act according to such a general formula, 
he "systematically'' excludes blacks, and no partisan objective of the 
prosecution can justify that result. The constitutional value of pro-
tecting capital defendants against ''hanging juries," recognized in 
Witherspoon, is entitled to the same predominance over the partisan, 
interest of the prosecutor in exercising peremptory chall~mges.150 
The state might object to the characterization of its partisan in-
terest in the peremptory as merely an interest in obtaining a 
favorable jury. Rather, it might contend that given defense per-
emptories that are nonreviewable151 and clearly exercised for parti-
san ends - to remove death penalty advocates - the state must be 
able to use its peremptories to offset those of the defense. Otherwise, 
a jury will result that is more biased toward the defense on the death 
penalty question than would be one not subject to the peremptory 
process. Several considerations render this objection unpersuasive. 
First, it is almost impossible to predict how much systematic use of 
the peremptory would offset, but not surpass, the effect of the de-
fense peremptories. For example, if only ten percent of the venire 
remaining after challenges for cause is opposed to the death pen-
149. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353-74 (1976) (plurality opinion); Pickering v. 
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-75 (1968); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1962); 
Schlochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1956). 
150. Striking the balance in favor of the relevant constitutional value is particularly appro-
priate as the state interest in the peremptory challenge is enshrined in neither the Constitution, 
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919), nor the common law. See Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202, 242-43 & n.4 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); People v. Payne, 31 CRIM .. 
L. RPTR. (BNA) 2229, 2230 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 147-50, 
166-67. 
151. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219; Harrison v. United States, 163 U.S. 140, 
14~ (1896); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). 
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alty, 152 the defense will have to challenge nine death penalty advo-
cates for each opponent challenged by the prosecution to maintain a 
constant percentage of death-scrupled jurors. The defense, however, 
usually enjoys the same, or at most perhaps a slightly larger, number 
of challenges as the prosecution.153 
A second argument against permitting the state to attempt to off-
se~ the defense's use of the peremptory is that the prosecution has 
such a substantial initial advantage in being able to exclude one half 
to two thirds of the death penalty opponents for cause under Wither-
spoon before using its first peremptory challenge.154 That advan-
tage, which admittedly is necessary to protect the state's interest in 
enforcing its death penalty laws, 155 makes the jury more death-prone 
than the general population. It is unlikely that the defense chal-
lenges, even if used exclu~ively against death penalty advocates, are 
adequate to offset this initial bias. 
Finally, the prosecution has a higher duty than the defense of 
assuring a fair trial. 156 In view of that duty, and the uncertainty in 
trying to gauge how many challenges (if any) are required to balance 
the defense peremptories, use of the peremptory systematically to re-
move jurors solely because of death penalty opposition (not rising to 
152. In the study reported in this Article, scrupled venirepersons constituted only 6% of the 
total venire remaining at this stage. See text following note 98 supra. Admittedly, it is an 
oversimplification to view potential jurors as either scrupled or nonscrupled. There is a contin-
uum of attitudes on the death penalty, and it is conceivable, but not likely, that the net effect of 
defense and prosecution peremptories is a jury no more inclined to the death penalty than the 
average of the population, despite the reduction in the percentage of jurors classified as 
"scrupled." 
153. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (each side entitled to twenty peremptory challenges 
in capital cases); FLA. STAT.§ 913.08(l)(a) and FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350(a) (each side entitled to 
ten peremptory challenges in capital cases); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § l 15-4(e) (20 perempto-
ries). Although historically the prosecutor enjoyed less peremptory challenges than the de-
fense, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214-15, 220 (1965), in most jurisdictions today both 
are entitled to the same number. E.g., FLA. STAT.§ 913.08 (I); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350. In a 
few jurisdictions, the defendant may be entitled to a few more than the prosecutor. E.g., FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (in noncapital felony cases, defendant entitled to 10 peremptories and prose-
cutor to 6). The number of peremptory challenges may also increase with the severity of the 
crime. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b); FLA. STAT.§ 913.08(l)(a)-(c); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350 (a)-
(c). For a detailed compilation of peremptory challenge systems in various states, see J. VAN 
DYKE, supra note 25, at 281-85 (Appendix D). 
154. See notes 98 supra & 319 i'!fra. 
155. But see note 137 supra. 
156. See People v. Sears, 71 Cal. 2d at 648 n.5, 450 P.2d at 257 n.5, 74 CAL. RPTR. at 881 
n.5 (suggesting that "a prosecutor who uses peremptory challenges for the purpose of produc-
ing [a death qualified] jury is violating his obligation to assure the defendant a fair trial."), 
The court reasoned that although Swain compels the presumption that the state is using its 
peremptories to obtain an impartial jury, the prosecutor as an "agent of a sovereignty" has a 
duty to ensure a fair penalty determination within the limits of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 
U.S. 510 (1968). See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976); Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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the Witherspoon standard) should not be justified by any state inter-
est in attempting to offset defense peremptory practices. 
Although Witherspoon involved the removal of all scrupled ju-
rors, whereas systematic use of the peremptory may result only in 
removing a substantial number, somewhat less than all - in this 
study 81.3% of scrupled jurors who but for prosecutorial peremptory 
challenge would have served were removed 157 - this should make 
no difference. The Supreme Court has held that the Witherspoon 
principle is violated, and any ensuing death sentence must be va-
cated, where even one juror was excluded on "any broader basis" 
than authorized in Witherspoon .158 Thus, as a matter of law, a jury 
from which even one scrupled juror was improperly removed is 
deemed to be biased on the issue of sentence. Identical bias results 
whether that one juror is removed by challenge for cause or by per-
emptory challenge, assuming in the latter case that his or her re-
moval was part of a systematic pattern satisfying the Swain standard. 
Thus, although the methods of exclusion differ somewhat, in 
both cases it can be said that the state "cross[es] the line of neutral-
ity"159 and exceeds "the state's power to exclude."160 The ensuing 
prejudice is identical. To execute a death sentence imposed by a jury 
selected in either way ''would deprive [the defendant] of his life 
without due process of law."161 
157. See Table A.3 at p. 93 infra. Including those removed by challenge for cause by the 
prosecutor or the court, 89.8% of scrupled venirepersons who but for prosecutorial challenge 
would have served as jurors were removed (115 in all - 76 for cause and 39 by peremptory-
out of 128). See Tables A.I and A.3 at pp. 91 & 93 infra. If jurors and alternates are consid-
ered together, then 76.9% of all venirepersons who but for prosecutorial challenge would have 
served were removed. See Table 2 at p. 31 supra. For this combined group, including those 
removed by challenge for cause by the prosecutor or the court, 89.11% of scrupled venireper-
sons who but for prosecutorial challenge would have served as jurors or alternates were re-
moved (131 in all-91 for cause and 40 by peremptory-out of 147). See Tables l & 2 at pp. 
30 & 31 supra. 
158. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam). 
159. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968). 
160. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980). 
161. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 523. This conclusion is buttressed by the eighth 
amendment's strong concern for reliability in capital sentencing processes. In its recent eighth 
amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has focused on the "uniqueness" of the death 
penalty for the requirement, for example, that a state not limit the mitigating circumstances a 
capital defendant may ask the sentencer to consider, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) 
(plurality opinion), even through application of an otherwise valid hearsay rule. Green v. 
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam). In so doing, the Court stressed the need for "a 
gre~ter degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed," Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 
605, and for avoiding the "risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which 
may call for a less severe penalty." 438 U.S. at 604. These concerns, which Professor Gillers 
has argued should disable the state from excluding any scrupled venirepersons, Gillers, supra 
note 2, at 84-91, should certainly support the view that the state may not through systematic 
use of the peremptory challenge produce a jury that is biased in favor of death. 
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2. The Right to Jury Impartiality on Guilt 
a. Witherspoon's invitation and the conviction-proneness studies. 
The Witherspoon Court was unwilling to assume that a jury com-
posed by excluding all death scrupled venirepersons, although bi-
ased in favor of death, was also biased in favor of conviction. The 
incomplete and unpublished versions of the three studies cited on 
appeal were considered ''too tentative and fragmentary" to justify 
such a conclusion.162 Nevertheless, the Court regarded the question 
as an open one and suggested that future studies might result in a 
different ruling: 
A defendant convicted by such a jury in some future case might still 
attempt to establish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to 
guilt. Ifhe were to succeed in that effort, the question would then arise 
whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury 
capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at the ex-
pense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of 
guilt or innocence - given the possibility of accommodating both in-
terests by means of a bifurcated trial, using one jury to decide guilt and 
another to fix punishment. I63 
The time has come to reassess this possibility. 
In the intervening years, two of the three studies before the Court 
in Witherspoon were completed and published, 164 and a variety of 
new empirical studies were performed.165 Moreover, extensive ex-
162. 391 U.S. at 517. The three studies relied upon were difficult for the Court to evaluate. 
As they were unpublished, they had never been subjected to the scholarly analysis of works in 
the public domain. Moreover, since they were submitted for the first time on appeal and in the 
case of one on certiorari, they had not been subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination. As 
a result, the Court noted that it could "only speculate . . . as to the precise meaning of the 
terms used in those studies, the accuracy of the techniques employed, and the validity of the 
generalizations made." 391 U.S. at 517 n.11. 
163. 391 U.S. at 520 n.18. 
164. H. ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 
(1968) (University of Chicago Center for Studies in Criminal Justice); Goldberg, Toward Ex-
pansion ef Witherspoon: Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use ef Psychological .Data lo Raise Presump-
tions in tlte Law, 5 HARV. C.R. • C.L. L. REv. 53 (1970). The third study was never published. 
W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (unpub. 1957). 
165. See unpublished studies by Ellsworth et al. cited in Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 
3d 1, 27-60, 616 P.2d 1301, 1315-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 142-68 (1980); Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, 
Miss Sympathy and tlte Authoritarian Personality: An Application ef Psychological Measuring 
Techniques to tlte Problem ef Jury Bias, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 734; Bronson, .Does tlte Exclusion ef 
Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make tlte Jury More Likely lo Convict? Some California Evi-
dence, 3 WOODROW WILSON J.L. 11 (1980); Bronson, On tlte Conviction Proneness and Repre-
sentativeness ef tlte .Deatlt-Qual!fted Jury: An Empirical Study ef Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. 
CoLO. L. REV. I (1970); Buckhout, Baker & Speigel, Jury Altitudes and tlte .Death Penalty, 3 
SOCIAL ACTION & LAW 80 (1977), Crosson, An Investigation into Certain Personality Variables 
among Capital Trial Jurors, (unpub. doctoral dissertation), reported in PROC. 76TH ANN, 
MEETING AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL AssN. (1968); Haney, Juries and tlte .Dea/It Penalty: Readdres• 
sing tlte Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 512 (1980); Jurow, New .Data on 
tlte Effect ef a ".Death Qua/flied" Jury on tlte Guilt .Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 
(1971); Mitchell & Byrne, The .Defendant's .Dilemma: Effects ef Juror's Allltudes and Autltorlla-
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pert testimony concerning these studies and related social science is-
sues has been presented in a number of cases in which defendants 
accepted the Witherspoon invitation and attempted to demonstrate 
that juries are conviction-prone when formed by eliminating capital 
punishment objectors who, although unable to impose a death sen-
tence, would be able to make an impartial decision as to the defen-
dant's guilt. 166 A substantial body of research on the· conviction 
proneness issue has thus emerged since Witherspoon, with the result 
that it is no longer possible to regard the evidence as "too tentative 
and fragmentary/' 167 The new studies extensively examine differ-
ences between groups expressing opposition to the death penalty and 
those without such opposition in regard to such factors as convic-
tion-proneness or juror voting behavior, attitudes concerning various 
aspects of the criminal justice system that might be associated with 
conviction-proneness, demographic characteristics like race and sex, 
and juror evaluation of evidence.168 
In its recent decision in Hovey v. Superior Court, 169 the Supreme 
Court of California gave extensive consideration to these studies. It 
quoted expert testimony that the studies designed to test for convic-
tion-proneness had "convincingly established a strong correlation 
rianism on Judicial .Decisions, 25 J. PERSON & Soc. PSYCH. 123 (1973); Rokeach & McLellan, 
.Dogmatism and the .Death Penalty: A Reinterpretation of the ..Duquesne Poll .Data, 8 DuQ. U. L. 
REV. 125 (1969-1970); Thayer, Attitudes and Personality .D!!ferences between Conventional Ju-
rors Who Could Return a .Death Verdict and Those Who Could Not, PROC. 78TH ANN. MEET· 
ING AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL AsSN. 445 (1970); Comment, Grigsby v. Mabry: A New Look at 
.Death-(lual!fted Juries, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145 (1980); White supra note 68; White, The 
Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by .Death-(lual!fted Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 
1176, 1178 n.12, 1185-86 (1973) (summarizing study by Louis Harris & Assoc.). The studies by 
Professor Ellsworth and her colleagues summarized in Hovef will soon be published in a spe-
cial edition of LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR dedicated to the question of death qualification and 
the Hovey case under the following titles: Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of 
.Death-(lual!ftcation on Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of .Deliberation, Ells-
worth, Bukety, Cowan & Thompson, The .Death-Qual!fted Jury and the .Defense of Insanity, 
Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, .Due Process vs. Crime Control· .Death-(lual!ftcation and Jury Attitudes, 
Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth & Harrington, .Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: 
The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts. 
166. E.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ala.), mod!fted, 637 F.2d 525 (8th 
Cir. 1980); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I; 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). 
167. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. at 1388; Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d, 27-
60, 616 P.2d 1301, 1314-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 142-68; White supra note 68, at 370. Several 
courts, on records that contained none or few of the recent studies, have, however. continued 
to find insufficient evidence to prove that death-qualified juries are conviction prone. See, e.g., 
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 593-95 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 
(1979); United States ex. rel Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1064 (1977); United States ex rel Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350, 362-63 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972); Craig v. Wyse, 373 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. Colo. 1974). 
168. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 26, 616 P.2d at 1314, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 141 
(1980). · 
169. 28 Cal 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). 
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between the tendencies of jurors to vote for conviction and juror atti-
tudes toward capital punishment."170 The several attitude surveys 
introduced into evidence, considering juror attitudes toward a vari-
ety of criminal justice issues such as the privilege against self-incrim-
ination and the role of defense counsel, established a significant 
relationship between death penalty opposition and pro-prosecution 
attitudes. 171 The studies of demographic characteristics found that 
exclusion of capital punishment objectors results in the dispropor-
tionate exclusion of blacks and women.172 The research relating to 
juror evaluation of evidence revealed a significant difference be-
tween the two groups in their thresholds of reasonable doubt and in 
their perceptions of the credibility of defense and prosecution wit-
nesses.173 These consistent differences between death penalty oppo-
nents exdudable under Witherspoon and those not so excludable, led 
the California court to find that the defendant "has shown . . . that 
if a state used all four 'Witherspoon-qualified' groups in a capital 
trial, the jury would not be neutral."174 
The Witherspoon-qualified groups referred to by the Hovey court 
were labeled the "automatic death penalty" group, those who will 
vote automatically for the death penalty; the "favor death penalty" 
group, those who although favoring the death penalty, will not vote 
to impose it in every case; the "indifferent" group, neither favoring 
nor opposing the death penalty; and the "oppose death penalty" 
group, those with opposition or doubts about the death penalty but 
who will not automatically vote against it in every case.175 The de-
fendant in Hovey had contended that a jury composed of these four 
groups, but excluding a fifth group - the "automatic life imprison-
ment" group, those who oppose the death penalty and will automati-
cally vote for life imprisonment but whose opposition will not affect 
their consideration of guilt - violated his right to an impartial jury 
on guilt.176 Although finding that a jury composed of the first four 
groups, but excluding the fifth, ''would not be neutral," the Califor-
:iria court rejected the defendant's challenge on the basis that Califor-
nia is not a state that uses all four "Witherspoon-qualified" 
170. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal 3d. at 40, 616 P.2d at 1325, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 152. 
171. 28 Cal 3d at 43-54, 616 P.2d at 1326-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 153-64. 
172. 28 Cal. 3d at 54-57, 616 P.2d at 1337-39, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 164-66. 
173. 28 Cal 3d at 57-60, 616 P.2d at 1337-39, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 166-68. 
174. 28 Cal. 3d at 68, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173. 
175. 28 Cal. 3d at 20, 616 P.2d at 1311, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 138. 
176. A sixth group, which could be termed the "automatic acquittal" group-those whose 
opposition to the death penalty will lead them automatically to vote to acquit in evey case -
was conceded by the defendant in Hovey to be properly excludable. 
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groups. 177 Rather, California law excludes the first group - the 
"automatic death penalty" group178 - and, cons~quently, the court 
found that the studies, although sufficient to establish that death-
qualification in general results in juries that are not neutral on the 
question of guilt, had "failed to make such a showing as to 'death-
qualified' juries in California."179 
b. Applying the conviction-proneness argument to the combined 
use of cause and peremptory challenges to exclude scrupled jurors. 
The Hovey court's treatment of the prosecution-proneness question 
raised there, although different from the issue presented by the sys-
tematic use of the prosecutorial peremptory, is helpful in analyzing 
how the latter issue could be raised and how it would be dealt with 
by the courts. Indeed, it may be advantageous for defendants raising 
the latter issue - an attack on systematic use of the prosecutorial 
peremptory to exclude all or a substantial number of the "oppose 
death penalty" group - to combine this challenge with the one 
raised in Hovey to the use of challenges for cause to exclude the 
"automatic life imprisonment" group. 
When prosecutors systematically use their peremptory challenges 
to remove the "oppose death penalty" group, and their challenges 
for cause to remove the "automatic life imprisonment" group, only 
at most three groups remain - the "a~tomatic death penalty," the 
"favor death penalty," and the "indifferent" groups. As it is as-
sumed that the· "automatic death penalty" group is removable for 
cause by the defendant not only in California, but elsewhere as 
well, 180 and will be so removed, only the "favor death penalty" and 
the "indifferent" groups will actually remain to serve on capital ju-
ries. Thus, one way to state the question presented by the systematic 
use of prosecutorial peremptory challenges to exclude the "oppose 
death penalty" group is whether the remaining jury - composed 
only of the "favor death penalty" and "indifferent" groups-is con-
viction-prone and therefore not neutral or impartial on the question 
of guilt. 
Of course, "conviction-proneness" is a comparative notion. To 
177. 28 Cal. 3d at 67, 616 P.2d at 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 173. 
178. 28 Cal. 3dat63-64&n.ll0, 616 P.2dat 1343 &n.110, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170 &n.110. 
179. 28 Cal. 3d at 68-69, 616 P.2d at 1346, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74. 
180. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 n.20 (1968), citing Crawford v. 
Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 303-04 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded far further consideration in light 
efWitherspoon, 393 U.S. 76 (1968), reinstated (unreported), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970) 
(alternative holding); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578-79 (5th Cir. 1981) (dictum); Gillers, 
supra note 2, at 99 n.452. 
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what should the jury remaining after this combination of exclusions 
be compared? Witherspoon does not shed much light. Although 
suggesting the possibility that the exclusion of all scrupled jurors 
might produce a conviction-prone jury that failed to meet the due 
process requirement of an impartial jury as to guilt, the Court in 
Witherspoon failed to establish a benchmark against which a jury's 
propensity to convict should be measured. 181 The lower courts and 
the commentators discussing the Hovey-type challenge to exclusion 
of the "automatic life imprisonment" group treat the relevant com-
parison as that between "Witherspoon-qualified" juries -composed 
of the "favor death penalty," the "indifferent," and the "oppose 
death penalty" groups, and the nondeath-qualified jury utilized in 
noncapital cases.182 Adapting this methodology to a combined at-
tack on the systematic use of peremptories to remove the "oppose 
death penalty" group and challenges for cause to remove the "auto-
matic life imprisonment" group would call for a comparison be-
tween the jury remaining after this combination of exclusions - a 
j~ry composed only of "favor death penalty" and "indifferent" ju-
rors183 - and a "neutral" jury, one selected without regard to views 
concerning the death penalty. 1s4 
Defendants attacking the combined exclusion of the "oppose 
181. White, supra note 68, at 373-74. 
182. Grigsby v. Mabry, 637 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1980) (''whether death-qualified jurors 
are more likely to convict than jurors selected without regard for their views on the death 
penalty"); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I, 18-22, 67-68, 616 P.2d 1301, 1309-12, 1346, 
168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 136-39, 173 (1980); White, supra note 68, at 375, 381. 
183. Two other groups whose removal is concededly proper would be excluded in con-
ducting the comparison: the "automatic acquittal" group whose removal for cause Wither• 
spoon authorizes, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978), and the "automatic death 
penalty" group, which would presumably be removable for cause by the defendant, see cases 
cited in note l80supra; Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 63-64 & n.110, 616 P.2d at 1343 
& n.110, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170 & n.110. 
184. The "neutral" jury would consist of the entire spectrum of attitudes on the death 
penalty- the "favor death penalty" group, the "indifferent" group, the "automatic life impris• 
onment" group, and the "oppose death penalty" group, see note 94 supra, with one exception. 
The only group excluded from the "neutral" jury would be the "automatic acquittal" group, 
those who could never return a verdict of guilt and who therefore are biased against the state, 
Some of the members of the "automatic death penalty" group - those who could not be fair 
and impartial in deciding guilt - would also be excluded. These jurors are biased as they will 
base their decision on something other than the legally relevant facts. See, e.g., Dobbert v. 
Florida, 431 U.S. 282, 302 (1977), quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975) 
(impartial juror is one who will "render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court"); 
Irwin v. Dowd, 366 {!.S. 717, 722 (1961) (defining an "indifferent" juror as one whose "verdict 
must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial"), The courts considering the 'Hovey-
type challenge that treat the "neutral" jury for comparison purposes as a jury selected without 
regard to death penalty attitudes would also exclude the "oppose death penalty" group and 
presumably those members of the "automatic death penalty" group who could not be fair and 
impartial in assessing guilt. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 17, 22 n.54, 616 P.2d at 
1308, 1312 n.54, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 135, 139 n.54. 
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death penalty" and "automatic life imprisonment" groups, would 
thus have to show that resulting capital juries - composed only of 
"favor death penalty" and "indifferent" juries - are more convic-
tion-prone than juries containing these two groups plus the "auto-
matic life imprisonment" and "oppose death penalty" groups185 and . 
those members of the "automatic death penalty" group who could be 
fair and impartial in deciding guilt. The existing empirical studies 
do not establish this proposition, as they do not make the relevant 
comparison. The studies performed prior to Witherspoon compare 
groups opposed to the death penalty with those not opposed to capi-
tal punishment.186 The more recent ·studies generally compare the 
"automatic life imprisonment" group with the four Witherspoon-
qualified groups - the "automatic death penalty," the "favor death 
penalty," the "indifferent," and the "oppose death penalty" 
groups.187 It may be possible that some of these studies can be 
reevaluated to realign the comparison groups.188 If not, and perhaps 
in any event, new empirical studies will have to be designed that 
compare the relevant groups as to relative conviction-proneness. 
c. Assessing the state's interest in removing jurors who cannot im-
pose death: the h!furcated trial alternative. If empirical studies com-
paring the resulting capital jury with the "neutral" jury reveal that 
the former is more conviction-prone than the latter, then the ques-
tion _will need to be resolved whether the state's interests underlying 
the exclusion of "oppose death penalty" and "automatic life impris-
onment" jurors can justify the nonneutral result. Witherspoon itself 
18S. In making this showing, a defendant may only have to establish a "substantial doubt" 
whether resulting juries are neutral with respect to guilt. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 
3d 1, 17 n.37, 616 P.2d 1301, 1308 n.37, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 135 n.37 (1980); cf. Ballew v. 
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (applying "substantial doubt" standard in sixth amendment 
context). 
186. See studies cited in note 163 supra; Hovey v. Superior Court, supra note 185, at 27-33, 
616 P.2d at 131S-19, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 142-46 (discussing studies). The Bronson Colorado 
study compares four groups - those who strongly favor capital punishment, those who favor 
it, those who oppose it, and those who strongly oppose it - and also compares the two favor 
capital punishment groups with the oppose groups. Bronson, supra note 16S, at 8-9. 
187. See studies cited in note 16S supra. Hovey v. Superior Court, supra note 186, at 33-
40, 43-54, 57-60, 616 P.2d at 1319-25, 1327-37. 1339-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 142-52, 154-64, 166-
68 (discussing studies). 
188. The Hovey court equated the five-part spectrum of attitudes toward capital punish-
ment used in the Jurow study, supra note 16S, based on Jurow's "Capital Punishment Attitude 
Questionnaire" part B, or CPAQ (B), with the five-part Hovey spectrum. Hovey v. Superior 
Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 33-36 n.70, 616 P.2d at 1319-21 & n.70, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 144-48 n.70. 
However, the two spectrums do not in fact correspond. Other studies, if capable of reorganiza-
tion and reanalysis, may permit an inference as to the ultimate fact of prosecution-proneness 
considered here. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (studies considering effects of 
reducing jury size from 12 or 10 to smaller numbers relied on for finding concerning conse-
quences of reducing jury size from 6 to 5). 
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recognized that a balancing of the state's interests and those of the 
defendant would be necessary by its statement that even if a defend-
ant could demonstrate that juries formed by excluding the "auto-
matic life imprisonment" group were "less than neutral with respect 
to guilt," the question would then arise whether the state's interest 
"in submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital 
punishment may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant's in-
terest in a completely fair determination of guilt or innocence."189 
The Court suggested that it might be possible to accommodate both 
interests by means of a bifurcated trial, using one jury to decide guilt 
and another to fix punishment.190 This same approach could be used 
to assess the validity of the combined exclusion of the "automatic life 
imprisonment" and the "oppose death penalty" groups. 
In effect, the Witherspoon Court suggested the applicability of the 
"least restrictive alternative" doctrine191 to assess the constitutional 
validity of the means chosen - the use to decide both guilt and pun-
ishment of one jury from which "automatic life imprisonment" ju-
rors were excluded - to accomplish the state's significant interest in 
having the penalty issue determined by a jury capable of imposing 
capital punishment. As those courts that have considered "prosecu-
tion-proneness" arguments have either rejected them on the basis 
189. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968). 
190. 391 U.S. at 520 n.18; see Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (E.D. Ark.), 
mod!fted on other grounds, 631 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980) (dictum). 
191. See Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1981). In a variety of constitu-
tional contexts, the Supreme Court has ruled that if alternative means exist which would ac-
complish the government's interest in a manner that intrudes less on the fundamental 
constitutional right at issue, the government may not choose the more intrusive means - the 
"less drastic means" or "least restrictive alternative" must be chosen. The doctrine orginated 
in first amendment cases. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the Supreme Court struck 
down an Arkansas statute that required school teachers to disclose all of the organizations to 
which they belonged. The Court ruled: 
(E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose can-
not be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end 
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth oflegislative abridgment must be viewed in 
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. 
364 U.S. at 488. Similarly, in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972), in which a dura-
tional residence requirement that interfered with the right to vote and the right to travel was 
held unconstitutional, the Court reiterated: 
It is not sufficient for the State to show that durational residence requirements further a 
very substantial state interest. . . . (I]f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those 
goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a state may not choose 
the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means." 
405 U.S. at 343, quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. at 488. The doctrine has also been ap• 
plied in cases involving the sixth amendment right to jury trial, where broad exclusionary rules 
that impinge on jury representativeness have been condemned on the ground that more pre-
cisely focused exclusions or exemptions would have served the states' asserted justifying inter-
ests with less intrusion upon the representative character of the jury. Duren v. Missouri, 439 
U.S. 357, 367-70 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533-35 (1975); see notes 296 & 301 
i'!fra. 
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that the empirical evidence was too "tentative and fragmentary" 192 
or that the studies addressed the wrong issue, 193 this "least restrictive 
alternative" question remains unresolved. 
Undoubtedly the state has a significant interest in submitting the 
penalty issue to a jury_ capable of returning a death sentence. The 
question, however, is whether this interest requires exclusion of "au-
tomatic life imprisonment" jurors and all or a substantial number of 
"oppose death penalty" jurors, or whether the state's interest can be 
accomplished by means that do not result in a nonneutral jury on 
guilt. Addressing the exclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" ju-
rors, Witherspoon suggested the possibility that the state's and- the 
defendant"s interests could be accommodated by means of a bifur-
cated trial using two juries - one to determine guilt (from which 
"automatic life imprisonment" jurors would not be removed) and 
one to determine punishment (from which these jurors would per-
missibly be removed). 
Obviously, this would impose some costs on the state in excess of 
those incurred pursuant to the present system in which one jury is 
used to make both determinations. These potential additional costs, 
however, would seem fairly modest. First, capital cases constitute a 
relatively small number of criminal trials. Moreover, the number of 
these cases in which a penalty determination will be necessary is 
even smaller. A penalty determination will occur only where a ver-
dict on guilt has been returned that authorizes the possible imposi-
tion of capital punishment, and only where the prosecutor decides 
that a death sentence should be sought. Even in cases in which a 
penaJty d~termination will occur, the impaneling of a new penalty 
jury may not always be necessary. In some cases, it may be possible 
to have alternate jurors replace any "automatic life imprisonment" · 
jurors who served at the guilt determination trial. 194 
192. See cases cited in note 167 supra. 
193. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d I, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 170; Justus v. 
Commonwealth,-Va.-,-, 283 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1981); State v. Peyton, 29 Wash. App. 701, 
630 P.2d 1362, 1367-68 (1981): 
194. The trial judge typically has considerable discretion in selecting the number of alter-
nate jurors. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) (not more than six alternate jurors). Moreover, al-
though FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) provides that an alternate juror "who does not replace a regular 
juror shall be -discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict," this provision has been 
held not to be violated by the replacement of a regular juror by an alternate after deliberations 
have commenced. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. Fla. 1979); see also Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 179 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 986 (1980) (substitution of alternate juror after regular juror suf-
fered heart attack held not to violate state defendant's right to trial by jury under six~ and 
fourteenth amendments); People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 552 P.2d 742, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782 
(1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977) (substitution of alternate juror after jury deliberations 
had begun permissible under California constitution); but see People v. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d 100, 
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Certainly, however, some cases would require a second voir dire 
and the impaneling of a second jury. This would involve additional 
state time and expense, and will likely also lengthen the total time of 
trial as some portion of the evidence previously submitted at the 
guilt phase of the trial would have to be repeated at the penalty 
phase.195 These costs can be minimized, however, through means of 
the trial courts' supervision of voir dire196 as well as by a number of 
devices - stipulations to introduce summaries of prior evidence, the 
reading of portions of prior testimony to the penalty jury, or the 
showing of a video-tape of material portions of the guilt trial to the 
new penalty jury.197 Moreover, against the added costs of impanel-
ing a second jury, it must be considered that a portion of the death 
qualifying that presently occurs at voir dires in every capital case 
will be eliminated. 
In any event, these state interests are essentially financial - sav-
ings in court time and costs - and precisely these interests were held 
ins~cient justification for a state's attempt to reduce the size of mis-
demeanor juries to five members. 198 The five-member jury would 
224 N.E.2d 710, 278 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1966) (New York constitution prohibits substitution of 
alternate juror after jury deliberations have begun). 
A proposed amendment to the Federal Rule would expressly permit the substitution of 
alternate jurors for 'jurors who become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform 
their duties," even after deliberations have begun. COMMl'ITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 42-43 (1981) 
(proposed FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(d)). The bifurcated capital trial may present special difficulties, 
however, for the substitution of alternate jurors. In a typical trial where juror substitution 
occurs before any decision has been reached, it may be reasonable to indulge the assumption 
that the reconstituted jury can consider the matter anew and that the new jurors will play a full 
role in deliberations. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971; United States v. Barone, 83 
F.R.D 565. Bui see J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 24.05 (2d ed. 1980) (''The in-
herent coercive effect upon an alternate who joins a jury leaning heavily toward a guilty ver-
dict may result in the alternate reaching a premature guilty verdict."), In the capital case, 
however, the substitution would occur after verdict, and the jurors who voted to convict may 
therefore play a dominant role. Of course, in any case where the defendant wished to forgo 
such an objection, alternate juror substitutions could occur by agreement of the parties. See 
United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1980). 
195. A number of states authorize the impanelling of a new jury at the penalty phase of a 
bifurcated capital trial, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 921.141 (West 1981); ILL. STAT, ANN, ch. 
38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979), thus recognizing that these added costs are warranted in appro-
priate circumstances. 
196. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976). 
191. See White, supra note 68, at 401. 
198. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 244 (1978). Accord, Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 
130, 139 (1979) (state interest in reducing time and expense of criminal justice administration 
insufficient justification for use ofnonunanimous six-person juries); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522, 535 (1975) ("the administrative convenience of dealing with women as a class is 
insufficient justification for'' their wholesale exclusion). This is consistent with the Court's 
approach in other contexts rejecting the state interest in saving money as sufficient justification 
for infringing upon fundamental rights. E.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 
1, 29 (1977); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-49 
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have applied in all misdemeanor trials, an enormous number of 
cases, and therefore would have resulted in considerable cost savings 
to the state even if the savings in each individual case were minim1:1l. 
As capital cases make up a relatively small number of criminal trials, 
the savings here would be considerably less. Moreover, in view of 
the Court's inclination to demand more in the way of due process in 
capital cases than in any other kind of case, it would seem that if the 
greater cost savings accomplished in the five-member misdemeanor 
jury context were deemed insufficient justification for the resulting 
infringement on defendant's jury trial rights, then a fortiori the lesser 
savings would be deemed insufficient in the capital punishment 
context. 
The Fifth Circuit has raised a more fundamental objection to in-
clusion of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors even in a bifurcated 
trial system. In its view, a jury that included this group, rather than 
being neutral, might be biased in favor of the defendant, and there-
fore deny to the state its right to an impartial jury. I99 This conclu-
sion appears inconsistent with Witherspoon's central holding that 
exclusion of "oppose death penalty" jurors results in an unconstitu-
tionally death-prone jury. As applied to Witherspoon's facts, the 
Fifth Circuit approach would presumably call for affirmance of 
Witherspoon's death sentence on the basis that juries including "op-
pose death penalty'' jurors are more life imprisonment-prone than 
death-qualified juries, and therefore biased in favor of the defen-
dant. But Witherspoon explicitly rejected this contention in favor of · 
a jury that the Court deemed more impartial than one which ex-
(1972); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971); Shapiro v. _Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
633 (1969); see Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. 
REv. 331, 381 (1981). 
199. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578-79 (5th Cir. 1981); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 
578 F.2d 582, 594, 594-96 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). Underlying the 
Fifth Circuit's concerns may be the suspicion that "automatic life imprisonment" jurors may 
really be "automatic acquittal" jurors, although they swear at voir dire that they are not. How-
ever, any such suspicion could not alone justify the exclusion of these jurors consistent with the 
explicit holding of Witherspoon and Adams that the factual basis for a venireperson's exclusion 
on account of death penalty attitudes must be ''unmistakably clear." See note 119 supra and 
accompanying text Moreover, if death penalty opponents constitute a cognizable class for 
sixth amendment cross-section purposes, see Section IV-B, i'!fra, the exclusion of these jurors 
based on such suspicion would also violate the Taylor-Duren prohibition of the use of rough 
rules of thumb in the jury selection context See notes 191 supra and 296 & 301 i,!fra. 
Indeed, if the Fifth Circuit's view is correct, prosecutors presumably should be able to 
interrogate venirepersons in noncapital cases (assuming that their prosecution proneness 
would apply there as well) concerning their view on the death penalty, and remove for cause 
those who could never impose it Nowhere, however, is this allowed. Haney, Juries and the 
Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 512,.514 
(1980) (The process of "death qualification" is ''unique to capital cases. In no other instance 
are prospective jurors systematically queried about their attitudes toward a particular legal 
punishment and then excluded, as a matter of law, depending on how they answer.") 
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eludes all death penalty objectors. Witherspoon thus suggests that if 
a capital jury resembling the jury200 that sits in the typical noncapital 
case - universally regarded as fair and impartial - is found to be 
significantly less conviction-prone than a death-qualified jury, then 
the latter would be constitutionally suspect as a trier of the defen-
dant's guilt. 
The Fifth Circuit has recently suggested an additional concern 
that might militate against use of a bifurcated trial with one jury to 
determine guilt and another to fix punishment.201 The court sug-
gested that the "less restrictive alternative" remedy proposed - the 
bifurcated trial - might be unacceptable because it would deprive 
the capital defendant at the penalty phase of the benefits of any 
"whimsical doubt" on the issue of guilt that the jurors might carry 
over into their penalty deliberations.202 Of course, whether a capital 
defendant would be more disadvantaged by the destruction of the 
"whimsical doubt" that would accompany the bifurcated trial rem-
edy than he would by a unitary trial system in which "automatic life 
imprisonment" jurors would be excluded from the determination of 
guilt is itself an unexplored empirical question.203 In any event, the 
Fifth Circuit's approach seems unduly paternalistic. The state's sub-
200. The comparison jury would resemble, but not be identical to, the typical jury in non-
capital cases, as it would not include the "automatic acquittal" group. See note l84supra and 
accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit's concern that adoption of the bifurcated trial system 
proposed would result in a jury biased in favor of the defendant would certainly be more 
understandable if "automatic acquittal" jurors would serve on the jury asked to assess guilt. 
Yet the defendant in Smith expressly disclaimed any desire to challenge the exclusion of these 
jurors. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), at 11. 
According to the Fifth Circuit, the defendant in Smith also suggested the propriety of ex-
cluding the "automatic death penalty" group, a suggestion criticized by the court as seeking 
"the best of both worlds." 660 F.2d at 579 n.14. The court appears, however, to have miscon-
strued the defendant's contention, which was that "death-qualified juries are guilt-prone by 
comparison with the norm of all jurors who could fairly and impartially try guilt or innocence 
- that is, by comparison with the entire pool of prospective jurors from which juries are 
ordinarily drawn in criminal cases." Petitioner-Appellant John Smith's Suggestion for Re-
hearing En Banc, Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 at 7; see also id. at 4, 8. Thus the defendant 
in Smith seems to concede that "automatic death penalty" jurors who can be fair and impartial 
in assessing guilt should be included in the first stage of a bifurcated trial. In any event, the 
Fifth Circuit's concerns about the exclusion of"automatic death penalty" jurors from this first 
stage may be largely theoretical. There are probably few jurors in this category to begin with, 
see Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49 (1980) ("it is undeniable ... that such jurors willl be few 
indeed as compared with those excluded because of scruples against capitfl punishment"), and 
of those, there may be few so strongly in favor of capital punishment that they would automat-
ically impose it, regardless of the facts, who also could be fair and impartial in deciding guilt. 
Of course, virtually nothing is actually known concerning the size or behavior of the "auto-
matic death penalty" group. 
201. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573. 
202. 660 F.2d at 579-82. 
203. The court acknowledged that its ''whimsical doubt" concern "is not based upon re-
view of the record in this case," but upon its own intuitions about juries. 660 F.2d at 582. 
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stantial interest in a penalty jury capable of imposing capital punish-
ment in accordance with the state's statutory scheme can be satisfied 
either by removal of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors from par-
ticipation in the determination of both guilt and punishment, or by 
the bifurcated trial mentioned in Witherspoon. As the state's interest 
in avoiding added costs should not itself justify the existing system, it 
would seem appropriate to allow a defendant himself to resolve the 
question as to which alternative would be more consistent with his 
own interests. 204 
d. Assessing the state's interest in removing scrupled jurors who 
can consider imposing capital punishment. If the "least restrictive al-
ternative" question is resolved in favor of a defendant's assertion 
that a bifurcated trial system with one jury to determine guilt and 
another to determine penalty would accommodate the state's and de-
fendant's respective interests, then the exclusion of "automatic life 
imprisonment" jurors and a substantial number of "oppose death 
penalty" jurors should be held to violate the defendant's due process 
right to an impartial jury on guilt. Whatever additional interest the 
state may assert in use of the peremptory challenge to remove mem-
bers of the "oppose death penalty" group would seem fully protected 
by limiting exclusions in such a way that jurors may not systemati-
cally be removed because of their views on capital punishment on 
" 'any broader basis' than inability to follow the law or abide by 
their oaths."205 
Moreover, even if the ''least restrictive alternative" argument 
with regard to the removal for cause of the "automatic life imprison-
ment" group is rejected- or if a defendant does not attack the re-
moval of this group, but seeks to challenge only the removal by 
peremptories of the "oppose death penalty'' group - the due process 
challenge may still succeed. ·If empirical studies show that death-
qualified juries brought about by a combination of prosecutorial 
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges of all or virtually all 
death scrupled jurors were less than neutral with regard to guilt 
when compared with "neutral" juries, then the lack of justification 
for the state's systematic use of the peremptory challenge should re-
sult in denial of the defendant's right to an impartial jury on guilt in 
any event. Thus, a potentially potent due process argument may be 
204. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (even though self-representation may 
disadvantage a defendant compared to representation by appointed counsel, defendants enti-
tled to choose self-representation). · 
205. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 "(1980). 
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raised that the systematic use by prosecutors of peremptory chal-
lenges to remove death-scrupled jurors, either alone or in combina-
tion with the removal for cause of "automatic life imprisonment" 
jurors, would require not only the vacating of the defendant's death 
penalty, but the reversal of his conviction as well. The validity of 
this argument, however, depends upon empirical studies that have 
not as yet ·been performed. 
B. Systematic Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors and the Sixth 
Amendment 
I. The Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-Section Requirement 
Witherspoon was not a sixth amendment case.206 Although two 
weeks before Witherspoon was decided, the Court in .Duncan v. Loui-
siana ,207 held the jury trial guarantee of the sixth amendment appli-
cable to the states, the trial in Witherspoon occurred beforehand and 
.Duncan was not given retroactive effect.208 The requirements of the 
sixth amendment, considerably different from the due process right 
to an impartial jury involved in Witherspoon, may thus pose a sepa-
rate constitutional basis to invalidate the systematic exclusion of 
death-scrupled jurors. 
/ In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court recognized that funda-
mental to the jury trial guarantee of the sixth amendment is the right 
to a ju~ ~lected from a representative "cross section of the commu-
nity."23/In so doing, the Court subsumed within the sixth amend-
ment the concern for jury represent~tiveness previously articulated 
as a matter of equal protection or through the Court's supervisory 
powers over the lower federal courts. Use of equal protection doc-
trine to limit jury composition practices dates from the 1880 case of 
Strauder v. West Virginia, which invalidated a state statute that ex-
cluded all blacks from serving onjuries.210 The Supreme Court first 
articulated the representativeness principle in Smith v. Texas,211 an-
other equal protection case involving racial discrimination in state 
206. See note 118 supra and accompanying text. 
207. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
208. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). 
209. 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
210. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The Court's opinion.expressed a concern with the "constitution 
of juries," not merely with discrimination based on race: 
The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person 
whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, 
associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds. 
100 U.S. at 308. 
211. 311 U.S. 128 (1940). 
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jury selection. The Court deemed it "part of the established tradi-
tion in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury 
be a body truly representative of the community." Race discrimina-
tion in jury selection is not only unconstitutional, the Court noted; 
"but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a 
representative government."212 Two years later, in Glasser v. United 
States, the Court first spoke of the "concept of the jury as a cross-
section of the community."213 The first case to apply the cross-sec-
tion requirement to reverse a jury verdict was Thiel v. Southern Pa-
c!ftc Co. , a civil case involving the seventh amendment right to jury 
trial in which the Court used its supervisory powers to invalidate the 
exclusion of daily wage earners from lists of prospective jurors: 
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection 
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an 
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. This does 
not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all 
the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical 
groups of the community; frequently ·such complete representation 
would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be 
selected by couq officials without systematic and intentional exclusion 
of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that 
those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum of soci-
ety. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class mat-
ter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it 
is to open the door to cl~s distinctions and discriminations which are 
abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.214 
The cross-section requirement is violated if the jury pool is made up 
solely from "segments of the populace or if large, distinctive gr_oups 
are excluded from the pool."21s 
The use of peremptory challenges, of course, does not affect the 
representatives of the jury pool - the venire from which jurors are 
selected by a process of elimination occurring through exercise of 
challenges for cause and peremptory chalJ,enges. However, such 
challenges can affect the representativeness of the juries actually se-
lected. Although the Fifth Circuit has recently suggested that the 
sixth amendment cross-section requirement may apply only to 
212. 311 U.S. at 130. 
213. 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). 
214. 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (citations omitted). For further discussions of the cross-
section requirement, see generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25 at 45-83; Daughtrey, Cross 
Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. I 
(1975); Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate far Multiple Source 
Lists, 65 CAL. L. REv. 776, 780-88 (1977). · 
215. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
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venires," and not to actualjuries,216 this suggestion seems inconsistent 
with the policies underlying the constitutional requirement. The 
purpose of the fair cross-section mandate is the selection of represen-
tative juries, not merely representative venires.217 
The concept of the jury as representing a fair cross-section of the 
community serves not only the interest of the litigants in a fair trial, 
ie., the assurance of at least some degree of what Mr. Justice Frank-
furter called "diffused impartiality,"218 but significant societal goals 
as well. Community participation in the jury system comports with 
"our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative gov-
ernment."219 Moreover, it is also "critical to public confidence in the 
fairness of the criminal justice system."220 These goals would not be 
accomplished if the representativeness requirement pertained only to 
jury pools, and if challenges systematically could be used in such a 
way that the juries actually selected are "made up of only special 
segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are ex-
cluded."221 Moreover, the essential purpose of the jury - to inter-
pose the "common sense judgement of the community as a hedge 
against the over-zealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to 
the professional or perhaps over-con~tioned or biased response of a 
judge"222 - is not achieved if the over-zealous prosecutor or over-
conditioned judge can eliminate the representative character of the 
jury through the jury challenge process. 
The systematic use of jury challenges should thus be subject to 
scrutiny under the sixth amendment cross-section requirement.223 
216. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 583 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981). 
217. See People v. Payne, 31 CRIM. L. RPrR. (BNA) 2229, 2229 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982) 
(''The desired goal of interaction of a cross-section of the community does not occur within the 
venire, but rather, is only effectuated by the petit jury that is selected and sworn to try the 
issues."); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, <182, 387 N.E.2d 499,513, cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 881 (1979) (''The desired interaction of a cross-section of the community does not occur 
[at the venire]; it is only effectuated within the jury room itself.") 
218. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 
quoted In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975). 
219. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 
530 (1975) ("our democratic heritage"); A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127-28 
(New American Library ed. 1956). 
220. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 53p (1975). 
221. 419 U.S. at 530. See]. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 168-69. 
222. 419 U.S. at 530. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968). 
223. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1376-85 (E.D. Ark.), modified on other 
grounds, 637 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980) (exclusion for cause in capital case of "automatic life 
imprisonment" group scrutinized under cross-section requirement); People v. Payne, 31 CRIM. 
L. RPrR. (BNA) 2229 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982) (peremptory challenge of 6 of 7 blacks on 
venire scrutinized under sixth amendment cross-section requirement); People v. Wheeler, 22 
Cal. 3d 258, 274, 583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 901 (1978) (peremptory challenge of all 
blacks on venire to produce all-white jury scrutinized under state constitution cross-section 
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The Supreme Court's decision in Ballew v. Georgia ,224 scrutinizing 
under the cross-section requirement a statutory reduction in jury size 
to five persons in misdemeanor cases, supports this conclusion. The 
Court noted that the sixth amendment mandates a jury of sufficient 
size ''to provide a representative cross-section of the community,"225 
and invalidated the five-person jury in part because of its concern 
that this size "prevents juries from truly representing their communi-
ties."226 No issue was raised concerning the representativeness of the 
jury pools from which Georgia selected five-person juries, or con-
cerning the arbitrary exclusion of any particular class from five-per-
son juries. Yet the Court noted that the absence of an equal 
protection problem did not dispose of "the question of representa-
tion," which combined with other factors created "a problem of con-
stitutional significance under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. "227 If the cross-section requirement places limits on 
statutory reductions in jury size because resulting juries may not 
truly represent the community, then it should also be deemed to 
place limits on jury challenges which interfere with the representa-
tive character of resulting juries. 
To subject jury challenges to scrutiny under the sixth amend-
ment, however, is not to say that the absence or substantial under-
representation of any p~cular group on a petit jury violates the 
cross-section requirement. A defendant is not entitled to "a jury of 
any particular composition,"228 or to a jury that mirrors the commu-
nity.229 The random ·application of unobjectionable jury selection 
methods, or the legitimate exercise of challenges for cause or per-
emptory challenges, will often result in particular juries that do not 
even approximately mirror the community. Indeed, a jury of twelve 
requirement); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
881 (1979) (peremptory challenge of 12 of 13 blacks on venire scrutinized under state constitu-
tion cross-section requirement). 
224. _435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
225. 435 U.S. at 230. 
226. 435 U.S. at 239. Mr. Justice White concurred solely on the ground that a jury of fewer 
than six persons "would fail to represent the sense of the community and hence not satisfy the 
fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." 435 U.S. at 245. 
227. 435 U.S. at 242. 
228. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). 
229. 419 U.S. at 538; United States v. D'Alora, 585 F.2d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 
1103 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); Stewart v. Ricketts, 451 F. Supp. 911, 
917 (M.D. Ga. 1978); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 274, 583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
890,903 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461,488,387 N.E.2d 499,516, cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). · 
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could never reflect all the distinctive groups in the population.230 A 
defendant is entitled only to jury selection procedures which do not 
"systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community."231 If a 
particular type of challenge for cause, or the systematic use of per-
emptory challenges against a distinctive group, by its nature results 
in unrepresentative petit juries, then it should be subject to scrutiny 
under the sixth amendment cross-section requirement no less than 
are selection methods that produce unrepresentative jury wheels, 
pools of names, panels or venires. 
As was discussed before, it is not absolutely certain that the jury 
resulting after peremptory challenges by both the defense and the 
prosecution is more likely to impose the death penalty than a ran-
dom sample of the population would be.232 The sixth amendment 
claim, however, is not that the attitude of the jury on a particular 
issue does not accord with that of the population at large, but instead 
that a "cognizable class," sharing a wide range of attitudes bearing 
on how it might view evidence, judge credibility or assess reasonable 
doubt, in addition to how it might recommend penalties, has been 
systematically excluded. 
2. The Cognizable Class Requirement Applied 
to Scrupled Jurors 
In .Duren v. Missouri, the Supreme Court defined the elements of 
proof necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-sec-
tion requirement: 
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is 
a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of 
this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and rea-
sonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; 
. and-(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of 
the group in the jury-selection process.233 
The requirement of a "distinctive" group, also frequently referred to 
as a "cognizable class," has been said to include "economic, social, 
religious, racial, political, and geographical groups of the 
community."234 · 
The concept of cognizability, however, is not free of ambiguity, 
and Supreme Court treatment of the issue has not always been con-
230. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. at 481-82, 387 N.E.2d at 512. 
231. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). 
232. See note 152 supra and accompanying text. 
233. 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
·234_ Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,220 (1946). 
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sistent. In Rawlins v. Georgia, the Court said that the test was 
whether those excluded would "act otherwise than those who were 
drawn would act."235 Justice Frankfurter, in his frequently cited dis-
senting opinion in Thiel, said the test was whether the persons ex-
cluded "have a different outlook psychologically and economically," 
whether they "adopt a different social outlook," and whether they 
"have a different sense of justice, and a different conception of a 
juror's responsibility."236 In Ballard v. United States,231 the Court 
invoked its supervisory powers to reverse a conviction where women 
had been systematically excluded from grand and petit juries. The 
Court was willing to assume that women constituted a cognizable 
class, without requiring proof that they share attitudes or perspec-
tives different from that of men. It rejected the argument that be-
cause women did not tend to act as a class, they should not be 
considered a cognizable group. The Court stressed that "a commu-
nity made up exclusively of one [of the sexes] is different from a 
community composed of both . . . . A flavor, a distinct quality is 
lost if either sex is excluded."238 
In Hernandez v. Texas, finding Mexican-American~ to be a cog-
nizable group, the Court noted that "[w]hether such a group exists 
within a community is a question of fact" that defendant had the 
"initial burden" of proving. 239 Hernandez had satisfied the burden 
by demonstrating the "attitude of the community," which subjected 
Mexican-Americans to different treatment from whites.240 In more 
recent cases, the Court has spoken of a cognizable class as "any large 
and identifiable segment of the community,"241 and any group that.is 
"sufficiently numerous and distinct."242 
These varying formulations of the cognizability test leave appli-
cation of the standard somewhat unclear.243 Race and national ori-
235. 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906) (upholding the exclusion from grand juries of certain occu-
pational groups). 
236. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. at 230. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also 
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (Marshall, J.) (stressing the psychological "perspec-
tive" of a group). · 
237. 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946). 
238. 329 U.S. at 193-94 .. 
239. 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954). 
240. 347 U.S. at 479-80. 
241. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
242. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975). In finding women to be a cognizable 
class, the Court relied in part on sociological studies reporting that women brought different 
"perspectives and values" to jury service than men. 419 U.S. at 532 n.12. 
243. See, e.g., Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 16 MICH. L. 
REV. 1045, 1057-61 (1978). 
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gin have easily met the standard,244 as has sex245 and religious 
belief.246 A variety of groups based on economic, occupational or 
social class status have met the standard,247 as have groups based on 
political beliefs and values.248 The cases on the cognizability of age 
groups, however, are inconsistent.249 Courts have rejected ex-
244. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (Mexican-Americans); Hernandez 
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) 
(blacks); United States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (Latins); Vil-
lafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78 (D. Conn. 1980) (Puerto Ricans); United States ex rel. 
Leguillou v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392 (D.V.I. 1953), revd on other grounds, 212 F.2d 681 (3d 
Cir. 1954) (Puerto Ricans); United States v. Fujimoto, 105 F. Supp. 727 (D. Hawaii 1952), cert. 
denied, 344 U.S. 852 (1953) (non-Caucasians); International Longshoremen's Union v. Acker-
man, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1949), revd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1951) 
(Filipinos); Montoya v. Colorado, 141 Colo. 9, 345 P.2d 1062 (1959) ("Spanish-sounding 
names"); State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D. 401, 184 N.W.2d 654 (1971) (American Indians). 
245. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); 
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
246. See, e.g., State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265,213 A.2d 8?0 (1965); Schowgurow v. State, 
240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965) (agnostics and atheists); People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 
420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (Jews); Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 
(1925) (Roman-Catholics); State v. Holmstrom, 43 Wis. 2d 465, 168 N.W.2d 574 (1969). 
247. See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (daily wage earners); 
Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Commrs., 622 F.2d 807 (5th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981) (incomes below poverty level); United States v. 
Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970) (less educated); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 
1966) (en bane), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) (daily wage earners); United States v. An-
drews, 342 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Mass.), revd on procedural grounds, 462 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1972) 
("paupers"); United States v. Cohen, 275 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1967) (less educated); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1948), revd on other 
grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1951) (laborers); Colvin v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 181 
(Ky. 1978) (teachers); State v. Jenison, 405 A.2d 3 (R.I. 1979) (academic community); hut see 
Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906) (upholding exclusion of doctors, ministers, lawyers, 
engineers, dentists and other occupational groups); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (less educated persons, i.e., high school or less, not a cognizable class); United States 
v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (blue-collar workers and persons with 
less than a high school education not cognizable classes); Quadra v. Superior Court, 378 F. 
Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (blue-collar workers not cognizable); United States v. McDaniels, 
370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La. 1973), q/fd sub nom. United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 
1975) ("poor" not a cognizable class); State v. Porro, 158 N.J. Super. 269, 385 A.2d 1258 
(1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S 1047 (1978) (students not a cognizable class); Comment, Under-
representation of Economic Groups on Federal Juries, 57 B.U. L. REV. 198 (1977); Comment, 
The Questionable Validity of the Automatic Exemption of Allorneys from Jury Service, 14 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 837 (1980). 
248. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,220 (1946); Simmons v. Jones, 317 F. 
Supp. 397, 406 (S.D. Ga. 1970), revd on other grounds, 418 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1973) (political 
affiliation); Kentucky v. Powers, 139 F. 452 (E.D. Ky.), revd on other gounds, 201 U.S. I (1905) 
(political party); State v. McCarthy, 76 N.J.L. 295, 69 A. 1075 (N.J. 1908) (political faction); 
State v. Holmstrom, 43 Wis. 2d 465, 168 N.W.2d 574 (1969). 
249. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), the Court assumed, without decid-
ing, that the young are a cognizable group, but then ruled that no showing of systematic exclu-
sion was established. The lower courts are divided on the issue. Compare Cuidadanos Unidos 
de San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Commrs., 622 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970); Simmons v. 
Jones, 317 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Ga. 1970), revd on other grounds, 418 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1973); 
and Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 409 N.E. 2d 796 (Mass. App. 1980), recognizing that cer-
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felons250 and resident aliens251 as cognizable classes. 
Clearly, to be cognizable, a group must be identifiable in some 
objective sense. As one lower court put it, such a group must have a 
"definite composition," i.e., there must be "some factor which de-
fines and limits the group."252 A cognizable group is not one ''whose 
membership shifts from day to day or whose members can be arbi-
trarily selected."253 In addition, the group must have "cohesion" -
there must be a "common thread which runs through the group, a 
basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or experience."254 Another court 
has termed this a ''unifying viewpoint," a requirement that members 
of the group share "a common perspective arising from their life ex-
perience in the group, i.e., a perspective gained precisely because 
they are members of that group . . . a common social or psychologi-
cal outlook on human events."255 In addition, some lower courts 
have recently added a new and controversial requirement - "that 
no other members of the community are capable of adequately rep-
resenting the perspective of the group assertedly excluded."256 Fi:-
nally, application of the concept of cognizability may differ from 
time to time and from place to place. ''What is a fair cross section at 
one time or place is not necessarily a fair cross section at another 
time or a different place."257 
Applying these criteria to death-scrupled jurors leads to the con-
tain age groups are cognizable classes, with United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 
1977); United States v. Allen, 445 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cabrera-
Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Fla. 1982); and United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 
(S.D.N.Y.), affd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973), holding that 
certain age groups are not cognizable. See generally, Zeigler, supra note 243. 
250. Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 r.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979). 
251. United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975); Rubio v. Superior 
Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979). 
252. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y), affd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 973 (1973). 
253. 337 F. Supp. at 143. 
254. 337 F. Supp. at 143; accord, United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977); 
Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 97-98, 593 P.2d 595, 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. 737, 737 
(1979). 
255. Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737. 
256. 24 Cal. 3d at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737; accord, United States v. Potter, 
552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1973); Grigsby 
v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1382-85 (E.D. Ark.), modified on other grounds, 637 F.2d 525 (8th 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 468 F.2d 1245 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 4lp U.S. 937 (1973); State v. Brewer, 247 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1977). But 
see Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d at 105-17, 593 P.2d at 603-11, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 742-50 
(dissenting opinion ofTobriner, J.,joined by Bird, C.J., and Newman, J.) (criticizing this addi-
tional requirement as being unsupported by prior cases, impossible to apply and inconsistent 
with the policies underlying the cross-section requirement). 
257. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 {1975). 
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clusion that the cognizable class requirement has been satisfied. 
Those with conscientious scruples against imposition of the death 
penalty form a coherent and sizable group within the community. 
This was recognized in Witherspoon, where the Supreme Court, al-
though not discussing the cross-section requirement, concluded that 
a jury composed exclusively of persons who believe in the death pen-
alty "cannot speak for the community."258 Although at the time the 
Court spoke, approximately forty-seven percent of the American 
public opposed the death penalty,259 more recent polls indicate that 
only about twenty-five percent currently oppose it.260 Moreover, 
whether death-scrupled jurors are "sufficiently numerous" to consti-
tute a cognizable class depends upon the extent of their representa-
tion in the community in question.261 The study reported on in this 
Article indicates that about thirteen percent of the population of 
Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit during the five-year period studied 
opposed the death penalty.262 The extent of death penalty opposi-
tion in the community studied is comparable to the representation of 
Catholics (thirteen percent),263 Republicans (fifteen percent),264 and 
blacks (between seventeen and twenty-one percent)265 in the commu-
nity during roughly the same period. As these three groups would 
undoubtedly meet the cognizability standard, the number of death-
scrupled individuals in the community should certainly satisfy at 
least the numerical requirement for cognizability.266 
Death-scrupled jurors also seem sufficiently identifiable to meet 
the cognizability standard. The group has a "definite composi-
258. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968). 
259. 391 U.S. at 520 n.16. 
260. See note 97 supra. 
261. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531, 537 (1975). 
262. See Table I at p. 30. A survey conducted in September of 1979 in Metropolitan 
Jacksonville, Florida, strongly confirms the reliability of the study result that 13.17% of 
elegible jurors in the community are opposed to the death penalty. Research Department, 
Florida Publishing Company, What Residents of Metro Jacksonville Think About Capital Pun• 
ishment (unpublished, Sept. 1979) (hereinafter referred to as "Survey"). The survey included 
Duval and four adjacent counties - Clay, Nassau, Baker and St.Johns. Although the latter 
two are not within the Fourth Judicial Circuit, only 9% of the respondents resided in these two 
counties. Id. at 6. The survey consisted of interviews with 3,621 men and women age 18 or 
over. Id. at 1, 2. Fifteen per cent of those interviewed responded that they were opposed to 
the death penalty (7% opposed "somewhat," and 8% opposed "strongly"). Id. at 4. 
263. Survey, supra note 262, at 5. 
264. Survey, supra note 262, at 6. 
265. Note 75 supra & accompanying text. 
266. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark.), mod!fied on other grounds, 631 
F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980) (comparing percentage of blacks in population to percentage of death 
penalty opponents to support conclusion that death penalty opponents are sufficiently numer-
ous to meet the cognizability standard). 
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tion,"267 defined and limited by i~s members' expressed views on 
capital punishment. Moreover, the group seems to be cohesive in the 
sense that there is a "common thread which runs through the group, 
a basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or experiences."268 This "com-
mon thread" or "unifying viewpoint,"269 is their common perspec-
tive on the death penalty. In addition, a number of empirical studies 
have shown that attitudes about the death penalty are related to 
other social and legal attitudes and to personality variables.270 
These studies clearly establish that an individual's attitude toward 
capital punishment is not an isolated phenomenon, but rather is 
closely related to other deeply held attitudes and values.271 Zeisel's 
study found that "attitude towards the death penalty is but a part of 
a larger syndrome of values that are roughly characterized by being 
'liberal' - or being less so."272 Jurors who have scruples against the 
death penalty are "clearly distinguishable" from those who do not -
different in "background," in ''basic attitudes," and in "psychologi-
cal makeup."273 Jurow concluded, based on his study as well as his 
review of the literature, that there is "strong evidence indicating that 
groups in favor and groups opposing capital punishment constitute 
cohesive and different classes in terms of community attitudes."274 
Vidmar and Ellsworth reviewed several studies examining whether 
persons favoring the death penalty differ from persons opposing it in 
terms of attitudes, values and personality dispositions, and con-
cluded that those favoring the death penalty are more conservative 
in their legal, social, and political-views.275 Similarly, White's review 
of the studies revealed "a difference in attitudes on the part of the 
267. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D. N.Y.), ajfd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 973 (1973). 
268. See note 254 supra & accompanying text. 
269. Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 98, 593 P.2d 595, 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737 
(1979). 
270. See Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the JJeath Penalty 26 STAN. L. REV. 
1245, 1258-62 (1974) (discussing studies). The propriety of relying on such studies to demon-
strate cognizability was recognized in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975), 
where the Supreme Court cited social science studies, in support of its finding that women met 
the test, that reported that women bring to jury service "their own perspectives and values that 
influence both jury deliJ?eration and resulL" 
271. Girsh, The Witherspoon Question: The Social Science and the Evidence, NLAJJA 
BRIEFCASE 99, 100 (SepL 1978); White, supra note 68, at 370. 
272. H. ZEISEL, supra note 164, at-24. 
273. Id at 25, 51. 
274. Jurow, New JJata on the Effect of a "JJeath-Qual[!ied" Jwy on the Gtlilt JJetermination 
Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 567, 598 (1971) (discussing studies by Boehm, Crosson, Bronson, 
Wilson, Goldberg and Zeisel, cited in notes 164 & 165 mpra). 
275. Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 270, at 1260 (discussing studies by Zeisel, Crosson, 
Jurow, and Rokeach & McLellan, cited in notes 164 & 165 supra). 
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two groups," particularly in attitudes bearing upon the adjudicatory 
process in criminal trials.276 These studies provide consistent and 
impressive support for the conclusion that death penalty objectors 
are attitudinally distinct from nonobjectors, and therefore meet the 
"common thread" requirement.277 
The additional requirement applied by some lower courts - that 
other segments of the community cannot adequately represent the 
perspective of the excluded group278 - also seems satisfied. A fed-
eral district court recently rejected a cross-section challenge to the 
exclusion for cause of "automatic life imprisonment" venirepersons 
on the basis of this requirement.279 Because Witherspoon had au-
thorized removal of "automatic life imprisonment" jurors but not 
"oppose death penalty" jurors, the district court concluded that the 
presence of the latter group on capital juries suffices to assure repre-
sentation of the perspective of the former.280 A systematic use of 
prosecution peremptories to exclude the "oppose death penalty" 
group would totally undercut this conclusion. As this case drama-
tizes, not only is the most likely surrogate group itself excludable for 
cause, but in addition, the "oppose death penalty" group is already 
being relied on to represent it. If both groups are eliminated, there is 
no logical candidate group to represent the large and distinct seg-
ment of the community that opposes the death penalty. 
In view of the size and distinctive character of the segment of the 
community opposed to capital punishment, systematic exclusion of 
this entire group would seem to raise a prima facie violation of the 
sixth amendment cross-section requirement.281 This conclusion is 
276. White, supra note 165, at 1192 ("For example, death qualified jurors are more likely 
to distrust defendants and to trust the prosecution; they are more likely to hold attitudes on the 
determination of guilt which reflect antipathy toward constitutional protections afforded the 
accused; and when faced with any kind of a simulated trial situation, they are significantly 
more likely to render a guilty verdict.") (footnotes omitted). 
211. See note 165 supra. 
278. See cases cited in note 256 supra. 
279. Grigsby v. Mabiy, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1385 (E.D. Ark.), mod!fted on other grounds, 631 
F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1980). 
280. 483 F. Supp. at 1385. In two Fifth Circuit cases raising the same sixth amendment 
challenge, the court declined to decide whether "automatic life imprisonment" jurors comprise 
a cognizable class. Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 583 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981); Spinkellink v. 
Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 597 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979) (assuming 
arguendo the "distinctiveness" of this group). 
281. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 524-25, 528 (1968) (separate opinion of 
Douglas, J.); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 48; cf. Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297, 308 
(4th Cir. 1968), remanded far farther consideration in light oJ Witherspoon, 393 U.S. 76 (1968), 
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1970) (exclusion of capital punishment objectors ''prevents the juiy 
in its function of determining the issue of guilt from being fairly representative of the commu-
nity, and thus violates equal protection of the laws"). 
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supported by the significant social and historical policies underlying 
the cross-section requirement - the desire to increase public confi-
dence in the fairness of the process,282 the desire to provide an assur-
ance of at least some degree of "diffused impartiality" among the 
triers of fact, 283 and a desire to protect the defendant against the 
over-zealous prosecutor and over-conditioned judge by interposing 
the "common sense judgement of the community."284 
3. Substantial Underrepresentation of Scrupled Jurors 
If death-scrupled jurors are considered a cognizable class, two 
other requirements must be met in order to establish a prima facie 
violation of the cross-section requirement. It must also be shown 
that the representation of this group "is not fair and reasonable in 
relation to the number of such persons in the community," and that 
"this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group 
in the jury-selection process."285 ·The study reported on in this Arti-
cle would seem to satisfy both requirements. 
Application of the "rule of exclusion"286 to the data demonstrates 
the substantial underrepresentation of death-scrupled jurors on capi-
tal juries. If the extent of death penalty opposition in Florida's 
Fourth Judicial Circuit is estimated at 13.2% - the percentage of 
death penalty opposition revealed among the 1,116 venirepersons ex-
amined during the five-year period287 - then one would expect that 
of the 360 jurors actually selected in the 30 cases analyzed,288 about 
47 or 48 of them (13.17%) would have been death penalty opponents. 
In fact, as Table A-3 in the appendix reveals, only 9 of the 360 jurors 
selected were death penalty opponents.289 The chances of 9 or fewer 
death-scrupled jurors being selected is calculated at approximately 
19 in ten billion (.000,000,001,9), or the equivalent of 6.1 standard 
deviations. This presents an astronomical degree of statistical signif-
icance, the equivalent of flipping 30 or 31 heads in a row with an 
unbiased coin. When the results for total venirepersons selected -
both as jurors and as alternate jurors - are analyzed, the under-
representative. result is equally striking. Because 426 jurors and al-
282. See note 219-20 supra and accompanying text. 
• 283. See note 218 supra and accompanying text. 
284. See note 222 supra and accompanying text. 
285. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
286. See note 86 supra and accompanying text. 
287. See note 262 supra and accompanying text. 
288. Table A.3 in the appendix. 
289. Id. 
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temates were selected,290 one would expect that 56 or 57 of them 
(13.17%) would have been death penalty opponents. In fact, as Ta-
ble 2 reveals, only 12 of the 426 jurors and alternates selected were 
death penalty opponents.291 The chances of 12 or fewer being se-
lected is calculated at approximately 29 in one hundred billion 
(.000,000,000,29), or the equivalent of 6.25 standard deviations. This 
too presents an astronomical degree of statistical significance, the 
equivalent of flipping approximately 32 or 33 heads in a row with an 
unbiased coin. 
Thus, the study demonstrates that during the five-year period an-
alyzed, death penalty opponents were substantially underrepresented 
in capital juries in Florida's Fourth Judicial Circuit.292 Moreover, 
the study establishes that this underrepresentative result is due to the 
systematic use by prosecutors of their peremptory challenges to elim-
inate those expressing opposition to the death penalty who were not 
previously removed for cause.293 
4. The State's Interest in Removing Scrupled Jurors: The Attempt 
To Justify Substantial Underrepresentation 
In sixth amendment cross-section cases, "systematic dispropor-
tion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant's interest in 
290. Table 2, at p. 31 supra. 
291. Id 
292. It is also likely - although the study did not analyze the question - that the substan-
tial underrepresentation of death penalty opponents on capital juries in the Fourth Judicial 
Circuit also produced the underrepresentation of other cognizable classes. A considerable 
number of studies have consistently shown that attitudes toward capital punishment are re-
lated to such demographic characteristics as race and sex. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 
1, 57-60, 616 P.2d 1301, 1339-41, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 164-66 (1980) (discussing studies), See 
SoURCEBOOK, supra note 97, at 210-11 (table showing attitudes on capital punishment by dem-
ographic characteristics for 1972-1978 and 1980). Reviewing these studies, White concluded 
that the exclusion of death penalty opponents results in a clear underrepresentation of "blacks, 
women, those with less than a high school education, and people with certain religious beliefs, 
especially Jews and agnostics." White, supra note 165, at 1193-94. Moreover, available evi-
dence indicates that these groups are already underrepresented on juries, and that the process 
of death qualification thus acts to compound existing underrepresentation. Haney, supra note 
165, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY at 517-18. 
The survey of capital punishment attitudes in Metropolitan Jacksonville suggests that these 
conclusions may apply in the Fourth Circuit. The survey revealed that 40% of blacks or 
"others" were opposed to capital punishment compared to 10% for whites; that 18% of women 
were opposed compared to 12% for men; and that 16% of Jews and 20% of those listing them-
selves as having "no religion" were opposed, compared to 15% for Protestants and 12% for 
Catholics. Survey, supra note 262 at 8-9. Several cases have regarded as significant to their 
findings that various practices violated the jury trial rights of defendants that these practices 
had the incidental effect of excluding disproportionate numbers of minority groups. Ballew v, 
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,236 (1978) (five-person jury reduces. minority group representation on 
juries); Labat v. Bennet, 365 F.2d 698, 720 (5th Cir. 1966) (en bane), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 
(1967) (exclusion of daily wage earners results in disproportionate exclusion of blacks). 
293. See text accompanying notes 107-13 supra. 
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a jury chosen from a fair community cross-section. There is no need 
to show particularized bias against the defendant. The only remain-
ing question is whether there is adequate justification for this in-
fringement."294 The state bears the burden of justifying the 
underrepresentative result "by showing attainment of a fair cross-
section to be incompatible with a significant state interest."295 More-
over, the significant state interest asserted must be "manifestly and 
primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection process 
. . . that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive 
group."296 
Undoubtedly, the state has 'a significant interest in excluding cer-
tain suo-groups of those opposed to the death penalty. It is clear, for 
example, that the state interest in an impartial jury on the question 
of guilt justifies challenge for cause of the "automatic acquittal" 
group, those whose opposition to the death penalty render them un-
able to return a verdict of guilty.297 Moreover, the state's interest in 
enforcing its capital punishment scheme has traditionally been 
thought to justify the exclusion for cause of the "automatic life im-
prisonment" group, those who would automatically vote against 
death in any case.298 It may be, however, that the wholesale exclu-
sion of this group will no longer be tolerated in view of the "least 
restrictive alternative" suggestion made in Witherspoon - that it 
may be possible to accommodate the state's interests with the de-
fendant's interest in an impartial jury by a bifurcated trial, with one 
jury to assess guilt, on which "automatic life imprisonment" jurors 
could serve, and another jury to fix punishment, from which such 
jurors would be excluded.299 If this alternative would satisfy the 
294. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (1979). This contrasts with an equal protec-
tion challenge to jury selection practices, in which both a discriminatory effect and discrimina-
tory purpose must be demonstrated. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493-95 
(1977). 
295. 439 U.S. at 368-69; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) (the sixth 
amendment right to a proper jury "cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds."). By 
contrast, in an equal protection case, the state may rebut a prima facie cross-section case by 
demonstrating that the jury selection practices that produced the underrepresentative result 
were nondiscriminatory. See, e.g., Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 494 (state may rebut 
prima facie case " 'by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and proce-
dures have produced the monochromatic result.'"), quoting Alexander v. Lousiana, 405 U.S. 
605, 632 (1972). Compare Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (jury selection practices resulting 
in substantial underrepresentation of women violate sixth amendment cross-section require-
ment), with ~oyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (jury selection system resulting in substantial 
underrepresentation of women held not to violate equal protection because there was a suffi-
ciently rational basis for the exemption in question). 
296. 439 U.S. at 367-68. 
297. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978). 
298. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). 
299. 391 U.S. at 520 n.18. 
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state's interest,300 then that interest is not "manifestly and primarily 
advanced" by the total exclusion for cause of such jurors.301 In any 
event, even if the total exclusion of "automatic life imprisonment" 
jurors is justifiable, a substantial number of death-scrupled jurors in 
the "oppose death penalty" group would remain whose blanket ex-
clusion cannot be justified.302 
It might be argued that the state's interest in preserving the per-
emptory challenge justifies permitting the exclusion of the "oppose 
death penalty" group by peremptory challenge, even though their 
exclusion by other means would clearly be impe~ssible. However, 
as was pointed out earlier,303 Swain indicates that the state's interest 
in the peremptory challenge is not paramount. When systematically 
used to eliminate death-scrupled jurors who fall short of the Wither-
spoon standard, the peremptory challenge, as I have argued earlier, 
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's prohibition of the exclusion 
of death penalty objectors on a "broader basis" than Witherspoon 
authorizes.304 It therefore cannot be said that the state's significant 
interest in securing impartial juries is "manifestly and primarily ad-
vanced"305 by the overbroad use of the peremptory challenge. 
300. See notes 191-204 supra and accompanying text. 
301. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1979). 
302. More than one third of the venirepersons expressing opposition to the death penalty 
in the study were not removed for cause, and therefore can be assumed to be in the "oppose 
death penalty" group. Table A.I in the appendix reveals that out of a total of 128 potential 
jurors expressing opposition to capital punishment, 48 (37.5%) remained after excuse for cause 
and defense peremptories. Table 1, on p. 30 supra, reveals that out of a total of 147 venireper-
sons (jurors and alternates) expressing opposition to capital punishment, 52 (35.3%) remained 
after excuse for cause and defense peremptories. These results are consistent with public opin-
ion polls indicating that only between one half and two thirds of jurors opposed to capital 
punishment would be subject to challenge for cause under Witherspoon. A 1979 survey con-
ducted in Alameda County, California, revealed that of the 37.8% of those surveyed who ex-
pressed opposition to the death penalty, 9% indicated that they could not be fair and impartial 
in determining guilt or innocence and 15.2% indicated that they could not consider imposing 
the death penalty in any case. Ellsworth & Fitzgerald, .Due Process vs. Crime Control: Tlte 
Impact of .Death Qua/!fication on Jury Allitudes (prepub. draft 1979), summarized in Hovey v. 
Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 50-54, 616 P.2d 1301, 1333-37, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 161-64 (1980). 
Thus, at most 64% of those expressing death penalty opposition in the survey would be exclud-
able under Witherspoon (assuming no overlap between the 9% and 15.2% groups). A similar 
figure was revealed by the 1971 Harris Poll, which indicated that of about 36% of the Ameri-
can population opposed to capital punishment at the time, 23% stated that they would abso-
lutely refuse to vote for the imposition of the death penalty in any circumstances. See White, 
supra note 165, at 1178 n.12. 53% of those expressing opposition to the death penalty in a 1968 
Gallup Poll would be excludable under Witherspoon, while 47% would not be. See H. ZEISEL, 
supra note 164, at 7-8 (53% stated that they would in no case vote for the death penalty; 38% 
would vote for the death penalty "reluctantly, if there were no mitigating circumstances," or 
"if it were a horrible murder and a most terrible murderer;" 9% were not <;ertain.). 
303. See notes 24-32 supra and accompanying text. 
304. See notes 136-38 supra and accompanying text. 
305. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367 (1979). 
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Rather, the state's peremptory challenge practices must be "appro-
priately tailored" 306 to its legitimate interest in securing impartial 
juries.307 This interest would be fully protected by limiting the use of 
peremptories in such a way that jurors may not systematically be 
removed because of their views on capital punishment on " 'any 
broader basis' than inability to follow the law or abide by their 
oath."Jos 
And since the "cognizable class" requirement involves more than 
the attitudes of jurors solely with respect to the death penalty, in the 
absence of such a class, the lack of a fair cross-section invalidates not 
only the defendant's sentence, but his conviction as well.309 
306. 439 U.S. at 370. 
307. Certainly, the state's interest in an impartial jury justifies the peremptory challenge of 
some "oppose death penalty" jurors. However, the substantial disparity between the prosecu-
tors' use of peremptories for nonscrupled jurors - under 30% were challenged - and their use 
for scrupled jurors - 81% were challenged (see Table A.3 in the Appendix) - suggests that 
the state is not merely exercising its peremptory challenges to secure impartial panels. The 
same inference is suggested by the combined data for potential jurors and potential alternates. 
Absent justification, these data suggest that the state is systematically abusing the peremp-
tory to secure juries perceived to be more conviction-prone and more death-prone than would 
otherwise result. To the extent that the prosecutor has a legitimate interest in using his or her 
peremptory challenges in this way, I have previously argued that this interest would not justify 
the frustration of an overriding constitutional value. See notes 144-50 supra and accompany-
ing text. Surely the cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment, a fundamental consti-
tutional right, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975), would have predominance over 
the prosecutor's purely partisan interest in the peremptory challenge. People v. Payne, 31 
CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2229, 2230 (Ill. App., May 19, 1982); see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 
258, 266-70, 281 n.28, 583 P.2d 758, 761-62, 768 n.28, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 896-97, 906 n.28 
(1978) (applying state constitution cross-section requirement). However legitimate this parti-
san interest may be in the context of our adversary system, it should not count as a "significant 
state interest" sufficient to outweigh the fundamental interest in jury representativeness re-
flected in the cross-section requirement. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368-69; note 295 
supra and accompanying text. Table 2, on p. 31 supra, reveals that in selecting jurors and 
alternates, prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to remove 28.2% of nonscrupled po-
tential jurors, and 76.9% of scrupled jurors. The statistical analysis in the text at note I06supra 
demonstrates that this disparity gives rise to the inference that the prosecutors used their per-
emptory challenges systematically to eliminate death-scrupled jurors. Moreover, the analysis 
in the text accompanying notes 106-08 supra reveals that this systematic pattern produced a 
substantial underrepresentation of death-scrupled jurors on the panels selected. 
308. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980). 
309. Reversal of any conviction returned by an unrepresentative jury is the traditional 
remedy for violation of the sixth amendment cross-section right. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 
357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Indeed, as the very integrity of the fact-
finding process is cast in doubt by an unrepresentative jury, the Supreme Court has applied a 
rule of automatic reversal for sixth amendment violations rather than examining for harmless 
error. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
Couif s reversal of a conviction "without a suggestion, much less a showing, that the appellant 
has been unfairly treated or prejudiced in any way by the manner in which his jury was se-
lected."). Nor would reversal of a conviction be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of this remedy for Witherspoon error, see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 516-18, as 
Witherspoon was based on due process, rather than sixth amendment grounds. See notes 118, 
206-08 supra and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the question of when 
the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment forbids a sentence of death is neither certain nor consistent. 
Few issues of constitutional law have generated a body of decisions 
so characterized by plurality opinions,310 the precarious force of ap-
plicable precedents,311 and profound tensions in underlying doc-
trine.312 But some established principles do emerge from the decided 
cases. 
First, the process of deciding whom to execute may render a 
death sentence "cruel and unusual," even if capital punishment does 
not, by its nature, inherently deserve that description.313 Second, the 
310. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) set the tone for contemporary 
eighth amendment jurisprudence; a majority of five justices agreed upon a stark half-page per 
curiam decision, which was followed by five concurring and four dissenting opinions occupy-
ing two hundred and thirty additional pages. Succeeding plurality opinions include Enmund 
v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) 
(plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 
(1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 n.9 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion). 
As is generally the case in a field marked by plurality opinions, the lower courts are left 
confused, producing instability and uncertainty in the law and engendering wasteful and repe-
titious litigation. See Davis & Reynolds, Judicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme 
Court, 1974 DUKE LJ. 59; Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality .Decisions, 
80 COLUM. L. REv. 756, 759 (1980). These problems are heightened in the capital punishment 
context given the high stakes and the resulting pressures on defense attorneys to raise all con-
ceivable issues in an effort to save their clients' lives. 
311. Compare McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (jury sentencing in capital 
cases without legal standards to guide jury discretion does not violate due process), with 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (capital punishment without legal stan-
dards to guide the discretion of the sentencing authority constitutes unconstitutional cruel and 
unusual punishment). See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 449 ("Having so recently reaffirmed our historic 
dedication to entrusting the sentencing function to the jury's untrammeled discretion,' it is 
difficult to see how the Court can now hold the entire process constitutionally defective under 
the Eighth Amendment") (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 
207). 
312. Consider, for example, the essential paradox of Furman: "The freakish and arbitrary 
nature of the death penalty described in the separate concurring opinions of Justices Stewart 
and White in Furman arose not from the perception that so many capital sentences were being 
imposed but from the perception that so few were being imposed." Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 315 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). One might 
reject Justice Rehnquist's perspective, but considerable tension inheres in accepting that 
Furman has come to mean that the process of deciding which convicted murderers to execute 
can render one death sentence more "cruel and unusual" than another, but that that process, 
however discretionary, will not give rise to a procedural due process claim under McGautlta. 
313. See 408 U.S. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); 408 U.S. at 310-14 (White, J,, concur• 
ring). These pivotal opinions, which have become Furman's accepted meaning, agree that the 
death penalty is not inherently "cruel and unusual," but that the procedures by which the 
government decided to impose it in the cases at bar permitted "this unique penalty to be so 
wantonly and freakishly imposed." 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). See Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869 (1982); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Adams v. Texas, 448 
November 1982) Peremptory Challenges in Capital Cases 79 
constitutionality of the sentencing process may depend upon its con-
formity with the values of society. Whether the eighth amendment 
requires jury participation in the decision to impose the death pen-
alty has never been determined by the Supreme Court.314 But the 
Court has frequently emphasized the importance of jury sentencing 
as an indication of community values in assessing the constitutional-
ity of capital punishment.315 The data presented in this study indi-
cate that prosecutorial peremptory challenge practices result in juries 
that do not reflect the conscience of the community; rather, they re-
flect community sentiment purged of its reluctance to impose a death 
sentence. The jury selection process that produces such a result runs 
a serious risk of imposing death sentences that do not comport with 
society's aggregated understanding of justice. When this risk inheres 
in the process of deciding which offenders deserve to die, capital 
punishment violates the eighth amendment. 
The eighth amendment values that infuse Witherspoon strongly 
support this conclusion. The Court noted that the jury from which 
all death penalty opponents have been excluded cannot perform the 
task demanded of it by states leaving the life or death decision to 
jury discretion. For where state law leaves capital punishment to the 
discretion of the jury,316 "a jury that must choose between life im-
prisonment and capital punishment can do little more - and must 
do nothing less - than express the conscience of the community on 
U.S. 38 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 
(1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam). 
314. The Court's statement in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,252 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion), that the Court "has never suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required" is 
dictum. See Gillers, supra note 2, at 6 n.22. Because the death sentence in Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586 (1968), was reversed on other grounds, the Court found it unnecessary to address 
the defendant's assertion of a constitutional right to a jury determination of penalty in capital 
cases. 438 U.S. at 609 n.16. Various members of the Court, however, have expressed the view 
that the Constitution does not require a jury in capital cases. See Westbrook v. Balkcom, 101 
S. Ct. 541,542 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Lockett v. Ohio, 4381.T.S. 
at 633 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For an extensive argument in support of such a constitu-
tional right, see Gillers, supra note 2, at 39-74. 
315. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3375-76 (1982); 102 S. Ct. at 3386 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.); Coker v. Geor-
gia, 443 U.S. 584, 592, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 181 
(1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (plurality 
opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); 498 U.S. 
at 386 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 498 U.S. at 439-40 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by 
Burger, C.J., Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ.). 
316. Where the jury makes a recommendation on a penalty, with the judge exercising the 
final discretion, the same concerns arise. Where the judge has complete discretion over sen-
tence, and the jury plays no role, this argument fails. Whether statutes giving the judge com-
plete discretion are prohibited by the eighth amendment is an open question. Se~ notes 14, 
314supra. 
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the ultimate question of life or death."317 A full measure of commu-
nity participation in this vital decision is thus crucial. 
The eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment is an evolving constitutional norm which changes over time 
to reflect society's changing moral judgments concerning the limits 
of appropriate punishment.318 A capital jury from which all oppo-
nents of the death penalty are excluded fails to reflect the shared 
values of the community. Sanctioning their systematic removal 
would freeze the procedure for imposing death sentences in a struc-
ture that would prevent the progressive evolution of constitutional 
norms over time. Professor Tribe has sounded this theme in his 
analysis of Witherspoon as mandating a "structure through which 
Eighth Amendment principles would be linked to community senti-
ments."319 In this way, a fully representative jury system, containing 
the full spectrum of community views on the death penalty question, 
would serve, through its conduct in imposing and rejecting death 
sentences, as a reflection of evolving community values over time.320 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly regarded jury deter-
minations in capital cases as "a significant and reliable objective in-
dex of contemporary values,"321 using the actions of juries as a basis 
both to uphold death penalty statutes guiding jury discretion on the 
life or death question, 322 and to invalidate mandatory death statutes 
as cruel and unusual.323 The Witherspoon Court recognized the cru-
cial importance of juries that are representative of the community on 
the death penalty question by its statement that "one of the most 
317. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
318. As early as 1910, the Court stated that the eighth amendment is "progressive" and 
"may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Weems 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,378 (1910). Since the language of the prohibition is not precise 
and its scope is not static, "(t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100 (1958) (plurality opinion); accord, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,288 (1976); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). 
319. Tribe, Structural .Due Processs, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 294-96 (1975). 
320. Id. at 296. 
321. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 
(1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 439-41 (1972) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
322. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 182 (ac;tions of juries in imposing 460 death sentences 
in less than four years after Furman indicated continued acceptance of capital punishment). 
323. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,293 (1976) (reluctance of American juries 
to convict a significant portion of those charged under mandatory death penalty statutes indi-
cated a repudiation of automatic death sentences). See also Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 
3368, 3375-76 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 5~2, 596-97 (1977); notes 13 & 315 supra 
and accompanying text. 
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important functions any jury can perform" in deciding between life 
and death "is to maintain a link between contemporary community 
values and the penal system - a link without which the determina-
tion of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' "324 A jury 
can perform this function only if it truly represents community atti-
tudes on capital punishment.325 
Witherspoon's approval of excluding for cause those who could 
not, under any circumstances, impose the death penalty does not un-
dercut this conclusion.326 Legislatures as well as jurors express a so-
ciety's collective sense of political morality;327 the state can 
justifiably object to representing on a jury individual viewpoints so 
inconsistent with majority sentiments as to preclude the good faith 
application of the law. But the exclusion of those who will never 
approve a death sentence makes the representation of those reluctant 
to do so imperative for the accurate reflection of community values. 
The systematic elimination of death-scrupled venirepersons biases 
jury composition, resulting in a distorted exaggeration of the com-
munity's willingness to impose the death penalty. Since it is un-
knowable whether a more representative jury selection process 
would have resulted in a different weighing of aggravating and miti-
gating factors in a particular case, the death sentences of those con-
demned by the existing system should be overturned. 
To summarize this Part, the prosecution's use of the peremptory 
challenge to remove death-scrupled jurors is a violation of the de-
fendant's due process rights, by analogy to Witherspoon, his sixth 
amendment fair cross-section right, and his eighth amendment right 
against cruel and unusual punishment. Where a pattern of system-
atic abuse sufficient to satisfy the Swain standard exists, the defen-
dant's sentence must therefore be set aside. Where the pattern also 
undermines the representative character of the capital jury in viola-
324. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968), quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). This language was subsequently quoted with approval in Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 (1976), and in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976). 
See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (where the Court, in dicta, noted that no 
state provides for fewer than twelve jurors in capital cases, and interpreted this fact as reflect-
ing an "implicit recognition of the value of the larger body as a means of legitimating society's 
decision to impose the death penalty"). 
325. See note 292 supra. 
326. According to public opinion polls, only between one half and one third of jurors 
opposed to capital punishment would be subject to challenge for cause under Witherspoon. 
See note 302 supra. 
327. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179-81 (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. at 294-95 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 436-38 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting). 
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tion of the cross-section requirement, his conviction must also be re-
versed. Moreover, reversal would also be required as a matter of 
due process, even apart from considerations of representativeness 
where it can be demonstrated that the systematic removal of scru-
pled jurors produces a jury that is conviction-prone and hence not 
impartial in assessing guilt. 
V. PREVENTING ABUSE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: 
RESTRUCTURING VOIR DIRE IN CAPITAL CASES 
The preceding results clearly demonstrate that prosecutors in one 
Florida district systematically (and effectively) exercise their per-
emptory challenges to exclude death-scrupled jurors from capital ju-
ries. These results have devastating consequences for the 
adjudication of capital cases. As this Article has demonstrated, the 
systematic exclusion of death-scrupled jurors deprives capital de-
fendants of their due process right to an impartial jury on sentence. 
A substantial argument can also be made that this pattern in the use 
of peremptory challenges, particularly in combination with the re-
moval for cause of death penalty opponents able to assess guilt but 
not to impose death, produces capital juries that are significantly 
more prone to convict than would be neutral juries, thereby depriv-
ing the capital defendant of his due process right to an impartial jury 
on guilt. 328 
In addition, the practice distorts the representative character of 
capital juries by eliminating virtually all members of the community 
who oppose capital punishment. Death-scrupled jurors are suffi-
ciently numerous and distinct that they may not be substantially 
barred from participation in the capital trial process consistent with 
the sixth amendment requirement that juries represent a fair cross-
section of the community. Moreover, the substantial under-
representation of capital punishment objectors on juries that try 
death cases prevents such juries from serving as a link to contempo-
rary community values regarding the limits of appropriate punish-
ment. Capital punishment is constitutional only on the assumption 
that its continued imposition does not violate the enlightened con-
science of the community. For the jury to serve as the conscience of 
the community, it must decide cases the way the community would, 
and to do this, it must be fairly representative of the community. 
Prosecutorial peremptory challenge practices that frustrate the abil-
ity of capital juries to "express the conscience of the community on 
3~8. See notes 162-205 supra and accompanying text. 
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the ultimate question of life or death,"329 are thus fundamentally in-
consistent with eighth amendment values. 
The result of these violations is that defendants tried before the 
juries in this study must be retried, at least as to sentence, unless the 
state can show that their particular juries did not involve the removal 
of any scrupled jurors by prosecutional peremptory,330 or that even if 
sucli removal was involved, that peremptories were justified on some 
basis other than opposition to the death penalty. 
It would seem unlikely that the pattern revealed is unique to the 
district studied. Although more studies of this type need to be done 
before generalizations concerning prosecutorial behavior can safely 
be made, many knowledgeable observers of the criminal process sus-
pect that substantial numbers of prosecutors use their peremptory 
challenges in precisely this way. And while differences may exist 
among geographic regions, the determinants of prosecutorial jury se-
lection tactics following a decision to seek a death sentence do not 
depend on local conditions. When the only empirical evidence yet 
available strongly suggests unconstitutional prosecutorial behavior, 
the risks of uncertainty weigh heavily against inaction. If the avail-
able evidence does not permit universal generalizations, it does sug-
gest the widespread use of the prosecutorial peremptory to exclude 
death-scrupled individuals from capital juries. The government 
should bear the burden of proving an exception. 331 
329. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
330. In such cases the defendant would lack standing to raise a constitutional claim. 
33 I. The question of which party - the defendant or the state - should bear the burden 
of demonstration concerning possible abuse of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges is re-
lated to the general procedural problem of allocating burdens of pleading and persuasion. 
Professor Cleary, in an influential essay, has suggested that implicit in the case law dealing 
with problems of allocation are three somewhat related factors: fairness, probability, and pol-
icy. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 11 
(1959). Consideration of these three factors in the peremptory challenge context leads to a 
persuasive case for allocating to the state the burden of demonstration concerning 
prosecutorial use of the peremptory, perhaps after the defendant has carried a preliminary 
burden of going forward to demonstrate that peremptories were used in his case to eliminate 
all or virtually all scrupled venirepersons. 
By fairness, Professor Cleary means that, other things being equal, where evidence relating 
to a particular issue lies more within the control of one party, that element should in fairness 
be allocated to him. Id at 12. Clearly, the state has greater access to evidence concerning how 
its prosecutors used their challenges than does the defendant, particularly as Swain makes the 
critical issue prosecutorial conduct over a significnt number of cases, rather than just in the one 
case in which the defendant was involved. 
The factor of probability, according to frofessor Cleary, involves a general, nonstatistical 
estimate of the probabilities of the situation, with the burden allocated to the party who will be 
benefited by a departure from the supposed norm. Id at 12-13. The general view of knowl-
edgeable observers of the criminal processes, acknowledged by some prosecutors, is that prose-
cutors routinely use their peremptories in capital cases to eliminate scrupled jurors. See note 
17 supra. The only empirical evidence available - this study - strongly supports the exist-
ence of a systematic pattern in the use of peremptories in this way. As a result, the factor of 
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Given Swain, which continues to be the law in the federal courts 
and in all but a handful of the states, studies of the kind undertaken 
here must be done for the defendant to raise these constitutional is-
sues. But studies of this kind are considerably beyond the resources 
of the typical capital defendant. As a result, the prospect of such 
legal challenges may not deter the continuation of prosecutorial 
abuses in the use of the peremptory. Judicially or legislatively 
designed prophylactic measures are thus necessary. 
One solution to the problem is to allow capital defendants to es-
tablish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of death-scrupled 
jurors based on the prosecutor's conduct during the voir dire in the 
defendant's case alone. This is the approach adopted by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in People v. 1¥hee/er332 for showing systematic 
exclusion of members of a cognizable class. Although extending to 
prosecutors the presumption that they are acting on the basis oflegit-
imate considerations whenever a peremptory challenge is exercised, 
the court held that this presumption may be rebutted by evidence 
adduced in a single voir dire. Under this approach, a prima facie 
case of abuse of the peremptory challenge can be established by a 
showing that the prosecutor is disproportionately excluding mem-
bers of a group from the jury, that the group is cognizable for sixth 
probability argues in favor of the state bearing the burden of demonstrating what would ap• 
pear to be a departure from the norm. This conclusion might seem inconsistent with Swain's 
presumption that prosecutors use their peremptories for proper, trial-related reasons. Swai11 
may, however, be distinguishable based on the factor of probability; it may be the norm in 
capital cases for prosecutors to use their peremptories systematically to remove death penalty 
opponents, but not the norm in criminal cases generally for prosecutors to use their perempto-
ries systematically to remove blacks. Indeed, the failure of the many attempts by defendants to 
carry the burden imposed by Swain for demonstrating abuse of the peremptory on racial 
grounds, see cases discussed in notes 49-51 & 57-59 supra and accompanying text, suggests that 
such abuse in the racial context may not be the norm. See also note 139 supra. 
The final factor noted by Professor Cleary - policy - is more difficult to assess in this 
context as there are conflicting policy considerations at stake. The need to protect the utility of 
the peremptory, relied on by the Swain Court as the justification for its restrictive rule, see text 
at note 29 supra, clearly argues in favor of placing the burden of demonstration on the defen-
dant. On the other hand, in view of the extreme social disutility of imposing the death penalty 
erroneously or based on unfair procedures, see notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text, note 
161 supra, the scales of policy may well tip in favor of allocating the burden to the state. 
Swain's general presumption that peremptories are exercised based on trial-related factors 
may thus be relaxed in death penalty ~es, where more in the way of due process should be 
required than in ordinary cases. 
Considerations of fairness, probability and policy thus point decisively to the future alloca-
tion of the burden to the state to demonstrate that prosecutorial peremptories are based on 
acceptable trial-related considerations rather than merely on attitudes toward the death pen-
alty, once a capital defendant has gone forward to demonstrate a prima facie case of abuse 
based on his case alone. Whatever the merits of the Wheeler approach generally, see notes 44-
45 supra and accompanying text, it appears reasonable in the capital trial context, particularly 
in view of the results of this study. 
332. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); see notes 40-43 supra and 
accompanying text. 
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amendment cross-section purposes, and that it is likely that the ex-
clusion is based on group membership. 333 The trial judge can be 
asked to find that exclusion is based on group membership if their 
group affiliation appears to be the only characteristic shared by the 
jurors excluded. Applying this approach in the death penalty con-
text, if the trial judge "from all the circumstances in the case" con-
cludes that there was a "strong likelihood" that a disproportionate 
number of venirepersons were excluded because of their· opposition 
to capital punishment, the burden will shift to the state to show that 
the challenges were based on trial-related factors, rather than on 
death penalty attitudes. 334 Jurisdictions disinclined to adopt the 
Wheeler approach for all criminal cases may consider it in the lim-
ited context of capital trials. The substantially higher degree of due 
process required to impose the death penalty justifies adopting more 
restrictive procedures in selecting a capital jury than are applied in 
selecting juries in ordinary cases. The approach in Wheeler, how-
ever, may intrude further into the state's legitimate interest in the 
peremptory challenge335 than many jurisdictions will be willing to 
accept. 
An alternative solution would be to restrict the prosecutor's abil-
ity to question prospective jurors concerning their attitudes toward 
the death penalty. A prosecutor's ability to develop grounds for a 
challenge for cause should not unreasonably be restricted. But the 
use of voir dire to develop grounds for the improper exercise of per-
emptory challenges is not as worthy of protection.336 Thus, inquiry 
into prospective jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty could be 
strictly limited to determining whether they require disqualification 
under the standards set forth in Witherspoon. Rather than being per-
mitted to ask whether a venireperson has conscientious or religious 
scruples against the death penalty, prosecutors could be restricted to 
asking whether venirepersons ''would automatically vote against the 
333. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. 
334. See 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Under the Wheeler 
approach, the prosecutor would similarly be able to challenge defense exercises of peremptory 
challenges based on group '!>iases. 
335. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text. 
336. See Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 376, 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 920 
(1967); People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 819, 506 P.2d 193, 195, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1973). 
This has, however, been its tradition. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965) 
("The voir dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a predicate 
for the exercise of peremptories .••. "); Babcock, supra note 24, at 551. I do not question the 
propriety generally of allowing broad voir dire to explore attitudes and characteristics relevant 
to the informed use of peremptory challenges. The prophylactic rule suggested should apply 
· only in the limited situation where there is concern that the information gathered at voir dire is 
being used in exercising peremptory challenges in an unconstitutional manner. 
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impostion of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that 
might be developed at the trial of the case before them," or would be 
unable to make "an impartial decision as to the defendant'sgui/t."337 
If the venireperson answers in the negative, no further questions 
concerning attitudes on the death penalty should be permitted. The 
venireperson's general attitude toward the death penalty is, under 
Witherspoon, irrelevant to the determination of whether he or she is 
qualified for jury service. 33s 
The trial juq.ge can limit juror confusion concerning these inquir-
ies by prefacing such questions with a brief explanation of the quali-
fications necessary to serve as a capital juror. The trial judge could 
explain, for example, that a prospective juror who adamantly op-
poses capital punishment may still be able to serve as an impartial 
juror if he can set aside his opposition and follow his oath as a juror 
to uphold the law; only if the juror's attitude toward capital punish-
ment makes it impossible for him to follow the law must he be ex-
cused. 339 The prospective jurors also could be cautioned not to 
volunteer their opinions about capital punishment. Only if that atti-
tude interferes with their ability to serve as jurors is it necessary for 
them to speak out. Finally, it would be desirable for the trial judge 
to explain that jury service by persons opposed to capital punish-
ment, provided they can follow their oath as jurors, is necessary to 
effectuate the constitutional requirement of a representative jury, 
which in death cases must reflect the values of the community on the 
discretionary life or death question. 
After this general explanation of the basic qualifications for capi-
tal jury service, the prosecutor could be permitted simply to ask 
whether, in light of the judge's explanation, the prospective juror 
feels that he would automatically vote against the death penalty re-
gardless of the evidence or would be unable to render an impartial 
decision as to guilt. Only if a prospective juror volunteers some con-;-
cem with his abilities in this regard should further questioning be 
allowed. 
Of course, voir dire questioning would be even further limited in 
jurisdictions using the bifurcated trial system suggested in Wither-
337. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. S10, 522-23 n.21 (1968) (emphasis in original). Ac-
cord, Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1969). 
338. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. 
339. The Supreme Court has recognized that even a ''.juror who believes that capital pun-
ishment should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its abolition" might be 
able to "subordinate his personal views to what he perceived to be his duty to abide by his oath 
as a juror and to obey the law of the State." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,514 n.7; 
accord, Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 484 (1969). 
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spoon, with one jury to determine guilt, that would include death 
penalty opponents able to convict but not to impose death, and a 
second jury to assess penalty, from which such jurors would be re-
moved. In such jurisdictions, voir dire questioning preceding the 
guilt phase should be limited to inquiries about death penalty atti-
tudes that would prevent the making of an impartial decision as to 
the defendant's guilt. No further inquiries concerning attitudes on 
the death penalty should be permitted until a second voir · dire, oc-
curring before the penalty phase. 
The limited questioning suggested as a means of curtailing 
prosecutorial peremptory challenge abuses could be conducted 
either by the prosecutor or by the judge alone. In the federal system, 
"the court has the discretion either to conduct the examination itself 
or to permit counsel to do so."340 This is also the practice in about 
ten states.341 Approximately eleven additional states provide for ex-
amination only by the judge; in twenty-two other states provision is 
made for questioning by both the judge and the attorneys, and in the 
remaining states, examination is left to counsel. 342 Regardless of 
who conducts the questioning, there is ample precedent for imposing 
restrictions on the scope of voir dire. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently recognized that the conduct of voir dire is a matter within 
the broad discretion of the trial judge. 343 For example, absent "spe-
cial circumstances," such as when racial issues are "inextricably 
bound up with the conduct of the trial" and there are substantial 
indications of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting 
the jurors in the particular case, the Constitution does not require 
questioning prospective jurors about racial or ethnic bias.344 Nor is 
it unconstitutional to refuse inquiry about other types of possible 
340. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). See Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1928) (up-
holding the constitutionality of judge-conducted voire dire). 
341. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, 
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1344 (5th ed. 1980). 
342. Id.; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 25, at 164, 281-84 (App. D). For conflicting views con-
cerning who should conduct the voir dire, compare Babcock, supra note 24 (voir dire should be 
conducted by the attorneys with little or no restriction by the court), and Gutman, The Attor-
ney-Conducted Voir .Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 290 (1972) 
(same), with Braswell, Voir .Dire - Use and Abuse, 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49 (1970) (trial 
court should actively participate in voir dire and may severely restrict questioning by the attor-
neys), and Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir .Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 916 (1971) (advocating the federal method of questioning by the court with the 
attorneys given the opportunity to submit proposed questions). 
343. E.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1629, 1634 (1981); Ristaino v. Ross, 
424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (1973); Aldridge v. United 
States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931). 
344. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1634; see Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at 
594-96. 
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prejudice, such as prejudice against facial hair where the defendant 
wears a beard,345 or in an obscenity case, about whether the jurors' 
educational, political, and religious beliefs might affect their view on 
the question of obscenity.346 These cases permit the trial judge to 
restrict inquiries into bias to the ultimate disqualifying question, and 
to disallow more specific inquiries and detailed probing into the ba-
sis for the venireperson's answer. The trial court's broad discretion 
should thus include· the imposition of similar limits on the prosecu-
tor's ability to question prospective jurors regarding their attitudes 
on the death penalty. 
Professor Haney's research on the effects of the death-qualifica-
tion process on capital juries suggests an additional method of cur-
tailing prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge. Haney 
suggests that the typical elaborate voir dire inquiry into attitudes 
concerning the death penalty, generally conducted before the entire 
venire, may itself bias the venire in favor of death and perhaps also 
in favor of guilt. 347 Prolonged discussion of the death penalty at voir 
dire suggests to prospective jurors that the defendant's guilt is pre-
sumed by the attorneys and the judge, desensitizes jurors to the pos-
sibility of imposing the death penalty, communicates the law's 
disapproval of death penalty opposition, increases the acceptability 
of pro-death penalty attitudes, and increases both the likelihood that 
jurors will convict and their willingness to vote for the death pen-
alty.348 In response to testimony concerning Professor Haney's re-
search, and to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects it revealed, 
the California Supreme Court has ordered that future voir dire ques-
tioning of a capital venireperson be performed outside the presence 
of other prospective jurors.349 Requiring that voir dire in capital 
cases concerning juror attitudes on the death penalty be done indi-
345. Ham v South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (1973). 
346. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S 87 (1974). See also United States v. Barnes, 604 
F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (trial court's refusal to allow questioning about jurors' ethnic back-
grounds or their addresses was not error); United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 432 U.S. 909 (1977) (refusal to allow questioning about juror's educational background 
was not error); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963) 
(refusal to ask prospective jurors if they would give more weight to the testimony of a police 
officer was not error). 
347. See Haney, .Death Penalty Rptr. 1 (no. IO, June 1981); Haney, 26 CRIME & DELIN· 
QUENCY, supra note 199, at 525 ("Rather than simply discovering prejudice, the process of 
death qualification tends to create it."); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 69-81, 616 P.2d 
1301, 1347-55, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 174-82 (1980) (ordering that future voir dire questioning ofa 
venireperson be performed outside the presence of other prosepective jurors "in order to mini-
mize the potentially prejudicial effects identified by the Haney study."). 
348. See note 347 supra. 
349. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 69-81, 616 P.2d 1301, 1347-55, 168 Cal. Rptr, 
128, 174-82 (1980). 
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vidually and in sequestration reduces some of the biasing effects of 
the death qualification process that Haney documented.350 These 
objectives, in addition to the curtailment of prosecutorial peremp-
tory challenge abuse, could be accomplished by including on ques-
tionnaires that prospective jurors must fill out in advance of voir dire 
the limited question(s) necessary to assess whether the venireperson 
should be removed for cause under Witherspoon.351 
Limiting inquiry concerning the death penalty attitudes of pro-
spective jurors in any of these ways would deprive prosecutors of 
information concerning a venireperson's opposition to the death 
penalty, other than to the extent that such opposition would render 
him excludable for cause under Witherspoon. Admittedly, an astute 
prosecutor may occasionally correctly suspect reluctance to impose 
capital punishment, because death-scrupled individuals share many 
common correlative opinions. But just as certain well-established 
cognizable classes of potential jurors, such as those classes de.fined by 
various religions, may share common viewpoints from which the es-
sential trait of the class may not easily be deduced, just so death 
penalty opposition will rarely reveal itself through those elements of 
the common viewpoint shared by the class of death-scrupled individ-
uals which the prosecutor can ascertain through other voir dire 
questioning. 
Since the defense would similarly be denied extraneous informa-
tion on death penalty attitudes, the prosecution could not claim a 
right to use its challenges to offset systematic defense challenges of 
death penalty advocates.352 This would avoid the difficult question 
of when these two tendencies reach equipoise. 
Such restructuring of the voir dire in capital cases would elimi-
nate the ability of prosecutors to use peremptory challenges to ex-
clude death-scrupled jurors "on any broader basis" than authorized 
by Witherspoon. Prosecutorial peremptories could continue to be 
used, and some no doubt would result in the removal of death-scru-
pled jurors not subject to removal for cause. But the virtual elimina-
tion or substantial underrepresentation of death penalty opponents 
350. A recent empirical study has also suggested that examination of venirepersons while 
individually sequestered enables better identification of bias than other voir dire methods. 
Nietzel & Dillehay, The Effects of Variations in Voir .Dire Procedures in Capital Murder Trials, 
6 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 1 (1982). 
351. See Babcock, supra note 24, at 563. See also Gillers, supra note 2, at 97 n.446 (sug-
gesting that voir dire on death penalty attitudes be conducted by the trial judge with the law-
yers absent but with a court reporter present. The defendant, but not the prosecutor, woµld 
later be permitted to review the transcript and argue the validity of the judge's exclusionary 
rulings.). 
352. See notes 152-56 sup~a and accompanying text. 
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would not continue. The result would be capital juries able to assess 
guilt and punishment with increased impartiality, and with an in-
creased ability to reflect the conscience of the community. If we are 
to have death sentences at all, nothing less should be tolerated. 
APPENDIX 
This appendix presents a more detailed breakdown of the data 
presented in Part III of this Article. Table A. I presents the total 
number of venirepersons who were examined as potential jurors, 
subdivided into scrupled and nonscrupled categories. Table A. I also 
shows the numbers of venirepersons removed for cause, those re-
moved by defense peremptory challenges, and those remaining and 
subject to the exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenge. Table 
A.2 shows the equivalent data for venirepersons examined as possi-
ble alternate jurors rather than as jurors. 
Table A.3 shows how the prosecutors used their peremptory chal-
lenges against potential jurors, divided into scrupled and non-
scrupled categories. Table A.3 reveals that for nonscrupled potential 
jurors subject to exercise of prosecutorial peremptory challenge 
(those remaining after challenge for cause and defense perempto-
ries ), the prosecutors challenged 151 out of 502 (30.08%). For scru-
pled potential jurors subject to exercise of prosecutorial peremptory 
challenge, 39 out of 48 (81.25%) were challenged. Given that prose-
cutors used peremptory challenges for 30.08% of nonscrupled poten-
tial jurors, one would expect that 14 or 15 of the 48 scrupled jurors 
would have been challenged. The chances of 39 or more scupled 
potential jurors being removed by prosecutorial peremptory chal-
lenge at random is calculated at fourteen in one hundred billion 
(.000,000,000,14), or the equivalent of7.57 standard deviations. This 
presents an astronomical degree of statistical significance, the 
equivalent of flipping approximately 33 heads in a row with an unbi-
ased coin. 
Moreover, the data demonstrates that the pattern in the use of 
peremptories by the prosecutors produced a substantial under-
represention of scrupled jurors on the jury panels selected. Table 
A.I reveals that 128 out of 1000 (12.8%) venirepersons examined as 
potential jurors expressed opposition to the death penalty, and that 
872 (87.2%) did not. After those excused for cause and by defense 
peremptory challenge were eliminated, 550 venirepersons remained. 
Of these, 48 (8.73%) were scrupled and 502 (91.27%) were non-
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TABLE A.I 
VENIREPERSONS EXAMINED AS POTENTIAL JURORS 
(Based on 30 cases) 
Venire persons Excused by 
Challenged for Challenged for Excused for remaining after defense 
cause by cause by cause by court excuse for peremptory 
prosecutor defense without motion cause challenge 
32 24 55 761 259 
(35.96%) (96%) (74.32%) (93.72%) (98.85%) 
57 1 19 51 3 
(64.04%) (4%) (25.68%) (6.28%) (1.15%) 
89 25 74 812 262 
Subject to exercise of 
prosecutorial peremptory 
challenge (those remaining 







































VENIREPERSONS EXAMINED AS POTENTIAL ALTERNATE JURORS 
(Based on 30 cases) 
Subject to exercise of 
Venire persons Venire persons Excused by prosecutorial peremptory 
examined as Challenged for Challenged for Excused for remaining after defense challenge (those remaining 
potential cause by cause by cause by court excuse for peremptory after excuse for cause and 
alternates prosecutor defense without motion cause challenge defense peremptories) 
97 4 I 5 87 12 75 
(83.62%) (28.57%) (100%) (50%) (95.6%) (100%) (94.94%) 
19 10 0 5 4 0 4 
(16.38%) (71.43%) (0%) (50%) (4.4%) (0%) (5.06%) 
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TABLE A.3 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 










(Based on 30 cases) 
Potential jurors subject to 
exercise of prosecutorial 
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(those remaining after 





















Given that 360 jurors were actually selected, one would expect that 
31 or 32 of them (8.73%) would have been scrupled jurors. In fact, as 
Table A.3 reveals, only 9 scrupled jurors were selected, the remain-
ing 39 having been removed by prosecutorial peremptory challenge. 
The chances of 9 or fewer scrupled jurors being selected at random is 
calculated at approximately 43 out of one million (.000,043), or the 
equivalent of 3.93 standard deviations. This presents a high degree 
of statistical significance, the equivalent of flipping approximately 14 
heads in a row with an unbiased coin. 
In addition, the Swain burden of attributing the underrepresenta-
tive result shown to action of the prosecution rather than the defense 
is met, since prosecution peremptory challenges eliminated 39 of the 
48 scrupled potential jurors who but for these challenges would have 
served on the juries selected. Moreover, even if we consider those 
scrupled potential jurors who were challenged by defense perempto-
ries - adding them to the 48 subject to possible prosecutorial per-
emptory challenges, Tables A. l and A.3 demonstrate that the 
substantial underrepresentation of scrupled jurors that was produced 
is attributable overwhelmingly to prosecutorial action.353 Of the 42 
353. If the above calculation of the effect of prosecutorial peremptory challenges on the 
representative character of juries selected is recomputed by adding back in those potential 
jurors subject to defense peremptory challenge, the results still indicate a statistically signifi-
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potential scrupled jurors removed by either party by means of per-
emptory challenge, 39 (92.86%) were removed by prosecutorial per-
emptories and only 3 (7.14%) by defense peremptories. 
TABLEA.4 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
IN SELECTING ALTERNATE JURORS 
(Based on 30 cases) 
Potential alternates subject 
to exercise of prosecutorial 
peremptory challenge 
(those remaining after Not challenged 
excuse for cause and (those selected as 
defense peremptories) Challenged alternate jurors) 
Nonscrupled 12 63 (not opposed 75 
to death (16%) (84%) 
penalty) 
Scrupled 3 





Table A.4 shows the results equivalent to those shown in Table 
A.3, but for potential alternates, rather than potential jurors. Be-
cause of the relatively small sample size, these numbers do not pro-
vide the same degree of statistical significance conveyed by the data 
in Table A.3, but the trends are qualitatively the same. 
Tables A.5-A. l l show the detailed data used in the multivariate 
analysis to show the effect of potentially confounding variables on 
the study results. 
cant underrepresentation in the number of scrupled jurors selected. Table A. I reveals that 
after those excused for cause were eliminated, 812 potential jurors remained. Fifty-one of 
these were scrupled potential jurors (6.28%) and 761 were non-scrupled (93.72%). Table A.3 
reveals that 360 jurors were actually selected. Given that 360 jurors were actually selected, one 
would expect that 22 or 23 of them (6.28%) would have been scrupled jurors. In fact, as Tables 
A.I and A.3 reveal, only 9 scrupled jurors were selected, the remaining 42 having been re• 
moved by peremptory challenge (39 by prosecutors and 3 by defense attorneys). The chances 
of 9 or fewer scrupled jurors being selected at random is approximately 22 out of 10,000 
(.0022), or the equivalent of 2.85 standard deviations. Moreover, this substantial under• 
representation was produced overwhelmingly by prosecutorial peremptory challenges. Of the 
42 potential scrupled jurors removed by peremptory challenge, 39 (92.86%) were removed by 
prosecutorial peremptories and only 3 (7.14%) by defense peremptories. 
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TABLEA.5 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
BY VENIREPERSON'S SEX AND DEATH 
PENALTY ATTITUDES 




SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL PERSONS 
CHALLENGED 17 81 98 23 82 105 203 
(77.27%) (29.89%) (33.45%) (76.67%) (26.8%) (31.25%) (32.27%) 
NOT 5 190 195 7 224 231 426 
CHALLENGED (22.73%) (70.11%) (66.55%) (23.33%) (73.2%) (68.75%) (67.73%) 
TOTAL 22 271 293 30 306 336 629 
TABLEA.6 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
BY VENIREPERSON'S MARITAL STATUS AND DEATH 
PENALTY ATTITUDES 
(Based on 609 venirepersons) 
MARRIED NOT MARRIED 
TOTAL 
NON- NON- VENIRE-
SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL PERSONS 
CHALLENGED 18 76 94 19 15 94 188 
(64.29%) (19.49%) (22.49%) (90.48%) (44.12%) (49.21%) (30.87%) 
NOT 10 314 324 2 95 97 421 
CHALLENGED (35.71%) (80.51%) (77.51%) (9.52%) (55.88%) (50.79%) (69.13%) 
TOTAL 28 390 418 21 170 191 609 
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TABLEA.7 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
BY VENIREPERSON'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND 
DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES 
(Based on 611 venirepersons) 
EMPLOYED NOT EMPLOYED 
TOTAL 
NON- NON- VENIRE-
SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL PERSONS 
CHALLENGED 25 113 138 11 43 S4 192 
(73.53%) (26.46%) (29.93%) (84.62%) (31.39%) (36%) (31.42%) 
NOT 9 314 323 2 94 96 419 
CHALLENGED (26.47%) (73.54%) (70.07%) (15.38%) (68.61%) (64%) (68.58%) 
TOTAL 34 427 461 13 137 ISO 611 
TABLE A.8 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
BY WHETHER VENIREPERSON KNEW DEFENDANT AND 
DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES 
(Based on 599 venirepersons) 
KNEW DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW DEFENDANT 
TOTAL 
NON- NON- VENIRE-
SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL PERSONS 
CHALLENGED 0 s s 38 151 189 194 
(0%) (83.33%) (83.33%) (76%) (27.81%) (31.87%) (32.39%) 
NOT 0 I 1 12 392 404 405 
CHALLENGED (0%) (16.67%) (16.67%) (24%) (72.19%) (68.13%) (67.61%) 
TOTAL 0 6 6 so S43 S93 S99 
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TABLEA.9 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
BY WHETHER VENIREPERSON WAS UNSUCCESSFULLY 
CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE BY PROSECUTOR* AND 
DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES 
(Based on 629 venirepersons) 
UNSUCCESSFULLY NOT CHALLENGED FOR 
CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE CAUSE 
TOTAL 
NON- NON- VENIRE-
SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL PERSONS 
CHALLENGED 10 7 17 30 156 186 203 
(90.91%) (100%) (94.44%) (73.17%) (27.37%) (30.44%) (32.27%) 
NOT I 0 l 11 414 425 426 
CHALLENGED (9.09%) (0%) (5.56%) (26.83%) (72.63%) (69.56%) (67.73%) 
TOTAL 11 7 18 41 570 611 629 
• As this table includes only venirepersons subject to possible prosecutorial peremptory challenge, it excludes 
those successfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor (as well as those successfully challenged for cause 
by the defense and excused for cause by the court without motion). Table I illustrates those excused for 
cause. 
TABLE A.IO 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
BY WHETHER VENIREPERSON WAS UNSUCCESSFULLY 
CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE BY PROSECUTOR* 
BASED ON DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES AND DEATH 
PENALTY ATTITUDES 
(Based on 629 venirepersons) 
UNSUCCESSFULLY 
CHALLENGED FOR CAUSE NOT CHALLENGED FOR 
BASED ON DEATH PENALTY CAUSE BASED ON DEATH 
ATTITUDES PENALTY ATTITUDES 
TOTAL 
NON- NON- VENIRE-
SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL PERSONS 
CHALLENGED 10 0 10 30 163 193 203 
(100%) (0%) (100%) (71.43%) (28.25%) (31.18%) (32.27%) 
NOT 0 0 0 12 414 426 426 
CHALLENGED (0%) (0%) (0%) (28.57%) (71.75%) (68.82%) (67.73%) 
TOTAL 10 0 10 42 S77 619 629 
• As this table includes only venirepersons subject to possible prosecutorial peremptory challenge, it excludes 
those succesfully challenged for cause by the prosecutor (as well as those successfully challenged for cause 
by the defense and excused for cause by ~e court without motion). Table I illustrates those excused for 
cause. 
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TABLEA.11 
USE OF PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
BY WHETHER VENIREPERSON WAS QUESTIONED BY 
PROSECUTOR ON ABILITY TO BE IMPARTIAL IN DECID-
ING GUILT AND DEATH PENALTY ATTITUDES 
(Based on 629 venirepersons) 
IMPARTIALITY NOT 
IMPARTIALITY QUESTIONED QUESTIONED 
TOTAL 
NON· NON• VENIRE-
SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL SCRUPLED SCRUPLED TOTAL PERSONS 
CHALLENGED 40 149 189 0 14 14 203 
(76.92%) (26.7%) (30.98%) (0%) (73.68%) (73.68%) (32.27%) 
NOT 12 409 421 0 s s 426 
CHALLENGED (23.08%) (73.3%) (69.02%) (0%) (26.32%) (26.32%) (67.73%) 
TOTAL 52 558 610 0 19 19 629 
